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ABSTRACT
Metropolitan areas across the U.S. are characterized by sprawling development
which uses larger amounts of open space than necessary, leads to the inefficient use of
energy and water, increases social inequality, and causes a variety of other negative
externalities. One way to prevent this type of development is to promote coordinated
land use planning at the metropolitan scale. Metropolitan coordination is a challenge,
however, in a country where most land use decisions are made at the local level and most
states have not encouraged regional planning.
This dissertation examines several different models of metropolitan coordination
- or what I call metropolitan governance - and asks how they compare in term of their
relative effectiveness. Given the growing interest in voluntary forms of governance, I
explore whether regional planning agencies without authority are as effective at
influencing local land use planning as regional planning agencies with greater authority.
My research focuses on regional planning agencies in Boston, Denver, and Portland
because each agency has a different level of authority over land use planning and a
different level of control over certain financial tools. My hypothesis is that regional
planning agencies with more tools at their disposal (such as state-mandated planning
authority and the power to allocate transportation improvement funds) will be more
successful at influencing local land use planning so that it meets regional goals. I find
that agencies with financial and regulatory incentives are better able to engage local
stakeholders and influence local land use planning.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence Susskind
Title: Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning
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Research Overview:
Research Question: To what extent do the different levels of authority and types of
responsibilities assigned to metropolitan planning agencies account for their varying
degrees of success in influencing local land use planning so that regional goals are met?
Hypothesis: Metropolitan planning agencies that can (1) use capacity building tools, (2)
provide financial incentives, and (3) take advantage of state mandates
are more likely to be able to bring local land use planning into conformance with
regional goals and objectives than agencies that have only the first two types of influence.
Independent Variables: Type and level of metropolitan planning authority: capacity
building (technical assistance), financial incentives, and regulatory authority (granted by
state legislation).
Dependent Variables: 1) Change in local planning necessary to implement regional
goals and objectives. This is an important variable since local land use decisions add up
and ultimately determine the way each region develops. 2) Change in institutional
relationships between local officials and the metropolitan planning agency. This is an
important variable because stronger ways of ensuring regional cooperation can create
better alignment between regional and local goals.
When metropolitan planning agencies rely entirely on capacity building (technical
assistance and convening stakeholders) as a means of influencing local land use and
growth management decisions, does planning remain local, fragmented, and reactionary
rather than forward looking and coordinated? When local officials have fiscal and
regulatory incentives to cooperate with metropolitan planning agencies do they have a
different relationship with the officials involved? Are they encouraged to work together
with other local officials and to think "regionally"? Planning in a metropolitan setting in
which the metro agency has additional authority and tools at its disposal should look
quite different from planning in a weak metropolitan framework, but does it?
Capacity building by metropolitan planning agencies includes a number of
activities designed to improve the local planning capabilities. These technical assistance
strategies often hinge on providing geo-coded information to localities (GIS) about
existing social and environmental conditions as well as offering advice of various kinds.
Metropolitan planning agencies can exert influence over local land use planning by
offering model bylaws, helping communities prepare plans, and advising them on how to
best meet federal and state regulatory requirements. Finally, metropolitan planning
agencies can provide capacity building assistance to localities by bringing together
elected and appointed municipal officials to discuss common challenges and propose
joint solutions to shared problems. Capacity building is the weakest approach to
metropolitan planning because local governments can ignore whatever information and
advice the metro agency provides.
A second level of influence that metropolitan planning agencies can pursue is
providing financial incentives to municipalities to comply with regional goals. One way
this can be accomplished is by providing operating or capital improvement grants of
various kinds. Some metropolitan planning agencies are the officially designated
Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO) for their region. This gives them the
advantage of being able to provide financial incentives in the form of access to federal
Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) money to municipalities that work with
them.
Finally, metropolitan planning agencies that have the formal statutory authority to
require all local plans to take account of regional goals and objectives, or have the power
to reject or override local growth management decisions, have a very
important additional level of authority.
My research question is, "To what extent do these different levels of influence and
authority account for the different degrees of success that metropolitan planning agencies
have in shaping municipal land use planning so that regional goals are met?" Are
localities less likely to be influenced by capacity building in the absence of additional
metro agency authority? If there are communities that have been convinced to alter
their land use plans through the influence wielded by metropolitan agencies offering only
capacity building, why and how has this worked?
I argue that metropolitan planning agencies that are able to move from capacity
building to financial incentives to rejecting or overriding local land use decisions will be
increasingly effective at ensuring that local plans are consistent with regional goals and
objectives.
Introduction
By 2020, the U.S. population will have increased by 64 million people (23
percent) beyond current levels.' Where will we house these 64 million new residents'?
Anthony Downs, a leading urban scholar, warns that the majority of the new
development will come in the form of sprawl, low-density development on the outer
fringes of metropolitan regions. This is bad news because we know that sprawl is
inefficient and causes a number of environmental, social and economic problems. How
will we provide services for these 64 million new Americans when we lack the fiscal
resources to even maintain our existing infrastructure, let alone develop new roads,
schools and sewage treatment plants? How will we handle more cars in our already
congested metropolitan areas when the average American already spends 55 eight-hour
workdays driving every year?2 How will we deal with more air pollution when according
to the American Lung Association, in 2002, 137 million Americans (about half of all
Americans) already live in counties with air pollution problems? 3 What will more cars
mean for greenhouse emissions given current concerns about climate change? When we
already lose about 400,000 acres of open space to development every year (about 1,100
acres per day), we have to ask ourselves how many more acres we can afford to lose to
urban and suburban development? 4 These questions remain largely unanswered, but they
Commentary by Anthony Downs. Online at https://www.planetizen.com/nodc/51 [last accessed April 24,
2007]
2 Sierra Club, "Sprawl Overview." Online at http://www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/overview [last accessed on
April 25, 2007]
3 Sierra Club Report (2004), "Highway Health Hazards," p. 2. Online at
http://www.sierraclub.org/sprawL/report04 hig hwayhealth/ [last accessed on August 15, 2007]
4 Sierra Club Report (1998), "Sprawl: The Dark Side of the American Dream." Online at
http://www.sierrac lub. org/sprawl/report98/report.asp [last accessed on April 25, 2007]
remind us that each urban development decision we make has an impact on the quality of
life we experience now and in the future. They also remind us of the importance of
metropolitan planning.
Anthony Downs sees sprawl in America's future because "[a]s long as power over
land-use decisions and housing location remains totally in the hands of local
governments, their continued support of exclusionary local zoning rules will dominate
future urban policy." 5 Downs is not alone in this assessment. For decades American
planners and scholars have argued that the problem facing metropolitan areas is the
fragmented nature of land use planning control in the U.S. These same analysts suggest
that the only effective solution is some form of metropolitan coordination. While the call
for a metropolitan solution has been heard for many decades, metropolitan planning still
takes place at the margin because planning continues to be controlled by local
governments. Most metropolitan regions in the United States have made some attempt to
shift to metropolitan governance -- whether through a Metropolitan Planning
Organization (MPO), a Council of Governments (COG), a regional planning authority, a
metropolitan transportation authority, or a combination of these; however, metropolitan
agencies serve primarily as advisors to local governments. Only in recent years have a
few metropolitan agencies been granted more authority by state governments to insist on
metropolitan coordination of land use planning and development.
Metropolitan or area-wide planning can happen in several ways. First,
communities can come together voluntarily to share ideas and work together to solve
5 Commentary by Anthony Downs. Online at https://www.planetizen.com/node/51 [last accessed on April
24, 2007]
certain problems. This is the weakest, but most prevalent form of metropolitan
governance in the United States. These arrangements are often codified as Councils of
Governments (COGs), membership organizations of local governments. COGs rely
primarily on capacity building as a strategy for ensuring metropolitan coordination and
promoting various regional initiatives.
Communities can also jointly create a new metropolitan or area-wide planning
agency with sufficient resources to gather information, undertake professional
assessments, prepare regional plans, and help build local planning capacity. Such moves
may be prompted by state government or by local leaders who believe that voluntary
cooperation on an issue-by-issue basis is not enough to counteract the negative
consequences of unmanaged growth. Sometimes Councils of Governments can play the
part of regional planning agencies. In other instances, entirely new regional entities are
created. Regional or metropolitan planning agencies often lack any regulatory authority
or control over fiscal incentives. Instead, they rely on consensus-based capacity building
strategies, which encourage stakeholders to come together to discuss regional goals. As a
result, in most metropolitan areas in the United States implementation of area-wide goals
and objectives is pretty much at the mercy of local governments.
Metropolitan planning is strengthened when the metropolitan or regional planning
agency is designated by the federal government as the Metropolitan Planning
Organization (MPO) under the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation
Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) legislation (previously known as the
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA)). There are 384 Metropolitan
Planning Organizations in the U.S. 178 of them are also the regional councils for the area
with the same geography.' MPOs provide local input for the programming of federal
transportation funds in cities with more than 50,000 people.
Finally, in rare cases, states grant metropolitan planning agencies sufficient
authority to veto certain local land use decisions and require plan consistency. That
means that metro agencies can require localities to redo their master plans to ensure that
zoning and other local land development regulations are consistent with regional goals
and objectives. When metropolitan planning agencies have this level of authority, threats
of vetoes over local decisions can be used to require more extensive consideration of each
community's responsibility to the larger region. The effect should be that local land use
planning reflects regional goals rather than an amalgamation of many, often conflicting,
local decisions that fail to take into consideration the spillover effects of local decisions.
Is there any way for metropolitan planning agencies without the power to grant
financial incentives or the authority to reject local land use decisions to be just as
effective at influencing local planning decisions? Or are localities much less likely to be
influenced by offers of technical assistance when metropolitan planning agencies lack
real financial incentives or legal authority to override local decision-making? What
happens when on top of capacity building assistance a metropolitan planning agency is
also the MPO and can offer substantial financial incentives? Can such an agency be
effective? And finally, what happens when a metropolitan agency has a full toolbox
available to it with capacity building, financial incentives, and authority over local land
use decisions? Is it sure to be effective in bringing local planning into conformance with
6 National Association of Regional Councils, "What is A Metropolitan Planning Organization?" Online at
http://narc.org/regional-councils-npos/what-is-a-metropolitan-planning-organization.htnl [last accessed on
June 11, 2007]
regional goals and objectives? This dissertation explores what capacity building looks
like and how effective it is when agencies do or don't have other levels of authority as
well. Then it examines the relative effectiveness of metropolitan planning agencies in a
position to offer financial incentives and those that offer financial assistance and
regulatory incentives.
I argue that metropolitan planning agencies that are able to move from capacity
building to providing financial incentives to mandating local land use changes will be
more effective at getting local land use planning to take account of the spillover effects of
development within their borders. Metropolitan planning agencies that know how to
wield capacity building assistance, allocate financial incentives of various kinds, and
exert regulatory authority will be better able to meet regional goals.
Structure of Argument: Capacity Building, Incentives, and Regulation:
Capacity
Buildino
Capacity
Building +
Incentives
Capacity Building
+ Incentives +
Regulatory
Authority
Lack of mechanisms for
implementation of regional plans
Metropolitan planning is
marginally effective because
localities plan according to their
own logic without concern for the
regional impact of local planning
decisions. For the most part, the
metropolitan plan is not
implemented.
Metropolitan planning is more
effective because officials start to
view local planning decisions in
the context of the regional goals.
Local planning acknowledges the
regional plan, but local decisions
shape regional development and
not the other way around. Parts
of the regional plan that local
officials feel is in their best
interest may be implemented.
Metropolitan planning is most
effective because local planning
decisions have to be consistent
with regional plans. The logic of
planning also shifts so that it is no
longer a purely local activity.
The likelihood that the regional
plan will be implemented at the
local level increases.
Some mechanisms for implementation
and authority to require some local
comphiance with regional plans
Metropolitan Types
Metropolitan agencies that rely on capacity building, capacity building and
control over financial incentive (when the metropolitan planning agency is also the
MPO), and capacity building, MPO status, and state mandated authority employ these
different tools and levels of authority to shape regional land use planning. While each
metropolitan planning agency has a similar goal: to promote sustainable development
through regional cooperation, each is empowered or hamstrung by the statutory mandate
granted to it by the state, its status as an MPO, the way it is funded, and its relationship to
the electorate-at-large. These differences, I believe, are critical to its capacity to
influence local implementation of area-wide planning goals.
All three metropolitan planning types engage in capacity building. This includes
providing information to localities about existing socio-economic and environmental
conditions -- often through GIS data -- as well as providing a forum for discussion about
shared problems. They also provide technical planning assistance to communities that do
not have sufficient staff. These agencies seek to influence local planning practices by
offering model bylaws, helping communities update master plans, and advising them on
complicated growth management choices. Capacity building also takes the form of
bringing regional stakeholders together so that they better understand each others'
concerns. A regional visioning process involving local politicians, citizens, and planners
can be used to formulate a shared sense of how the metropolitan area should grow and
develop. Tools like these can be used by metropolitan planning agencies to change the
way local stakeholders behave. By providing regular forums for discussion, metro
agencies can facilitate a deeper understanding of the interconnections between what one
locality does and the effects on others. They can shape current thinking about what "best
practice" requires. Local planners can use the results of such conversations to argue
more effectively within their own communities for changes of various kinds.
Metropolitan planning agencies that are also the MPO for the region have the
added advantage of being able to provide financial incentives in the form of access to
Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) funds. Finally, metropolitan planning
agencies that have the power to require consistency of local plans with regional goals are
provided with another level of authority over local land use decisions.
I examine whether having more authority matters by interviewing regional and
local officials (local planners, citizens, real estate developers, planners in the
metropolitan planning agency, and board or council members of the metropolitan
planning agencies) in metropolitan planning agencies of different types about the
relationship between local and metropolitan planning. I explore whether regional
planning decisions have actually been modified at the local level through incentives and
regulations. In addition, to show how the agency engages local stakeholders, I study the
relationship of each metropolitan planning agency to its constituents.
Through a case study method, I evaluate the ability of metropolitan agencies, with
varying degrees of authority, to influence development decisions of regional significance,
promote inter-municipal cooperation, and to encourage local planning that conforms with
and is guided by a regional vision. My research uses the comparative method to 1)
examine several kinds of evidence regarding the ways in which different levels of
metropolitan authority have and have not been used to produce more "regionally
regarding" land use decisions; and 2) explore the mechanisms used by metropolitan
planning agencies to alter local land use decisions.
I use the 'comparative method' and examine qualitative information in three
metropolitan areas (using a common set of tools for inquiry). According to Arend
Lijphart, using the comparative method to look carefully at a small number of cases can
be "more promising than a more superficial statistical analysis of many cases." 7 While
the drawback of the comparative method and case study research is that it examines
relatively few situations and cannot eliminate rival hypotheses with certainty, the upside
is that the comparative method and case study research can often get at information that
is not available using statistical analysis. I have chosen a qualitative research design
because I believe the relationship between metropolitan planning agencies and local land
use planning can best be understood through in-depth questioning.
Case Selection
I chose my three particular case study areas because of the differing levels of
authority assigned to the metropolitan agency in each case. More specifically, they vary
in the amount of authority they have been granted by the state and the ability of each
agency to deploy capacity building, financial incentives, and regulatory authority. In
making my initial selection of cases, I asked:
s Does the metropolitan planning agency primarily rely on capacity building and
voluntary measures to accomplish its goals?
e Does the metropolitan entity have statutory authority to influence local land use
planning?
7 Lijphart, Arend, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." American Political Science
Review 65, no. 3 (Sep., 1971): 685, 682-693.
Does the state mandate consistency between regional and local plans?
- Does the regional planning agency have the authority and the political
wherewithal to veto local planning decisions?
- Is the metropolitan planning agency counted on by the state to implement or
amplify certain state land use policies?
What capacity does the metropolitan entity have to raise, allocate, and spend
money?
Is the metropolitan planning agency the MPO for the region?
My first case, the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC) in Boston,
represents a planning agency that relies entirely on capacity building. The Boston region
has a relatively weak system of metropolitan governance because of the strong tradition
of home rule in Massachusetts.' MAPC, a council of 101 cities and towns, relies
primarily on capacity building to influence local planning. By comparison, regional
planning agencies in Denver and Portland, my second and third case studies, have more
authority through their control over the allocation of federal transportation funding
(because the metropolitan planning agency is also the MPO). My second case, the
Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG), a voluntary association of 52 local
governments, relies on capacity building, but is also the MPO for the region. DRCOG is
the metropolitan planning agency, the MPO, and the state- mandated body for permitting
8 Some states are governed by home rule and others are governed by Dillon's rule. Home rule means that
local governments can assume roles that are not specifically prohibited to them by state statutes and the
state constitution. Supreme Court Justice John F. Dillon's 1872 treatise on the City of Clinton v. Cedar
Rapids and Missouri River Railroad Company, 24 Iowa 455 (1868) is referred to as Dillon's rule. Dillon's
Rule "asserts that there are no such things as inherent rights of local self-government." Dillon's rule
granted more authority to the State. For more information see Dillon 's Rule: Good or Badfor Local
Governments? League of Women Voters Education Fund, October 2004. Online at http://www.lwv-
fairfax.org/LWV-Dillon-DTP-99041 .pdf [last accessed June 11, 2007].
regional water and sewer facilities. Finally, my third case, Portland Metro, uses capacity
building techniques, is also the MPO, and has state mandated authority over land use.
Portland Metro is the metropolitan planning agency as well as the MPO for the 25 cities
and three counties in the Portland metropolitan area. It also administers the Urban
Growth Boundary (UGB) for the region and controls a number of land use planning
functions under Oregon state law. Metro's authority comes from Oregon's strong state
land use planning regulations.
My three basic cases are informed by smaller 'mini-cases' in each region about
the development of 'regionally significant projects.' Analysis of 'regionally significant
projects,' such as the development of 12,000 acres in the Damascus Boring Area in the
Portland region, the South Weymouth Naval Air Station redevelopment in the Boston
region, or the 40-square mile Lowry Range in the Denver region, provide insight into
how the metropolitan planning agency deals with projects that will affect the whole
region and may or may not match with the metropolitan planning agencies plans and
goals for the region. I also study the local implementation of regional policies such as the
urban growth boundary in Denver and Portland.
My cases are 'comparable' 9 because they are matched in many ways (all three are
metropolitan planning agencies in the U.S. which engage in capacity building, have
similar goals of influencing local planning, and operate in similarly sized regions) and
differ in important ways (they have different authority given to them by the federal
government and the state and they have different tools available to them to influence
9 While my three case study areas vary in size, physical form, demographic composition, and growth rates,
all three have invested considerable resources in metropolitan visioning exercises with the goal of creating
a regional plan that will be implemented locally.
local planning). Table I describes the differences among the three metropolitan
planning agencies that I studied.
Table 1: Varying Degrees of Metro Planning Authority
t0 David Collier, "The Comparative Method: Two Decades of Change," in Comparative Political
Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives, ed. Dankward Rustow and Kenneth Erickson (USA: Harper
Collins, 1991), 10-11.
Weak (Boston) Moderate (Denver) Strong (Portland)
Primarily Capacity Building Some Capacity Building Some Capacity Building
Not MPO MPO MPO
(member of MPO
Voluntary regional plan Voluntary regional plan that Regional plan that requires
relies primarily on "good consistency with local plans
will" and "peer pressure"
Weak state planning Moderate state planning Strong state planning
framework that does not framework that grants framework that grants
grant metro planning metro planning agency metro planning agency
agency authority some authority over authority over determining
decisions such as large- shape of region (i.e. Urban
scale water and sewer Growth Boundary)
development
Forum for regional dialogue Forum for regional dialogue Forum for regional dialogue
Providing technical Providing technical Providing technical
assistance for planning assistance for planning assistance for lannin
Provides other benefits of Provides other benefits of Provides other benefits of
membership to the member membership to the member membership to the member
communities such as communities such as communities such as
helping them lobby the state helping them lobby the state helping them lobby the state
legislature or helping them legislature or helping them legislature or helping them
get "bulk" discounts when get "bulk" discounts when get "bulk" discounts when
they cooperate they cooperate. Operates they cooperate. Operates
regional activities such as regional services such as
the ride-share and services solid waste, recycling, and
for the elderly the zoo
Meitropolitin Area Planning Council (MA PC)
In Boston, MAPC tries to convince 101 cities and towns in the region that there
are economic and environmental reasons to think beyond their borders. MAPC does its
metropolitan planning work in the context of a weak state planning system. It is a voting
member of the Boston Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO), but it does not have
full control over the $424.4 million dollars ("of non-Artery highway funds, both federal
and state") earmarked for the Transportation Improvement Program from 2007-2010."
Without control over the Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) budget as a carrot
or a strong state land use planning system as a stick, MAPC staff members have to be
extremely creative to make their policies economically and politically relevant to their
101 member cities and towns. MAPC uses capacity building tools to work with member
municipalities to promote smart growth development goals. These goals are consistent
with a regional vision that the agency has developed. Given the fiscal and political
constraints that local governments face, implementing regional policies at the local level
is often difficult. Recently, MAPC has undergone a "rebirth" under the leadership of a
new executive director (who was formally a member of the state legislature). The agency
has organized a regional visioning process called MetroFuture. While MAPC hopes that
MetroFuture will reinvigorate regional planning in the Boston area, it will have to do so
in the context of a weak state planning framework.
1 Central Transportation Planning Staff, p. 6. Online at http://www.ctps.org/bostonrnpo/resources/tip/2007-
2010TIP.pdf [last accessed on March 6, 2007]
Denver Regional Council of Gover'nnents- DRCOG
The second area, metropolitan Denver, has a stronger system of metropolitan
governance - primarily because DRCOG, the metropolitan planning agency is also the
MPO and controls federal transportation funds. In 2004, DRCOG obligated $229.7
million dollars to 129 transportation projects.12 Fifty percent went to highway projects
($115.8 million), 40 percent went to transit projects ($91.2 million), 9 percent went to
other air quality projects ($20 million), and 1 percent went to bicycle and pedestrian
projects ($2.3 million).13 DRCOG uses its TIP funding as a mechanism to promote the
adoption of regional policies. Transportation projects that implement the goals of the
Metro Vision 2030 regional plan are rated higher in the TIP process. DRCOG also has a
state and federal mandate for "regional water quality planning in the Denver region." 4
This gives DRCOG the ability to accept or reject the development of water and sewer
projects that are part of any large-scale development effort. DRCOG has created a
regional plan known as Metro Vision 2030, a voluntary urban growth boundary (UGB),
and a voluntary agreement among counties and municipalities known as the Mile High
Compact (MHC). The Mile High Compact, signed in 2000, obliges signatory counties
and cities to abide by the planning and development principles put forward in the Metro
Vision plan. The signatories also agree to plan within the framework of the urban growth
boundary. As a result of the Mile High Compact and Denver's voluntary urban growth
1 Denver Regional Council of Governments (2004). Draft Annual Listing of Federally Obligated Projects
FY2004, p. 3. Online at http://www.drcog.org/documents/FY2004ObligatedProjectList.pdf [last accessed
on March 6, 2007]
13 Denver Regional Council of Governments (2004). Draft Annual Listing of Federally Obligated Projects
FY2004, p. 3.
1 Denver Regional Council of Governments. Online at
http://www.drcog.org/index.cfm'?page=WaterResources [last accessed March 7, 2007]
boundary, DRCOG has been cited as a leader in making voluntary regionalism work."5
However, my research questions whether the success of Denver depends on the voluntary
nature of its approach, or on the fact that DRCOG has authority over transportation funds
that it leverages to promote local conformance with regional goals.
Portland Metro
My third case, Portland Metro, is often discussed as the premier example of
metropolitan governance in America; however, practitioners and academics have recently
started to doubt the viability and replicability of the Portland model.16 Portland is the
only metropolitan area in the U.S. with a seven member elected metropolitan council,
authority over federal transportation money because it is the MPO, and control over the
region's urban growth boundary. In the 2006-2009 Transportation Improvement
Program (TIP) cycle, Metro allocated $385 million of state and federal revenue. About
$240.4 million went to Tri-Met, the regional public transportation system, but $114
million was allocated to "regionally flexible funds" that Metro allocates to the region."
The money that Metro controls as the MPO is needed by localities to maintain and
improve their transportation infrastructure. As a result, local officials pay attention to
Metro and participate in Metro's planning efforts. State growth management regulation
also gives Metro the authority to determine the urban growth boundary for the region and
15 Kathleen McCormick, "Regional Thinking," Urban Land (September 2006).
16 Myron Orfield, Carl Abbott, and Arthur Nelson see Portland as a model of regional governance.
However, Robert Bruegmann, Stanley Staley, Gerard Milner, and David Luberoff raise doubts about
Portland's desirability and replicabilty. This is discussed more in the Portland chapter.
17 Portland Metro. Metropolitan Transportation Improvement Program 2006-2009, Metro Resolution, No.
05-3606, p. 1-4. Online at http://www.metro-region .oru/Iibrary docs/trans/mtipweb.pdf [last accessed on
March 7, 2007]
constrain local land use planning. Under Oregon state law every city must have an urban
growth boundary that determines which land is urban and which will remain agricultural.
In the Portland metropolitan area, Metro is responsible for determining the UGB and
ensuring that there is a 20-year supply of available land for urban development within the
boundary. Every five years, the Metro Council reviews the land supply and decides
whether to expand the Urban Growth Boundary. The state legislature has also granted
Metro specific "land-use planning powers including: coordinating between regional and
local comprehensive plans in adopting a regional urban growth boundary; requiring
consistency of local comprehensive plans with statewide and regional planning goals;
planning for activities of metropolitan significance including (but not limited to)
transportation, water quality, air quality and solid waste."18 Portland Metro's
combination of capacity building tools, control over financial incentives, and ability to
wield regulatory authority make it an interesting comparative case.
Measuring Varying Levels of Authority
A metropolitan plan may look good on paper, but in the American system of
fragmented government, it is up to the municipalities involved to implement such plans.
As a result, metropolitan planning depends on the attitude and behavior of localities. If
metropolitan governance is the key to solving metropolitan problems, the metro agency
must be able to change the way localities make decisions. In Boston, Denver, and
Portland I look for evidence that the metro agency has, in fact, been able to do that. I
look for various indications that local officials are paying attention to the metropolitan
18 Portland Metro. Online at http://www.netro-region.org/article.cfm?articlelD=277 [last accessed on
March 7, 2007]
plan, that metropolitan policies are being implemented by localities, and that regional-
scale projects are being adapted to take account of metropolitan goals (see Table 2).
Rather than quantify the outcomes of metropolitan planning using numerical
indicators, I look for instances in which the key political and non-governmental actors
cite specific changes in local land use decision-making as evidence of the influence of the
metropolitan agency. I then try to mine these examples to find whatever supportive
evidence there might be to back up claims of metropolitan influence. Instances when
local officials appear to be ignoring regional plans, making planning decisions that
contradict the area-wide plan, or planning with a purely local focus are counted as
evidence of a lack of metro effectiveness.
Since the effectiveness of metropolitan planning is dependent on the extent to
which metropolitan planning can influence local land use choices, I look for 'observable
implications' that metropolitan planning agencies cause changes in local behavior. So,
for example, if a metropolitan planning agency is effective at influencing local planning,
we should expect to see localities adopt regional policies, local officials talk about how
they have changed their planning behavior as a result of the regional plan, 'projects of
regional significance' that are consistent with regional plan or goals, changes in
metropolitan land use patterns should reflect the goals of the metropolitan plan (i.e.,
denser development, transit-oriented development, communities following the urban
growth boundary, communities changing zoning to match regional plan goals), local
elected officials attending the meetings of the metropolitan planning agency, and local
communities working together to address problems that they share (see Table 2).
Table 2:
Observable Implications of the Effectiveness of a Metropolitan Planning Agency
If a metropolitan planning agency is If a metropolitan planning agency is
effective at influencing local planning, ineffective at influencing local planning,
we should expect to see we should expect to see
Regional policies are adopted by Regional policies are ignored by localities
localities
Local officials talk about how they have Local officials talk about how they do not
changed their planning behavior as a alter their planning behavior as a result of the
result of the regional plan regional plan
Plan consistency between local and Lack of plan consistency between the local
regional plan and regional plan
The metropolitan planning agency has The metropolitan planning agency does not
some influence over the development of have a say in the development of 'projects of
'projects of regional significance.' regional significance.' Projects are not
Projects should be consistent with the consistent with the regional plan and/or
regional plan and/or vision for the region vision for the region. Local communities
develop projects without regards to regional
implications
Changes in metropolitan land use Metropolitan land use patterns do not reflect
patterns that reflect the goals of the the goals of the metropolitan plan (i.e.,
metropolitan plan (i.e., denser communities continue to have large lot
development, transit-oriented zoning, develop in areas not consistent with
development, communities following the the regional plan, prevent the development of
urban growth boundary, communities affordable housing, etc.)
changing zoning to match regional plan
goals)
Language used by local planning Language used by local planning officials
officials recognizes the importance of privileges local concerns over regional
metropolitan coordination concerns
Local elected officials see the Local elected officials do not see the
metropolitan planning agency as relevant metropolitan planning agency as relevant to
to the work they are doing so they attend the work they are doing so they do not
the meetings of the metropolitan regularly attend the meetings at the
planning agency and are actively metropolitan planning agency and are not
involved with olicy-making activel involved with olic -making
Local communities work together to Local communities continue to focus
address problems that they share. We see primarily on their own bottom line. We see
instances of inter-local cooperation evidence that communities are suing each
whether it be through revenue sharing, other over development (i.e. competing for
working together to bring a project to the shopping malls, industrial areas, etc.)
area, or sharing the cost of infrastructure
development andaratielmtrooltapaninagnc _ad _reno
Selection of 'Mini-Cases'
I chose to look at specific incidences of how metropolitan planning agencies
influenced local land use planning by examining 'projects of regional significance' and
the local implementation of regional policies such as the urban growth boundary. In
Boston, I examine three 'regionally significant projects' and the role that MAPC played
in the way they unfolded: 1) the reuse of the South Weymouth Naval Air Base, a 1,442
square acre site which was decommissioned in 1997, 2) the Assembly Square area (145
acres) where the IKEA corporation wanted to locate a large store in a dense residential
area causing years of controversy; and 3) the Westwood Station development involving
the creation of a new transit-oriented development community (on 135 acres). In all
three instances, MAPC commented on the projects at various points, but its influence
appears to have been quite limited.
In Denver, the voluntary Urban Growth Boundary and the Mile High Compact
have been cited as evidence that voluntary regional cooperation works. I look at the
controversy over the State Land Board's proposal to develop the 40-square mile Lowry
Range. The project is outside of the Urban Growth Boundary, is not included in
DRCOG's Metro Vision 2030 plan, and contradicts the plan's goal of emphasize infill
rather than greenfield development. Finally, I examine the role DRCOG played in the
construction of the Denver International Airport, which opened in 1995.
In Portland, I examine what happened when two communities in the region
wanted to expand their industrial areas, but needed permission from Metro. I focus on
the cities of Cornelius and Hillsboro. I also examine how the adoption of Metro's 2040
Regional Plan changed the zoning of the City of Gresham and the effects this had.
Finally, I study the Damascus Boring area, 12,000 acres of undeveloped land at the edge
of the Portland Metro region that was added to the Urban Growth Boundary in 2002. The
Damascus Boring case is an example of how Metro's authority over the UGB can
determine where regional growth will take place. However, without sufficient funds or
attention to economic conditions, the planning and large-scale infrastructure required for
development cannot be provided.
Table 3: Projects and Policies with Regional Significance
Metropolitan Regionally Regionally Regionally
Regions with Significant Significant Significant
Varying Degrees Project/Policy #1 Project/Policy #2 Project/Policy #3
of Metropolitan
Agency Authority
Boston (MAPC) Assembly Square South Weymouth Westwood Station
Naval Air Base
Denver (DRCOG) Lowry Range New DIA Airport Urban Growth
Project Boundary and
Mile High
Compact
Portland (Metro) City of Cornelius Rezoning to meet Damascus Boring
and City of 2040 objectives.
Hillsboro's desire Particularly
for more industrial Gresham where
areas rejected by local zoning was
Metro changed to meet
metropolitan goals
Data Collection
My research in the Boston, Denver, and Portland metropolitan areas was infonned
by in-depth interviews with between 25-35 metropolitan planning agency staff and board
members, local planners, and municipal officials in each region. Each interview was
aimed at searching for evidence that metropolitan planning and governance is influencing
local behavior. I accomplished this by exploring the relationship between the metro
planning agency and local officials and through specific inquiries into whether
'regionally significant projects' are influenced by the metropolitan agency and if so,
how.' 9
In each region, I worked directly with the metropolitan agency to identify possible
municipal officials and local leaders to interview in-depth. I asked for suggestions about
communities that spanned a range of relationships with the metropolitan planning agency.
I also asked about projects of regional significance that were indicative of the
metropolitan planning agency's relationship with local communities. At MAPC, I had
the advantage of working there in the Summer of 2005 so I learned what staff members
thought about their interactions with specific municipalities.20 In Portland (Summer
2006) and Denver (Winter 2007), officials at DRCOG and Metro were helpful in pointing
out areas of agreement and disagreement between the metropolitan planning agencies and
19 Do the plans made at the local level reference the goals set at the metropolitan level? Do local planning
stakeholders feel that the metropolitan plans and goals have relevance to their work? What are some of the
mechanisms that encourage or discourage the incorporation of the ideas set forth in the metropolitan goal
setting?
20 In Boston, I spent the summer of 2005 as a Rappaport Fellow working at MAPC and interviewing 25
local land use planners and citizen activists about how land use decisions were made in four cities and
towns (Framingham, Marlborough, Acton, and Boxborough) along Route 1-495 (the outer circumferential
road around Boston).2 Since I was a member of a team studying a total of eight municipalities (the other
four were Franklin, Carlisle, Westford, and Hopkinton), I was able to compare my finding with those of the
other researchers. With a sample of eight case studies, we were able to find some important similarities
and difference in how local land use planning is conducted in the Boston region. In general, we found that
MAPC had very little influence over local land use planning.
localities. They suggested 'regionally significant' policies and projects I could
investigate.
I started with a short list of metropolitan planning agency staff and board
members as well as local planning and elected officials to talk with about the
effectiveness of the metropolitan agency. I met with each official for about an hour and
asked him/her a series of open ended questions about his/her communities' relationship
with the metropolitan agency, areas of agreement and disagreement, perceptions of
effectiveness and ineffectiveness, evidence of specific policy change as a result of the
metropolitan agency, openness of the metropolitan agency to the concerns of the
localities, concerns facing localities that were not addressed by the metropolitan agency,
degree to which metropolitan agency directly affected the planning work they did.21 I
asked interviewees to recommend additional interviewees. Based on these
recommendations, I made appointments with another round of interviewees.
Interviewees in the second tier were asked to recommend still other interviewees. I
continued to conduct interviews in this way until I started to hear the same stories over
and over again.
In each region, I made sure to interview officials from different communities so I
would have a sense of the different relationships that communities have with the
metropolitan agency. This approach allowed me to determine which policies were
universally accepted or rejected, and which ones were favored or rejected by particular
communities. This range of experience and opinion helped me understand how
metropolitan policies are perceived differently throughout the region.
21 Here it is important to note that in order to allow interviewees to speak freely, I promised them that I
would only list their names at the end of each case study, but that I would refer to them as 'one local
official' or 'one planning director' to protect their anonymity.
For my 'nini-cases' examining 'projects of regional significance,' I examined
project plans, proposals, newspaper accounts, and published research papers. After I
drafted each case study (the larger region case study as well as the 'mini-cases'), I sent
drafts to the officials I had interviewed to see if they have any comments. This was an
important means of ensuring the validity of my findings.
Contribution to Practice and Literature
Urban planners and policy makers have argued that metropolitan coordination
may be the solution to much of the unplanned, inequitable, and sprawling development
taking place in the United States and elsewhere. According to the literature, the quality
of life in metropolitan areas (fiscal and environmental sustainability, fair access to
housing, schools, transportation, employment, community infrastructure and public
services) hinges on regional growth being coordinated through a system of metropolitan
governance rather than remaining the product of individual development decisions
regulated solely at the local level. However, despite calls for metropolitan solutions,
metropolitan governance in the U.S. continues to be weak and ineffective. In the 2000s,
the focus has shifted to "voluntary" regionalism characterized by capacity building,
consensus building, deliberative democracy, social capital formation, and networking
rather than top-down, command-and-control models of metropolitan government.22 This
22 See Judith E. Innes and David Booher, "The Impact of Collaborative Planning on Governance Capacity."
Institute for Urban and Regional Development. (University of California at Berkeley, April 2003.
Working Paper 2003-03). Online at http://www-iurd.ccd.berkeley.edu/pub/WP-2003-03.pdf [last accessed
August 19, 2007]. See also, Elinor Ostrom, "The Danger of Self-Evident Truths," PS: Political Science and
Politics 33, no. 1. (Mar., 2000): 33-44. See also, Oakerson, Ronald, "The Study of Metropolitan
Governance," in Metropolitan Governance: Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation, ed. Richard Feiock
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004). See also, Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy,
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984). See also, Jane Mansbridge, "Practice-Thought-
Practice," in Deepening Democracy, eds. Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (New York: Verso, 2003).
research directly tackles the question of whether these more voluntary approaches are
effective.
Metropolitan scholars are also reluctant to quantify the effectiveness of different
governance systems or to explain why different systems of metropolitan governance do
or don't work to influence local land use decisions. Part of the difficulty of measuring
the effectiveness of metropolitan intervention is that the Census data does not match
areas coincident with the authority of metro agencies. As a result, it is difficult to assess
the impact that policies set by an agency have on an area. In addition, there are many
other variables besides metropolitan governance which may be equally or more important
in explaining changes that occur. For example, rapid development of land in one
metropolitan area may be a result of a strong economy, specific to that region, rather than
the failure of metropolitan policy. Similarly, housing trends may be different in each
metropolitan area as a result of historical development patterns rather than specific
policies initiated by a metropolitan agency. The age of the housing stock and
infrastructure may play a significant role in dictating the physical form of the region, so
the Boston region may have a better regional transportation system as a result of its
history rather than because of metropolitan policy or governance. Since it is difficult to
disaggregate these variables and say with certainty that particular outcomes are a direct
result of metropolitan policies, I have taken a different approach. Through my interviews
with local officials, I try to determine how local land use decisions regarding specific
projects of regional significance were shaped or changed by the metro agency's
See also, Feiock, Richard, Jill Tao, and Linda Johnson, "Institutional Collective Action," in Metropolitan
Governance: Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation, ed. Richard Feiock (Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press, 2004).
intervention or lack thereof. Thus, I rely on the first-hand reports of the individuals most
involved to evaluate the effectiveness of metropolitan planning agencies. This is a
different approach from most previous studies. And, because I have multiple informants
in each case, I can triangulate what they have to say.
Structure of the Dissertation
Chapter one focuses on the literature on metropolitan governance and planning. I
examine the problem that metropolitan governance is supposed to solve. I also explore
the growing literature on more voluntary forms of regional governance. Chapter two
looks at the Metropolitan Area Planning Council in Boston. The chapter explores how
despite the limits to MAPC's authority the agency manages to indirectly influence local
land use policies. Chapter three looks at DRCOG and demonstrates how the move to
becoming the MPO changes the way that local officials interact with the metropolitan
planning agency. I also find that the voluntary regionalism that DRCOG is known for
has limitations because it is purposefully vague and lacks enforcement. Chapter four
looks at Portland Metro. I discover that the view of Portland Metro as a top-down,
regulatory agency that ignores local concerns is not true. Instead, local elected officials
are active participants in Portland's metropolitan governance. Chapter five draws
conclusions from all three case studies to develop a new framework for understanding
how metropolitan planning agencies' different levels and types of authority influence
local behavior. Finally, chapter six summarizes the findings and makes a series of policy
recommendations for how to promote more effective metropolitan governance.
Chapter 1: The Metropolitan Problem
This chapter looks at the problems facing American metropolitan regions and the
solutions that have been proposed throughout the years. Part 1 examines current
metropolitan development patterns in the U.S. and the arguments made in the literature
about their sustainability, equity, and efficiency. This literature forms the basis of the
argument for metropolitan coordination. Part 2 explores the literature on
metropolitanization, which has shifted from promoting a more regulatory to a more
voluntary approach.
Part 1: Consequences of Current Development Patterns
Between 1982 and 1997, U.S. population increased by 17 percent while land
consumption increased 47 percent from 51 million acres to 76 million acres.23 The
prevailing trend of U.S. metropolitan development was suburban, low-density
development, and the rapid conversion of greenfields to suburban development. In short,
the pattern of metropolitan development in the U.S. was what has come to be termed
"sprawl."
Many metropolitan areas in the U.S. have expanded to a point where there is little
affordable housing, insufficient open space, stress on water supplies, unhealthful levels of
air pollution, severe traffic congestion, and questions about regional equity and
sustainability. Local governments do not have the capacity to respond to this interlocking
set of problems. Metropolitan regions continue to grow because of thousands of
development decisions made by people deciding where they want to live, work, and/or
23 Fulton, William, Rolf Pendall, Mai Nguyen, and Alicia Harrison, "Who Sprawls Most? How Growth
Patterns Differ Across the U.S.?" (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Survey Series, July 200 1),1.
invest. These decisions are made in the context of local control over land use planning.
Each development decision on its own may not amount to much, but in the aggregate
they change the pattern of land use and affect all residents in a region. Individual land
use choices made by millions of people in separate municipalities have a cumulative
effect of creating serious local and metropolitan problems.
Metropolitan growth shaped almost entirely by local land use decisions without
regard for the regional effects of local decisions leads to a series of collective action
24problems discussed in the literature: 1) financially strapped municipalities , 2) inefficient
allocation of scarce resources in a region, 3) failure to meet overall needs of region
26 27(particularly housing), 4) inequality of spatial opportunities, and 5) dispersed
development that uses a large amount of resources, fails to meet future development
needs, and causes negative externalities.28 Collectively, this literature serves to help
citizens and local officials recognize that their decisions have negative externalities on
the region. In addition, individual land use decisions may actually create negative
situations for communities themselves.
24 Myron Orfield. Metropolitics: A Regional Agenda for Community and Stability. Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press; Cambridge, Mass.: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (1997).
25 Luther Gulick, "Metropolitan Organization," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 314, Metropolis in Ferment (Nov., 1957): 57-65 and David McGee and Gerald H. Smith,
"Environmental Diseconomies in Suburban Expansion," American Journal of Economics and Sociology
31 no. 2 (Apr., 1972): 181-188.
26 Myron Orfield (1997).
27 Myron Orfield (1997) and Alan Altshuler, William Morrill, Harold Wolman, and Faith Mitchell, eds.,
Governance and Opportunity in Metropolitan America (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press,
1999), 23.
28 Robert Burchell, "Costs and Benefits of Alternative Development Patterns: Sprawl versus Smart
Growth," Metropolitan Development Patterns: 2000 Annual Round Table (Cambridge, MA: Lincoln
Institute of Land Policy, 2000).
Not all scholars view U.S. metropolitan development patterns as a problem.
"Public choice" theorists such as Charles Tiebout see the patterns of development of
metropolitan regions as a product of individual preferences. People choose to live in
particular communities because they prefer the bundle of services that one community
provides over another so they essentially "vote with their feet." Other scholars are
skeptical of Tiebout's assertion and argue that public policy decisions, not preferences,
are responsible for the uneven development of metropolitan regions. 29 These scholars
analyze how local political institutions shape the conditions of urban growth (Downs,
Fulton, Altshuler, Orfield, Rusk, Peirce, Katz, to name a few). 30 They argue that once we
understand that public policies, not individual preferences, lead to undesirable outcomes,
we can design new policies that lead to better outcomes and more functional metropolitan
regions.
Inefficient Allocation of Resources
American regions are governed by hundreds of individual jurisdictions.
According to the Committee on Improving the Future of U.S. Cities Through Improved
Metropolitan Area Governance, "the average metropolitan area consisted of 114 local
governments: 2 counties, 42 municipalities or towns, and 70 special districts, of which 21
were school districts. There were 18 local governments for every 100,000 people in
29 Charles Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," The Journal of Political Economy 64, no. 5
(1956): 2, 416-24, and Wolch, Jennifer, Manuel Pastor, Peter Drier, eds., Up Against the Sprawl: Public
Policy and the Making of Southern California (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004).
30 Paul Lewis, Shaping Suburbia: How Political Institutions Organize Urban Development (USA:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), 1.
metropolitan areas. "'3 One of the primary problems associated with fragmented
metropolitan governance is that municipalities that lack financial and technical capacity
have trouble meeting the infrastructure and service needs of their new residents. Since
each municipality is charged with providing services to its own residents, most will find
themselves strapped for resources.
As fragmented metropolitan regions grow, they often duplicate investments in
services and use scarce resources inefficiently. "The most obvious result of any increase
in suburban population," write McGee and Smith, "is an immediate demand for more
services. ,32 In order to accommodate new development, each municipality is forced to
provide new infrastructure investment: schools, roads, sewer, police, fire protection, etc.
However, many of these smaller and previously rural jurisdictions are not prepared
financially or structurally to provide the type of suburban services necessary. In addition,
some of the services that they are providing are best provided at a metropolitan scale.
However, because of jurisdictional boundaries and current systems of municipal finance,
they have to be provided at the local scale. Without coordinated regional planning, often
there is a duplication of services and difficulty raising funds for regional-level services.
There are also no economies of scale for service provision. Two towns right next to each
other may have their own school systems, planning directors, fire departments, and police
officers. This is certainly the case in the Boston region where 101 cities and towns
duplicate services. Studies by Robert Burchell at Rutgers University have found similar
Alan Altshuler, William Morrill, Harold Wolman, and Faith Mitchell, eds., Governance and Opportunity
in Metropolitan America (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999), 23.
32 David McGee and Gerald H. Smith, "Environmental Diseconomies in Suburban Expansion," American
Journal of Economics and Sociology 31, no. 2 (Apr., 1972): 185, 181-188.
duplication of services in Florida, New Jersey, Kentucky, South Carolina, and the
Delaware Estuary.
Bringing infrastructure (water, roads, sewer) to new suburban development is
costly and places a huge burden on already financially strapped municipal governments.
Writing in 1972, McGee and Smith describe the problem of urban sprawl as "an
inefficient allocation of resources for society."34 They argue that "sprawl suggests urban
areas which are larger than necessary which may mean that transportation,
communication, utility services, and local public services all become 'unnecessarily
inefficient and uneconomical." 35 The Real Estate Research Corporation's 1974 "Costs of
Sprawl" study describes sprawl as "the most expensive form of residential development
in terms of economic costs, environmental costs, natural resource consumption and many
types of personal costs." 36 Lower density development costs more per person to service
than higher density development. Arthur C. Nelson writes, "it costs twice as much per
unit of development to fully service two homes per acre as it does to serve four homes
per acre."37 According to the American Farmland Trust "for every tax dollar collected
33 Robert Burchell, "Costs and Benefits of Alternative Development Patterns: Sprawl versus Smart
Growth," Metropolitan Development Patterns: 2000 Annual Round Table (Cambridge, MA: Lincoln
Institute of Land Policy, 2000), 43.
3 McGee and Smith (1972) 182.
35 McGee and Smith (1972) 185.
36 Real Estate Research Corporation. The Costs of Sprawl: Environmental and Economic Costs of
Alternative Residential Development Patterns at the Urban Fringe, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1974), 7.
3 Arthur C. Nelson, "Regulations to Improve Development Patterns," in Metropolitan Development
Patterns: 2000 Annual Round Table (Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2000), 73.
from newly developed suburban residential property, about $1.25 in services must be
paid-a loss of 25 cents."3
Since new suburban development does not pay for the infrastructure that it
requires, in order to generate more income, municipalities compete with each other to
attract taxable development (retail development in sales tax states and industrial or
commercial development that is taxed at a higher rate than residential development in
non-sales tax states). Drier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom argue that communities
compete for "favored residents and investments" and "each jurisdiction has a strong
incentive to adopt zoning and development policies that exclude potential residents with
incomes below the median for their jurisdiction or who require more costly services." 39
Tax deals offered by municipalities to attract commercial and industrial development
may serve as a temporary response to revenue shortfalls, but these developments can
change the character of the area (creating a car-oriented environment that undercuts
existing downtown economies). In addition, developers who have learned how to
"game" the system, leapfrog to a new location just when their last tax break runs out and
the commercial development would finally produce a positive cash flow for the
municipality.
While the inefficiency of suburban development is agreed upon, not all scholars
think this is reason enough to be against sprawl. Anthony Downs recognizes the
increased "cost of sprawl," but he warns that Burchell's studies
38 As quoted in Morris, Douglas, It's A Sprawl World After All: The Human Cost of Unplanned Growth
and Visions of a Better Future (Canada: New Society Publishers, 2005), 23.
39 Drier, Peter, John Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanstrom, Place Matters: Metropolitics for the Twenty-First
Century (USA: University of Kansas Press, 2001), 99.
do not quantify any of the benefits that millions of Americans believe they
receive from sprawl-and for which many may be willing to pay notable
additional costs. At present, households receiving such benefits are
probably not paying the full social costs, but they might very well be
willing to pay some or all of the higher costs that Burchell has estimated
are associated with continued sprawl just to keep receiving these benefits.
Thus, even if Burchell's cost estimates are correct, they do not necessarily
imply that more compact forms of growth should be substituted for sprawl
in the future."
Instead of changing urban form from sprawl to denser development, Downs argues that
those who benefit from sprawl could simply be asked to pay for the marginal cost of that
benefit. If cost is the only concern, this may be an adequate solution; however, if (as the
section below demonstrates) there are serious environmental costs of sprawl, then paying
the marginal cost of sprawl may not be a sufficient means of addressing the problem.
Environmental Costs
Suburban lifestyles can impose negative externalities on individual communities
and the whole region because of a significant increase in resource consumption.
Suburban development is more resource intensive than urban development. According to
studies by Robert Burchell, "[u]ncontrolled sprawl would absorb 18.8 million additional
acres of land, but compact growth would reduce that amount by 4 million, or 21%.'*"
Matthew Kahn found that suburban residents "drive 31 percent and consume twice as
much land as their urban counterparts.'A2 However, often suburban residents do not fully
40 Anthony Downs, "Some Realities About Sprawl and Urban Decline," Housing Policy Debate 10, no 4,
(Fannie Mae Foundation, 1999): 964, 955-974.
41 Anthony Downs, "The Costs of Sprawl Revisited," Edited version of a speech presented at the ULI
District Council Meeting in Washington D.C. on April 15, 2004. Online at
http://www.anthonydowns.com/sprawlrev is ited.htmn [last accessed August 7, 2007]
42 Matthew Kahn, "The Environmental Impact of Suburbanization." Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management 19, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 584, 569-586.
understand the impacts that their decisions have on the region, nor do they have any
incentive to change their behavior. Paul Lewis argues that "[p]olitical fragmentation
gives suburbanities the institutional ammunition to preserve land-use advantages, and
provides little incentive for local politicians to consider the externality costs of their land-
use decisions." 43 So for instance, municipalities may prevent affordable housing from
being built because they do not want to pay for the construction of new schools when
more children move to the community. One way to do this is to zone out certain types of
developments or to require large lot zoning. Fulton et al. found that regions with more
fragmented governance were more likely to have less dense development.44
Zoning people and certain "unfavorable uses" out has negative environmental
implications. When lot sizes increase, the amount of land that is converted from open
space to residential increases. A recent study by Massachusetts Housing Partnership and
MIT demonstrates that this is the case in the Boston region where between 1998 and
2002 single home construction on an average lot size of 1.3 acres consumed 39,890 acres
(about 62 square miles).45 Boston had a 6.7 percent population growth between 1982 and
1997, but the amount of land that was urbanized (both suburban and urban) increased by
46.9 percent. This was a much higher population growth to land development ratio than
other parts of the country.46 Given Boston's fragmented governance structure, where
43 Paul Lewis (1992), 60.
44 Fulton, William et. al. (2001), 1.
4s Massachusetts Housing Partnership and MIT Center for Real Estate, "Large Lot Housing Construction in
the Greater Boston Metropolitan Area" (January 2006), 2. Online at
http://www.nhp.net/uploads/resources!mbp mit 1_30_06.pdf [last accessed August 19, 2007]
46 Fulton, William, et al. (2001), 9.
each community is concerned with attracting development that can fund schools and
infrastructure, it is no wonder that larger lots are becoming the regional norm. In
addition to using more land for development, local zoning requiring larger lot sizes also
leads to a decrease in affordable housing (as buildable lots become harder to find because
zoning requires more land for development).
If each community sets its own lot size requirements without regard to regional
trends this can lead to dispersed development which takes up a large amount of open
space, uses more water and land than would otherwise be necessary, does not meet the
development needs of future generations, increases land costs, and causes a number of
negative externalities (traffic congestion, air pollution, etc.). While policies that prevent
certain types of development may make fiscal sense for communities (particularly
communities that do not want to pay for school costs), when many communities in a
region adopt them, the result is that more land is consumed, land prices increase, and
there may not be enough affordable housing in the region.
Regional Inequality
Since the quality of services such as education vary by municipality, land use
planning decisions made at the municipal level can increase inequality in the region's
"spatial opportunity structure"A7 and reinforce economic and spatial segregation.
Wealthier communities concerned about "changing community character"-which is
often a code phrase for racial and/or socio-economic change-respond by zoning certain
types of residents out. In the process, residents in poorer communities will be denied
4 Altshuler, Alan, et al. (1999), 107.
access to opportunities in richer suburbs and exurbs based on their socio-economic and
often racial backgrounds. Low-income children, whose families cannot afford to live in
rich communities, may find themselves isolated in one part of the region far from good
schools. The opportunities that come from living in high-tax base suburbs-such as high
quality of services, safe streets, and good schools-are also closed off to less well off
residents who cannot afford to move to the area with the best infrastructure and services.
According to National Neighborhoods Coalition, "[s]prawl has segregated U.S.
metropolitan areas racially, carving cities into ghettos of poverty and exclusion contrasted
with enclaves of privilege and power. Current patterns of development have led to a
concentration of poverty in the central city and remote communities, limited access to
capital in both urban and rural areas, and further subjugated low-income and minority
residents." 48 Bruce Katz agrees writing that
America's metropolitan areas are experiencing remarkably similar
development patterns - explosive growth at the exurban fringe coupled
with decline and disinvestment in older established communities.
Throughout the country, upper-income, residentially exclusive suburbs are
capturing a disproportionate share of regional infrastructure spending and
economic growth. At the same time, trends generally associated with
inner-city neighborhoods - concentrated poverty, pervasive joblessness,
failing schools, racial and social isolation - are becoming the norm in
older suburbs surrounding the urban core.49
Like Katz, Myron Orfield finds that increasingly it is not just the central cities that are
suffering. Orfield's study of 25 metropolitan regions in the U.S. found that "more than
48 The National Neighborhood Coalition's Neighborhoods, Regions, and Smart Growth Project,
"Connecting Neighborhood and Region for Smarter Growth," (2000). Online at
http://www.neighborhoodcoalition.org/pdfs/Lit%20200 L.pdf [last accessed August 19, 2007]
49 Bruce Katz, "Connecting Community Building to Metropolitan Solutions," Shelterforce Online.
January/February 1998. Online at http://'www.nhi.org/online/issues/97/katz.htmi [last accessed August 19,
2007]
half of suburban residents reside in suburbs with social or fiscal challenges severe enough
to be considered 'at risk'."3 He also found that the difference between low-tax base
communities and high-tax communities can be up to ten to one "meaning a low-tax
capacity community would have to tax itself at ten times the rate of a high-tax capacity
place in order to deliver the same level of services."51 Orfield concludes that the
disparity in the quality of services provided is extreme and can only be addressed by
regional fiscal equity programs where communities share some portion of their tax
revenues.
Scholars and practitioners agree that current development patterns in metropolitan
regions are contributing to regional inequality. Anthony Downs supports the idea that it
is "the basic political and legal structure of U.S. land use markets, in addition to racial
discrimination, that causes concentration of poverty, not market failures."52 However,
Downs does not see "sprawl" as the culprit, but rather policies of exclusion and the
failure to subsidize affordable housing in suburban communities. He writes, "I came to
the conclusion that there is no meaningful and significant statistical relationship between
any of the specific traits of sprawl, or a sprawl index, and either measure of urban
decline. This was very surprising to me and went against my belief that sprawl had
contributed to concentrated poverty and therefore to urban decline." 3 While sprawl itself
may not be the 'culprit,' most scholars agree that governance and fiscal systems
50 Myron Orfield. "Building Regional Coalitions Between Cities and Suburbs," in Growing Smarter, ed.
Robert D. Bullard (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 324.
5 Myron Orfield (2007), 326.
52 Anthony Downs (1999), 963.
5 Anthony Downs (1999), 961.
determined at the purely local level probably are. Orfield argues that local fiscal systems
and land use need to be reformed and regional governance adopted He supports fiscal
equity systems like the Fiscal Disparities Program in Minneapolis-St. Paul where forty
percent of the increase in commercial-industrial tax bases are returned to a regional pool
to be distributed throughout the region. While these policies make sense, many
communities view them as a threat to their fiscal and political autonomy. Fear of these
types of redistributive policies may be behind much of the resistance to regional planning
and coordination.
Barriers to Moving Beyond Local Planning
While above, I have mentioned a series of inter-locking problems that result from
fragmented governance in metropolitan regions, it is important to note that there are also
a number of barriers to metropolitan governance that are discussed in the literature. First,
homeowners want to keep their home values high and perceive that local control is
critical to this goal. Anthony Downs writes that many homeowners "believe that their
economic interest in their home must be protected by preventing or limiting the
construction of lower-cost housing in their community, and homeowners dominate
suburban politics."5 6 Homeowners see the autonomy of their jurisdictions as an
5 Myron Orfield (2007), 325.
5 Myron Orfield (2007), 327.
56 Anthony Downs, ed., Growth Management and Affordable Housing (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 2004), 19.
important mechanism to "influence who their neighbors are."5 7 They feel threatened by
attempts to remove decision-making about planning and zoning from local control.
Second, since in most parts of the country, schools are primarily financed locally,
local residents want to make sure that they maintain the highest quality school systems.
Efforts at metropolitan governance are often perceived as threats to local autonomy and
control over the local school districts. Citizens feel that if local services are centralized
they will not have the same type of influence over them that they do now. Third,
localities that are doing well financially view efforts at metropolitanization as attempts to
redistribute their funding to poorer communities, which is not a welcome prospect.
Fourth, efforts at creating more regional institutions threaten the 'order' that exists in
metropolitan America, which can only be described as segregation. In Cities Without
Suburbs, David Rusk argues that "[t]his is the toughest issue in American society. It goes
right to the heart of Americans' fears about race and class. There will be no short-term,
politically comfortable solutions."58 He points out that traditional efforts at regional
cooperation have largely been focused on service delivery: trash, water, transportation
planning, sewage treatment, and air quality. "Regional arrangements," according to
Rusk, "usually avoid policies and programs that share the burden of inner-city
residents." 59 Here it is also important to note that in some cases inner-city communities
s7 Anthony Downs, New Visions for Metropolitan America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
1994), 19.
58 David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Distributed by
The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2003), 134.
s9 David Rusk (2003), p. 134.
have also been reluctant to adopt more regional approaches "for fear of losing cultural
control, cultural identity, and political power within their communities."
Part 2: What the Literature Says About Metropolitanization
This section explores the literature on metropolitanization: metropolitan
government, metropolitan governance, and voluntary regionalism. A more than local
approach to urban development has been a consistent theme in the urban planning
literature. However, over time, different proponents of metropolitanization have argued
about its desirability, have viewed metropolitanization as the solution to various
problems, and have disagreed about how it can best be achieved.
History of Metropolitan Governments and Governance
For generations scholars and planning officials have recognized that jurisdictional
boundaries serve more as historical artifacts than a representation of current
environmental, social, economic, and political conditions. According to reformers, the
problems that metropolitan areas were facing were really "inescapable housekeeping
problems": "[t]he metropolitan household is in many respects one; but its housekeeping is
organized in dozens or hundreds of families, each different (if not hostile) to the
neighbors"61 In the 1950s, Arthur Maass and his colleagues argued that the "systematic
60 John A. Powell, "Race, Poverty, and Urban Sprawl," in Growing Smarter: Achieving Livable
Communities, Environmental Justice, and Regional Equity, ed. Robert D. Bullard (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Pres, 1997), p. 60
61 Scott Greer, Governing the Metropolis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 113.
functions of government" could be metropolitanized. - In Area and Power, Maass
recommends that power be divided according to the process of governing, the functions
of government, or constituency.6 3 Maass' approach is consistent with the Progressive
reformers' rational approach to metropolitan problems. To make metropolitan
coordination work, the "assignment of power" just had to be "spelled out carefully."64
Robert Wood's 1961 book, 1,400 Governments, argues that the political fragmentation of
metropolitan regions makes governing them untenable as each of the 1400 governments
6566 44
makes its own decisions. In 1964, Matthew Holdern describes66 the "metropolitan
problem" as a diplomacy problem where each municipality is maximizing its own
"interest."
Raymond Vernon sums up the challenge of metropolitan governance arguing that
the familiar problem in government structure is "that of creating a body of authority that
is bigger than a breadbox but smaller than an elephant-more extensive in its scope than
the localities but less extensive than the state." 67 Scott Greer describes the logic behind
the drive for metropolitan government as a kind of "capitalist realism." Functional areas
that could address specific problems on a metropolitan level would take "garbage
62 Harrigan, John J, Political Change in the Metropolis (USA: Little, Brown, and Company, Inc., 1989),
272.
63 Maass, Arthur, ed., Area and Power (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), 11.
64 Maass, Arthur (1959), 11.
65 Robert C. Wood, 1400 Governments. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961).
66 Matthew Holdren, Jr. "The Governance of the Metropolis as a Problem in Diplomacy." The Journal of
Politics 26, no. 3 (August 1964): 627-647.
67 Raymond Vernon. "Myth and Reality of Our Urban Problems," in City and Suburb: The Economics of
Metropolitan Growth, ed. Benjamin Chinitz (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1964), 102.
collection out of politics." ' There was a sense that metropolitan administration could
create a highly rationalized system run by a "perfected bureaucracy operated by
professionally trained managers and judged as a business concern."
Writing in 1957, Luther Gulick states, "when it comes to zoning, land use
regulation, and the system for circulation and traffic, the underlying problem become
impossible of rational attack unless there is a single center for co-ordinated analysis,
planning, and action,"70 Gulick advocates the creation of a metropolitan model of
governance that takes into account the metropolitan nature of the problems and their
solutions, but also respects local autonomy.
While rationalization and efficiency were held up as goals, there was a growing
concern that these new metropolitan governments would lack the political accountability
that local jurisdictions had.71 In addition, skeptics worried that the division of the
metropolitan area into different 'functions' might produce a metropolitan area that was
fractured in yet another way, according to function rather than accountability. 72 Writing
in 1961, Anthony Downs warns of coordination by function arguing that "[s]ooner or
later the problem of coordinating the coordinators will also become acute." 73
In the 1990s and 2000s, the need for metropolitan solutions is still paramount.
'Smart growth' advocates, who propose policies to counter sprawl, join the growing list
68 Greer (1963), 10.
69 Greer, (1963), p. 10.
70 Luther Gulick, "Metropolitan Organization," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 314, Metropolis in Ferment (Nov., 1957): 59, 57-65
71 Maass, ed. (1959), 60.
72 Maass, ed. (1959), 65.
7 Anthony Downs (1961), 315.
of scholars and academics pushing for metropolitan solutions. Drier, Mollenkopf, and
Swanstrom, writing in 2004, argue that fragmented planning at the local level-without
regional cooperation-"has encouraged unplanned, costly sprawl on the urban fringe." 74
In addition, scholars interested in regional equity have also called for metropolitan
solutions. Myron Orfield suggests that "regional governance reflects the reality of
modern metropolitan challenges-challenges that are too large for any one government to
address alone and that are often exacerbated by excessive fragmentation." 75 Orfield
argues that cities and suburbs need to learn to work together because the problems they
each face are one and the same: "[c]oalition-building efforts that emphasize the links
between core cities and suburbs can bring about reforms to increase equity for an entire
region."76
Why Voluntary Regionalism is Politically Feasible (and Better)
Early experiments with annexation and special districts demonstrated that it was
possible to 'scale-up' to a higher level for urban service provision and administration.
However, while special districts for water and transportation have worked relatively well,
political integration at the metropolitan scale in the U.S. has been more complicated.
Local municipalities are not accustomed to thinking of themselves as a part of a
7 Drier, Peter, et al. (2001), 176.
71 Orfield (1997), 148.76
76 Myron Orfield, "Regional Coalition Building and the Inner Suburbs," Shelterforce Online.
January/February 1998. Online at http://www.nhi.org/online,issues/97/orfield.htrnil [last accessed August
19, 2007]
community of communities' and see efforts at metropolitan coordination as a threat to
their local autonomy. 77
Despite literature about the need for a metropolitan approach, the structure of
local planning in the U.S. makes it difficult to create metropolitan institutions with any
power. Most efforts at metropolitan government through consolidation have been
abandoned in the U.S. in favor of more cooperative and often voluntary models of
metropolitan governance. In the 2000s, increasingly scholars argue that creating
metropolitan governance with more authority is politically infeasible. Instead, they
recommend focusing our efforts on other models of 'voluntary' regionalism that rely on
capacity building, consensus building, deliberative democracy, social capital formation,
and networking. According to Feoick, Tao, and Johnson, "[t]op-down solutions have
been replaced by voluntary cooperation among governments and though public-private
'intercommunity partnerships'." 8 In the new model of governance, communities work
together because it is in their collective interest instead of being compelled by city-county
consolidation or other forms of metropolitan government. However, metropolitan
planning agencies that operate in this context have a 'limited' role and are careful not to
overstep their mandates.
The predominance of voluntary approaches follows the trend in the U.S. of
moving from a regulatory land use planning framework that supports regional planning to
one that focuses on individual property rights and local control. According to Harvey
77 Lamont C. Hempel, "Conceptual and Analytical Challenges to Building Sustainable Communities," in
Toward Sustainable Communities: Transition and Transformations in Environmental Policy, ed. Daniel A.
Mazmanian and Michael E. Kraft (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), p. 67.
78 Feiock, Richard, Jill Tao, and Linda Johnson, "Institutional Collective Action," in Metropolitan
Governance: Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation, ed. Richard Feiock (Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press, 2004), 149.
Jacobs "[s]ince 1991 every state has considered state-based legislation in support of the
property rights movement's position. "79 Proponents of a more voluntary approach to
metropolitan governance, argue that the "property rights" backlash throughout the
country is one of the main reasons that a more collaborative approach to regional
governance will be required in the future. As property rights advocates gain political
strength, the prospect of creating regional planning agencies with teeth diminishes.
Scholars are skeptical that citizens and local officials will support state mandated
regulatory approaches that take authority away from localities.
Recent scholarship also criticizes regulatory models of regional governance as
both politically improbable, ineffective, and undesirable. According to Ronald Oakerson,
"the actual use of coercion through command and control is a highly ineffective
instrument for undertaking many of the activities on which governance depends."8 0
Instead, Oakerson argues that governance structures should be based on "willing consent"
and "provide regularized means for indentifying and diagnosing problems, elucidating
information, arraying and assessing alternatives, and crafting rule-based solutions, as well
as for monitoring those arrangements for both implementation and possible alteration."81
He concludes that
the absence of a local metropoliswide governmental jurisdiction with
powers over subordinate units of government-allows citizens and
officials to create a metropolitan governance structure within civil
society.. .Metropolitan governance structures governed in this manner can
79 Harvey Jacobs, "Social Conflict Over Property Rights," Land Lines (Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute
of Land Policy, April 2007): 15, 14-19.
80 Oakerson, Ronald, "The Study of Metropolitan Governance," in Metropolitan Governance: Conflict,
Competition, and Cooperation, ed. Richard Feiock (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004),
20.
81 Ronald Oakerson (2004), 20.
be expected to be more participatory, to feature stronger representative, to
engage in more effective problem solving related to the care of common
goods (the maintenance of the public realm), to allow for more vigorous
public entrepreneurship, and to strengthen the accountability of officials to
the citizens they serve .
Oakerson is primarily arguing against city-suburban consolidation, but it is clear that he
views a veto authority over local jurisdictions (such as in Portland) as antithetical to a
more cooperative, polycentric metropolitan governance model (where communities work
together but maintain their authority).
Other researchers have also pushed back against regulation as a means of dealing
with collective action problems. Elinor Ostrom's studies of the management of Common
Pool Resources (CPRs)8 3 find that voluntary, cooperative management by stakeholders
can be more effective than top-down command-and-control models. She argues that
"[b]y consistently taking the power to make decisions about the ways to innovate, adapt,
and coordinate efforts away from those who are directly affected, policymakers have
created institutions that are less able to respond to the problems they were created to
address."4 Ostrom finds that collective action problems can be overcome (without an
outside enforcer) when stakeholders understand that it is in their best interest to preserve
a shared resource.
The sense that regulatory models of regional governance are both undesirable and
infeasible has lead to what Allan Wallis describes as a "third wave" in metropolitan
82 Ronald Oakerson (2004), 41-42.
83 Common Pool Resources are shared resources such as fisheries and forests which can be damaged by
misuse and overuse.
84 Elinor Ostrom, "The Danger of Self-Evident Truths," PS: Political Science and Politics 33, no. 1. (Mar.,
2000): 33, 33-44.
studies.' Proponents of this new approach argue that many of the goals of getting
communities to work together can be accomplished through consensus building.
According to Judith Innes and David Booher, "[c]ollaboration itself leads to breaking
down the institutional barriers to productive problem solving... Such a process can be
more quickly responsive and 'intelligent' than top-down guidance or highly structured
action and more suitable to our near-chaotic times of rapid change and multiple
conflicting goals and perspectives."86 Rather than evaluate the measurable outcomes of a
process, Innes and Booher are more interested in the process itself and how participation
changes the way that participants perceive and act in the world. They write, "[w]hile
collaboration does produce tangible outcomes like agreements or actions, it has many
other consequences that the more traditional rational/technical or bureaucratic approach
to planning, program design, and implementation does not."8 7 Collaborative approaches
can produce other forms of social, political, and intellectual capital such as "[n]ew
relationships and trust, new partnerships and organizations, and joint learning..."" They
argue that "[i]t is not enough to evaluate consensus building solely on the basis of
outcomes; the process itself matters."89 They propose evaluating the effectiveness of
85 Alan Wallis, "The Third Wave: Current Trends in Regional Governance," National Civic Review 83, no.
3 (1994): 290-310.
86 Judith E. Innes and David Booher, "The Impact of Collaborative Planning on Governance Capacity."
Institute for Urban and Regional Development. (University of California at Berkeley, April 2003.
Working Paper 2003-03), 8. Online at http://www-iurd.ced.berkelev.edui/pub/WP-2003-03.pdf [last
accessed August 19, 2007]
87 Innes and Booher (2003), 25.
88 Judith Innes, "Evaluating Consensus Building," in The Consensus Building Handbook, eds. Lawrence
Susskind, Sarah McKearnan, and Jennifer Thomas-Larmer (California: Sage Publications, 1999), 636.
89 Judith Innes (1999), 641.
collaboration by looking at three variables: 1) diversity, 2) interaction, and 3) "network
and information flows throughout the systen.""
The argument that voluntary initiatives are important governance mechanisms is
supported by the literature on deliberative democracy. Deliberative democrats like
Benjamin Barber argue that coming together to discuss common problems transforms the
stakeholders themselves. Since people do not have fixed preferences, it is only through
dialogue that they come to understand their true interests in relation to other people.
"With talk," states Barber, "we can invent alternative futures, create mutual purposes, and
construct competing visions of community."91
Part of the rationale behind deliberative democracy is that through the course of
discussion people will change their positions. Mansbridge argues that
deliberations should be as likely as possible to make the participants 1)
aware of the implications of their own preferences and interests, the
preferences and interests of others, and the interests of the polity as a
whole, and 2) capable of transforming their interests in ways that they
themselves, looking back on that transformation from a state of reflection
and awareness, would approve.92
Patsy Healey asserts that deliberative democracy can be a powerful tool for helping
stakeholders overcome differences. Healey states, "the power of dominant discourses
can be challenged at the level of dialogue, through the power of knowledgeable,
reflective discourse, through good arguments, through the transformations which come as
people learn to understand and respect each other across their differences and conflicts,
90 Judith Innes (2003), 21.
91 Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 177.
92 Jane Mansbridge, "Practice-Thought-Practice," in DeeVening Democracy, eds. Archon Fung and Erik
Olin Wright (New York: Verso, 2003), 179.
and as we learn to build consensus that respects difference."" If Healey, Mansbridge,
Barber, Innes, Booher, the deliberative democrats, and consensus builders are correct,
then deliberative processes rather than institutional reorganization and centralization
might be enough to change the behavior of local officials who participate in these
processes and ultimately change local land use outcomes. Metropolitan planning
agencies that bring stakeholders together and help them with capacity building might be
more effective than agencies that have regulatory authority and/or control over fiscal
resources.
Policy Implications of Theories of Voluntary Regionalism
The idea of voluntary regionalism is increasingly being put into practice. Regions
across the country are relying on voluntary measures to shape regional policy. A number
of multi-million dollar visioning exercises -- notably Envision Utah, Boston MetroFuture,
Denver Metro Vision, and Chicago 2020 -- have been initiated in metropolitan areas
across America to address problems of uncoordinated metropolitan growth. Metropolitan
visioning exercises all have familiar themes. They are often impressive in their goals,
scale, and scope. They promise to help create a "new way forward" for the region. They
engage citizens, businesses, politicians, and planners in a careful analysis of the current
trends happening in the region. They project what will happen to the region if we
continue with the current development patterns. They ask stakeholders to define what
type of region they would like to live in, and they propose policy changes that would be
necessary to reach the desired regional scenario. Often the final outcome is a plan that
93 Patsy Healey, Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies (Vancouver, BC: UBC
Press, 1997), 67.
advocates for a more compact, equitable, sustainable, efficient, and healthy region.
Metropolitan planning agencies often initiate these visioning exercises since they have
the ability to convene stakeholders and the capacity to conduct modeling of alternate
futures. When the visioning is complete, metropolitan planning agencies use their
expertise in capacity building as a means of implementing these plans.
While the process of regional visioning can be an important educational tool for
the stakeholders involved, the idea of change behind visioning exercises is that it can be
made in spite of political and institutional hurdles. In an effort to remain politically
uncontroversial (and hence feasible), visioning statements often do not recommend
changes to the political institutions that shape land use planning. They fall short of
restructuring the institutional dynamics of metropolitan institutions. Instead, they focus
on building coalitions (often ad hoc) of stakeholders who together will "speak" for the
region. Since the majority of these visioning exercises are convened by voluntary
institutions, they depend on the will of local officials for implementation. As a result,
implementation remains a challenge.
I raise the increased interest in visioning not because visioning itself is negative,
but because there is a belief in scholarly and policy circles that these voluntary regional
efforts are enough. My case study research explores how regional planning agencies that
rely entirely on voluntary measures stack up against regional planning agencies with
more authority over land use and control over financial resources. Through this inquiry, I
am able to test some of the propositions made by advocates of voluntary governance
about why voluntary approaches are better than regulatory ones.
Summary
American metropolitan regions that are governed by multiple jurisdictions, which
are each trying to maximize their fiscal health, are considered unsustainable, inequitable,
and inefficient. For generations metropolitan approaches have been proposed as an
improvement over fragmented local governance of metropolitan regions. However, how
to best achieve metropolitan coordination has been debated for decades. There is an
ongoing tension in the literature among efficiency, accountability, and the need to
maintain local autonomy.
While there is agreement about the need for a more than local approach, over time
the recommended approach has changed from the call for metropolitan government to
metropolitan governance and voluntary approaches. Increasingly voluntary approaches
are counted on to produce results. In the following chapters, I explore what happens in
metropolitan regions when metropolitan planning agencies move from relying on
voluntary approaches to having authority over fiscal resources and state mandated
authority.
Chapter 2: Boston Case Study: Regional Planning at the Margins
METRCPQL.tTAN AREA PLANNING COUtNCIL
Source: Source:
htp://www.inetrofuture.org/gallery2.asp?Group1D=6527&View=&Expanded=&ImagelD= [last accessed
September 4, 2007]
"While many of us think of Los Angeles as the ultimate in sprawl, the truth is that the
Los Angeles metropolitan area is not only bigger but also denser than Greater Boston-
twice as dense, in fact, at 5,400 people per square mile." 94
The Boston region is not usually thought of as a sprawling region; however, the
numbers tell a different story. Since 1950, Massachusetts has lost more than 260,000
acres of open space. Every day 40 acres of undeveloped land are developed. From 1950
94 Stephanie Pollack. Spring 2002 Rappaport Public Service Lecture, "Living Together: The Challenges of
Growing Smarter in Greater Boston," p. 2. Online at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/rappaport/downloads/publicservicelectures/livingtogether.pdf [last accessed
August 19, 2007]
to 2000, half of Massachusetts' farmland was lost to subdivisions, office parks, and
malls. Residents in the Boston region have moved to lower-density suburbs and are
driving 75 percent more than they did in 1970." 5 Most of the recent development in the
Boston region has taken place in the 1-495 region. Once an area of isolated small towns
and some small cities with significant amounts of manufacturing, the communities in the
1-495 region have become an integral and important part of the Boston regional economy
(ever since 1970, when most of Interstate 495, the outer ring highway in Greater Boston,
was completed).96 Illustratively, from 1990 to 2000, population in the central section of
the entire highway, which is often known as the 1-495 technology corridor, grew by 13
percent, from about 395,000 to 449,000. In contrast, the population of the rest of the
region grew by only 5.5 percent.97 Similarly, six of the ten municipalities in Greater
Boston that added the most housing between 1990-2000 were also in the 1-495 region.9 8
As a result of such development between 1971-1999, the amount of land devoted to
residential uses in the 1-495 region increased by an average of 76 percent, compared to 32
percent in Greater Boston.99
95 Stephanie Pollack (2002), p. 1.
96 The road's first section, in Westford, opened in 1961 and by 1970, the road ran for almost 100 miles from
Amesbury in the northeast to Mansfield, which is south of Boston. In 1983, the road was extended to
Wareham in southeastern Massachusetts. See Sam Bass Warner, Jr., Greater Boston, (Philadelphia, PA:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 166.
97 Online at http://www.massbenchmarks.orQ/regions/boston.htm [last accessed August 19, 2007]
98 Metropolitan Area Planning Council, A Decade of Change: Growth Trends in the Greater Boston Area.,
2001, p. 53. Online at http://www.mapc.oru/data Qis/data center/data center publications.html [last
accessed on June 11, 2007]
99 Unpublished data from MAPC urban typology data that is based on the William MacConnell Land Use
Data. This average does not include data from Shrewsbury and Groton since these were not included in the
MAPC data. The Greater Boston region is defined as the 101 cities and towns that are members of the
Metropolitan Area Planning Council.
Since 1963, the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC), which is
comprised of 101 cities and towns, has been designated by the State government as the
planning agency for the region. MAPC's planning area covers 1,422 square miles, 22
cities, 79 towns, and over 3 million residents (2000 Census).' 0( However, MAPC has not
been able to guide the growth of the region. Instead, land use planning decisions have
remained primarily a local prerogative. This chapter explores land use decision-making
in the Boston region and evaluates the influence that MAPC has had. While the agency
lacks the formal authority to mandate that plans be adopted or the ability to use MPO-
status as a means of fostering inter-municipal cooperation, it has played an indirect role.
In a state with a weak planning framework, where planning is a response to local needs
rather than a reflection of regional concerns, MAPC is forced to rely mostly on what
might be called capacity building as a means of influencing local land use decisions.
MAPC is like many of the 450 Councils of Governments in the United States. To
help coordinate regional efforts, these agencies help bring together local officials,
planners, and citizens in on-going discussions about the future of their region. In
addition, these agencies prepare quasi-regional plans and provide technical assistance
aimed at upgrading local planning. Originally established in 1963, in 1971 under MGL
(Massachusetts General Law) Chapter 40B MAPC became an independent district. 101
That is,
100 Metropolitan Area Planning Council, Strategic Plan, July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2010, p. 4. Online at
http://www.mapc.ore/whats new/MAPC%20Strategic%2OPlan%2006.08.05.pdf, [last accessed on May 3,
2007]
101 Online at http://www.nass.gov/egis/laws/ingl/40b-24.htm [last accessed on July 24, 2007] Full text:
"CHAPTER 40B. REGIONAL PLANNING METROPOLITAN AREA PLANNING DISTRICT
Chapter 40B: Section 24. Metropolitan area planning council; composition; appointments; vacancies
[ Text of section effective until February 25, 2007.] Section 24. There shall be a metropolitan area
planning council, in this section and in sections twenty-five to twenty-nine, inclusive, called the council.
MAPC is empowered to conduct research and/or studies and to compile
information necessary for identifying problems and needs of the district,
and for the formulation of goals, objectives, policies, plans and programs
in relation to the development and redevelopment of the district's
resources and facilities. While the MAPC is empowered to approve or
disapprove plans for the development or redevelopment of the district or
portions thereof, such powers are largely advisory.10 2
MAPC is funded through a combination of per capita assessments on member
communities as well as foundation and government grants. Local officials from 101
cities and towns along with 21 gubernatorial appointees, 10 state and 3 city of Boston
officials sit on MAPC's Council. They meet at least three times a year. Motions are
adopted when a majority of the members present approve them. Officers of the Council
(President, Vice-President, Secretary, and Treasurer) are elected by a majority of the
council. A smaller group of 25 representatives make up an Executive Committee that
meets once a month, appoints the executive director, and oversees the agency's
operations. In order to balance the power of the Executive Committee with the
interests of representatives from the sub-regional constituencies, "the representatives of
Said council shall consist of one representative from each city and town of the metropolitan area planning
district who shall be appointed by the mayor or, if the city has a manager, by the city manager, and in the
case of a town, by the board of selectmen or, if the town has a manager, by the town manager, twenty-one
persons to be appointed by the governor of which number there shall be sufficient representation of
minority and low-income groups so as to substantially represent their viewpoints in the area to be served by
the council; and the following officers or their respective designees who shall be members ex officiis: -- the
chairman of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, the chairman of the Massachusetts Port
Authority, the chairman of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, the commissioner of the metropolitan
district commission, the chairman of the board of directors of the Massachusetts Water Resources
Authority, the commissioner of highways, the director of economic development, the director of housing
and community development, the commissioner of environmental protection, the chairman of the Boston
Redevelopment Authority, the commissioner of public works of the city of Boston and the executive
director of the Boston Water and Sewer Commission. Upon the expiration of the term of any appointed
member, his successor shall be appointed in like manner for a term of three years. The appropriate
appointing authority shall fill any vacancy for the remainder of the unexpired term."
102 Commonwealth of Massachusetts State Ethics Commission. CONFLICT OF INTEREST OPINION
EC-COI-95-2. Online at http://www.nass.gov/ethics/COl 95 2.pdf [last accessed on July 25, 2007]
103 MAPC Bylaws. Online at http://www.imape.org/about rmapc/Bylaws_200705.pdf [last accessed on July
26, 2007]
the cities, the representatives of the towns, the gubernatorial appointees, and the ex
officio members, each caucus and elect five of their members to serve on the Executive
Committee."' 0 4
Table 1: MAPC Operating Revenues' 0 5
2006 2005
MAPC Operating Revenues:
Intergovernmental grants and contracts.................. $ 13,398,324 $ 7,982,353
Assessment fund grant match.............................. $110,271 $139,108
Private grants and contracts................................. $322,453 $367,575
Charges for services.......................................... $112,936 $42,304
Contributions................................................... $100,300 $80,200
Member assessments....................................... $924,696 $870,886
Total operating revenues.............................. $14,968,980 $9,482,426
While MAPC is charged with planning for the Boston region, it is not the
federally designated Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) for the Boston area.
This means that MAPC's influence over an average of $171 million per year for 50
regional projects is not as direct as the Denver Regional Council of Governments
(DRCOG) or Portland Metro.106 It also means that MAPC cannot use control over TIP
funding as an incentive for active local participation in regional governance. MAPC has
a complicated relationship with the Boston MPO. MAPC is one of 14 permanent voting
members on the MPO. Along with the Central Transportation Planning Staff (CTPS),
104 MAPC Bylaws, p. 7. Online at http://www.nape.or/about mapc/Bvlaws 200705.pdf [last accessed on
July 26, 2007]
105 Metropolitan Area Planning Council. "Metropolitan Area Planning Council Report on Examination of
Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information. Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2006," p. 7.
Online at http://www.mapc.org/about mapc/FY06/MAPC/20FY2006%20Basic%20FS.pLf [last
accessed on July 25, 2007]
106 "Comm Ave Gets TIPped Off." Newton Community Reports. Online at
http://www.ci.newton.na.us/Exec/NCR/apri12006/conmave.htn [last accessed on July 26, 2007]
MAPC serves as staff to the MPO.11" One MAPC staff member described the authority
that comes from being an active member of the MPO as follows: "when a group is
willing to convene the meeting and do staff work, it is able to influence the
conversation." However, MAPC's influence within the MPO depends in large part on
who the governor is, the state's mandate to the agency, and who is the head of the MPO.
MAPC staff members felt that when Doug Foy, the head of the Office of Commonwealth
Development during the Romney administration, was on the MPO, it was much easier to
get work done on land use and the environment. However, in the middle of Governor
Romney's term, there was a change back to a more highway-oriented approach to
development. When the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), the
regional public transit authority that runs the subway, commuter rail, and bus system,
headed the MPO, the MPO's agenda was more in line with MAPC's.109 MAPC has to
take advantage of the opportunities that come its way, said one official: "MAPC takes
advantage of opportunities provided by others whether it is the federal government saying
pay attention to the TIP criteria or a new administration interested in land use and
transportation."" 0 Like most of the work that MAPC does, since its influence is not
direct, it has to use creative means to sway regional decision makers. One MAPC staff
member described MAPC's influence saying, "MAPC has good ideas and people are
107 CTPS conduct modeling and provide other technical assistance to the MPO Board.
108 Interview 3B.
109 The Office of Commonwealth Development was created in 2003 specifically by the Romney
administration to deal with land use and smart growth issues. It brought together the state agencies
responsible for the state's environmental, housing, and transportation policies. The Office of
Commonwealth Development was granted the 2006 Excellence in Smart Growth Award by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
110 Interview 3B.
supportive of them."' In addition, MAPC uses its access to data and technical
expertise, particularly it computer-modeling capabilities, as a means of influence.
MAPC lobbied the MPO to adopt TIP (Transportation Improvement Program)
funding criteria that take into account the goals of MAPC and other organizations. As a
result, the current TIP criteria reflect a number of land use considerations. For example,
the 2006 TIP application form asks, "How does the [proposed] project improve access for
pedestrians, bicyclists, and public transportation?.. .How does the zoning of the area
within [X] mile of this project support transit-oriented-development and preserve any
new roadway capacity? How is the project consistent with state, regional, and local
economic development priorities? ,112 The incorporation of land use goals into the TIP
criteria offers a chance to integrate land use planning and transportation funding.
However, it is only an indirect implementation mechanism since the Boston MPO TIP
criteria are not explicitly tied to the adoption of particular goals outlined in MAPC's
regional plan as they are in the Denver region.
" Interview 3B.
112 Boston MPO. "2006 Boston Metropolitan Planning Organization. Transportation Improvement
Program. Proponent Provided Information. Excel Sheet." Online at
http://www.ctps.org/bostonmpo/resources/tip/tippif.h tin [last accessed on July 26, 2007]
Table 2: Boston MPO Membership
Boston MPO Membership:
Permanent Members:
The City of Boston
The Executive Office of Transportation
The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
The Massachusetts Highway Department
The Massachusetts Port Authority
The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority
The Metropolitan Area Planning Council
The MBTA Advisory Board
Term Elected Members:
Elected representatives from 3 cities
Elected representative from 3 towns' 13
The Boston MetroPlan 2000
As already stated, MAPC is charged with regional planning, but its effectiveness
is limited by its authority and the fact that it operates in a state with a weak state planning
framework. While the Boston MetroPlan 2000, the regional plan adopted by MAPC in
1990, called for concentrated development, development in the region has been primarily
on one and two acre lots, particularly in the 1-495 region. Despite its inability to reorient
local land use planning to meet the goals of Boston MetroPlan 2000, the MAPC staff is
particularly proud of the Boston MetroPlan 2000 because it "contained smart growth
principles. It was one of the first of its kind. It talked about density, mixed use, not
developing on critical wetlands. This was a plan that was written 20 years ago. It was
113 For years the structure of the Boston MPO has been debated. In 1997, in an effort to make the MPO
more representative of local concerns, the City of Boston was added as a permanent member. In addition,
three elected representatives from towns and three from cities in the region were added per term. For more
information see, "Metropolitan Planning Process." Office of Transportation Planning. 12/02/04. Online at
https://www.com mentmgr.con/proiects/ 11 49/docs/NP0-20Process.pdf [last accessed July 26, 2007]
basically a smart growth plan before that concept was really around."' 14 Boston
MetroPlan 2000 was innovative because it demonstrated that smart growth planning
techniques of building denser communities could help reduce infrastructure development
costs. Estimating that future infrastructure costs would be $1.5 billion dollars, Boston
MetroPlan 2000 encouraged "more efficient use of existing infrastructure capacity.""5
Drawing the connection between development type and cost was important; however, the
extent to which communities changed their development patterns as a result was minimal.
Most communities in suburban Boston continue to develop according to traditional land
use patterns, using 1 and 2 acre lots. As a result, infrastructure patterns are inefficient
and infrastructure investment continues to be a major hurdle for most communities.
MetroPlan 2000 primarily left implementation up to localities. When it came to
density, MetroPlan 2000 said, "[b]oundaries and other detailed information would be
covered in local comprehensive plans, written with consideration of the regional
development plan. Any major inconsistencies between MetroPlan 2000 and local
comprehensive plans should be addressed."' 1 6 However, MetroPlan 2000 did not
mention how these inconsistencies "should be addressed." Without the authority to turn
"should" into "shall" or at least to offer financial incentives for the adoption of these
policies, we should not be surprised that the goals outlined in the Boston MetroPlan 2000
17 years ago have for the most part not been adopted. None of the interviewees ever
mentioned Boston MetroPlan 2000 unless I specifically asked them about it.
114 Interview 2B.
1s Metropolitan Area Planning Council. "Boston MetroPlan 2000," p. 4. Online at
http://www.mapc.org/regional planing/MetroPlan.html [last accessed on August 19, 2007]
116 "Boston MetroPlan 2000," Section 1, p. 7.
According to MetroPlan 2000, MAPC plays a lead role in plan implementation by
1) reviewing local and subregional plans, 2) reviewing infrastructure impacts, 3)
analyzing regional benefits of proposed developments, 4) reviewing compliance of
proposed developments with master plan goals and zoning, 5) reviewing regional projects
that may be controversial to determine the costs and benefits of these projects, 6)
improving the regional database, 7) working with communities to review and update
regional development plan, 8) developing infrastructure priorities based on the plan, 9)
recommending to state and federal agencies that infrastructure projects should be funded
that match priorities, 10) reviewing plans for adjacent regions to promote consistency of
regional and state policies, 11) promoting community urban design plans that support
transit, pedestrians, and biking, 12) acting as a facilitator for projects with regional
impact reviews, 13) recommending that state and federal agencies fund infrastructure that
promotes concentrated development, 14) developing a land resources protection plan, and
15) encouraging state and federal agencies to spend discretionary funds on projects that
support concentrated development and economic vitality.1 7 While the list of activities is
long, it demonstrates the voluntary nature of everything MAPC does. MAPC tries to
position itself so that it influences development by providing data, working with
communities, and making comments on development projects. However, MAPC lacks
the authority to demand consistency between local master plans and MAPC's regional
plan. Furthermore, since master plans in Massachusetts do not have to be consistent with
local zoning, ensuring compliance with a community's master plan would not necessarily
117 "Boston MetroPlan 2000," Section 1, 15-16.
translate into local implementation." While MAPC reviews local plans, it typically does
so only when asked by a community. As a result, MAPC has the most influence in
communities that are already leaning towards smart growth concepts. The adoption of
the smart growth principles in Boston MetroPlan 2000 is therefore entirely dependent on
the political and planning orientation of each locality. As a result, in the 101 different
communities in the MAPC region, each interprets planning differently. Since MAPC
does not have authority to tell them what to do, its primary leverage comes from offering
capacity building assistance. This tends to produce haphazard results. One local official
said that implementation of regional plans in the Boston region is "hit or miss. If it suits
a community, fine. If it doesn't, fine." 19
If we examine the comprehensive plans for communities in the MAPC region,
they often mention being members of MAPC and in some cases, they mention Boston
MetroPlan 2000. The Town of Lexington's Comprehensive plan has this to say about
MAPC: "At the regional level, the Metropolitan Area Planning Council has worked for
decades to promote better-structured regional development, including efforts through its
Minuteman subarea planning group known as MAGIC. However, like most other
Massachusetts regional planning agencies, the MAPC lacks sufficient authority to have
118 In some other states there is a requirement that zoning is consistent with the master plans, but in
Massachusetts this is not the case. In Massachusetts, the master plan may propose a change to the zoning,
but this change will not take place unless the proposal is taken to the municipal legislative body, typically
the town meeting and approved by 2/3rds vote. Since changing zoning in Massachusetts is a difficult
political process many master plans serve as a general guide for the community rather than as a blueprint
for future development.
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had as much impact as many would hope."'" While the plan mentioned MAPC, it
recognizes the limits to MAPC's authority. An Annual report fror the Town of
Brookline states, "In 2002, the Department of Planning and Community Development
continued to be involved with several Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC)
committees including representation on the Inner Core Committee, Transportation and
Land Use Committee and the Metropolitan Highway System Advisory Board.
Representatives from the Department also met with MAPC officials to discuss important
programs such as Executive Order 4 ,,,12 1 Executive Order 418 involved a state
program that provided communities with $30,000 that could be used towards planning
and visioning efforts. As a result of Executive Order 418, MAPC worked with about 25
communities in 2006 to help strengthen their planning to meet smart growth goals. 2 2
The Open Space plan for the towns of Bellingham, Blackstone, and Franklin
acknowledges MAPC's role:
MetroGreen is the land resources element of MAPC's regional
development plan for metropolitan Boston (also known as MetroPlan
2000). The major goals of MetroGreen are to preserve and protect critical
land resources; to shape the growth of the region; to help preserve and
enhance a 'sense of place' for the region; and to fulfill the recreational
needs of the region's population and to provide access, when appropriate,
120 Town of Lexington, "Comprehensive Plan, 2002," p. 10. Online at
http://ci.lexington.ma.us/Planning/Documents/ComprehensivePlan/First%2OFour%20Elements/Land%20U
se.pdf [last accessed on July 24, 2007]
121 Town of Brookline. "2002 Annual Report for the Town of Brookline," p. 100. Online at
http://www.town.brookline.ma.us/Selectmen/PDFs/2002AnnualReport/SectionO6PlanningAndCommunity
Development.pdf [last accessed on July 24, 2007]
122 Metropolitan Area Planning Council. 2006 MAPC Annual Report. Online at
http://norwelna.virtualtownhall.net/Public Docurnents/NorwellMA TReport/MA PC.pdf [last accessed
on August 19, 2007]
to protected open areas. The recommendations of this report (including
recommended regulatory measures as well as open space acquisition and
trail development) are compatible with MetroGreen.' 2 3
The fact that the local plan mentions being consistent with MetroGreen and recognizes
Boston MetroPlan is indicative of the fact that some communities have used MAPC's
regional plan as a guide despite the plan's voluntary compliance. However, this appears
to be more of an exception than the rule.
Changing Regional Trends Through Regional Planning
The reality is that many of the goals set by Boston MetroPlan 2000 have not been
met. While the plan sought to address the growing gap between housing prices and
incomes, the gap has continued to grow. By 1990, "[t]he median priced house required
an annual income of $75,000, almost twice the regional median of $38,555."1" Boston
MetroPlan 2000 identified 214,000 households who needed some sort of housing
assistance. 125 The plan also identified a concentration of affordable units in certain
communities in the region and a lack in others. The result was that people of color were
concentrated in particular areas. Seventy percent of all minorities were located in only 5
communities while 61 of the region's communities had minority populations of less than
5 percent. 126
123 Conservation Commission. "Draft 2001 Open Space and Recreation Plan for Bellingham, Blackstone,
and Franklin." Volume 1. June 2001. Online at
http://www.franklin.ma.us/town/conservation/openspace old.htn [last accessed on July 24, 2007]
124 "Boston MetroPlan 2000," Section 2, p. 34.
125 "Boston MetroPlan 2000," Section 2, p. 39.
126 "Boston MetroPlan 2000," Section 2, p. 43.
Unfortunately, Boston MetroPlan 2000 has not altered regional land use and
housing patterns. The region continues to be unaffordable. According to the Boston
Indicators Project, the Boston region is "one of the least affordable metropolitan areas in
the US for both renters and homebuyers." 127 In 2005, "more than half of all tenants in
the Boston PMSA were paying more than 30 percent of their income for rent, including
one in five who paid more than half their income for shelter." 12 8
Statewide Chapter 40B legislation, a state law which allows developers of
projects in which 20-25 percent of the units are permanently subsidized to bypass local
zoning restrictions in communities that do not meet the state threshold of 10 percent
affordable, acts as a stick to encourage more local acceptance of affordable housing.
However, affordable housing approval and construction in the region remains a
challenge. As of 2006, only 22 of the 101 communities in the MAPC region had met the
goal of 10 percent affordability suggesting that MAPC has not been able to make
affordable housing a regional priority.' 29
One of the key reasons that housing has become less affordable in the Boston
metropolitan area is that lot sizes have increased rather than decreased as recommended
in Boston MetroPlan 2000. In fact, according to a study done by researchers at MIT's
Center for Real Estate, in the late 1990s, in 62 communities outside of Route 128,
m Boston Indicators Project. Online at
http://www.bostonindicators.org/IndicatorsProject/IHousing/Content.aspx?id=750 [last accessed on July
26, 2007]
128 Bonnie Heudorfer and Barry Bluestone, "The Greater Boston Housing Report Card 2005-2006: An
Assessment of Progress on Housing in the Greater Boston Area," p. 9. Online at
http:/"/www.tbf.org/uploadcedFiles/IousinQ%20Report%20Card%202005-06 2%20(2).pd f [last accessed
on July 26, 2007]
129 The Boston Indicators Project. Online at
http://www.bostonindicators.org /IndicatorsProject/H ousing/lIndicator.aspx?id=2776 [last accessed Auguest
19, 2008]
average lot sizes for new houses had more than doubled. " In the 1-495 region, tile
median lot size for a single-family house built between 1998 and 2002 ranged from .43
acres to 3.09 acres. Of the 42 communities in the 1-495 region, where the majority of the
Boston region's development has happened since 1990, 28 have median single-family lot
sizes of more than .9 acres.'31 Edward Moscovich's recent study of development patterns
in the Boston region found that of "the 23,000 single-family homes built in the 128/495
corridor over these years, only 2,055 - 9 percent - are built on lots of a quarter-acre or
less, while 3/4 of all new single-family homes are on lots of at least half an acre. Almost
half the homes are built on lots of at least an acre."132 Moscovich's research attributes
the high cost of housing prices in the Boston region to these large lot sizes. He argues
that if the average lot size in the Boston region were reduced from 1.08 to .25 acres, it
would be possible to double the number of new units constructed, drive home prices
down from an average price of $400,000 to $293,000 and cut vacant land consumption by
half.133 However, the challenge for the MAPC region is that each of the 101 cities and
towns must decide independently whether to increase or decrease its density. Since
zoning changes in most towns have to be approved by 2/3rd of the attendees at town
meeting, and community members are often reluctant to increase density (for fear of
subsequent increases in property taxes to service new residential development), it is no
130 Massachusetts Housing Partnership Housing Affordability Initiative at the MIT Center for Real Estate
Large-Lot Housing Construction in the Greater Boston Metropolitan Area, p. 2. Online at
http://www.mhp.net/uploads/resources/mhp mit 1 30 06.pdf [last accessed August 19, 20071
131 Please note that no data was available for the Town of Shirley.
132 Edward Moscovich. Open Space, Housing Construction, and Home Prices: What's the Payofffrom
Smart Growth? (The Massachusetts Housing Partnership, September, 2005), 11.
133 Edward Moscovich (2005), 2.
wonder that lot sizes have increased. Without a mandate to force compliance or
incentives that reward density, it is unlikely that MAPC's recommendations for denser
development, smaller lot sizes, and more affordable housing will trickle down to the local
level.
New Leadership and A New Plan
Since the adoption of Boston MetroPlan 2000 in 1990, MAPC has evolved as an
organization. In 2002, MAPC had a change in leadership resulting in more active
engagement with state political leaders and local officials. In October 2002, Marc
Draisen became MAPC's new executive director. Marc had previous experience as a
State Senator and as the Executive Director of the Massachusetts Association of
Community Development Corporations. Under Marc's leadership, MAPC has tried to
become a more politically relevant organization and a leader on regional issues. An
Executive Committee member said, "MAPC has been getting far more influential and
powerful in the past couple of years. The focus has shifted to legislative advocacy and
greater emphasis on PR with the current executive director. It is important to raise the
image of MAPC to have it taken seriously and it is important for moving the agenda
forward."' 3 4 A MAPC staff member echoed the importance of having a stronger public
profile saying,
we are not policy leaders, but we are opinion leaders. We do well by
changing opinion of the legislators. We can't make policy and have it turn
into law tomorrow, but smart growth advocacy is where MAPC has been a
leader. Technical assistance has become more secondary. Governor
Romney instituted good smart growth policies like 40R and
Commonwealth Capital that were significant in getting communities to
134 Interview 17B.
think about smart growth. We have had a role in bringing the idea of
smart growth to the public. Marc has been active with an outreach effort
to get MAPC into the press so when people are talking about these issues,
they hear about MAPC. About two and half years ago I needed to explain
smart growth and MAPC, but this doesn't happen anymore. Now I don't
need to explain the general word. MAPC has done a lot to get smart
growth concepts into the popular press.m
Another MAPC Executive Committee member said, "MAPC has been focusing on the
power of relationships. MAPC has been trying to be more effective at building coalition
and relationships. Through this work they have developed trust, credibility and they have
been able to have more effect. Good relationships are important to politics." 136
On May 1, 2007, MAPC ratified a new vision for the Boston region called
MetroFuture. Much like regional visioning processes that have taken place in other parts
of the country, MetroFuture is a multi-year, multi-stakeholder process that involved more
than 4,000 citizens, elected officials, planners, and representatives from other state
agencies. MetroFuture asked participants to say how they would like the Boston
metropolitan region to look in the future. MAPC staff members constructed models of
how the region might look like if it continues to develop as usual or if certain policy
measures were adopted. Participants chose among "Let it Be," continuing the current
regional trends out to 2020, "Little by Little," a plan which demands some changes in the
way land use is planned, "Winds of Change," a slightly more aggressive plan, and
"Imagine," a more dramatic change in regional land use patterns. The participants chose
"Winds of Change," with the goal of changing the current development patterns to
promote smart growth.
135 Interview 19B.
136 Interview 18B.
While the MetroFuture initiative is one of MAPC's key projects, even MAPC's
executive director, Marc Draisen, acknowledges that political advocacy is necessary if
the MetroFuture plan is ever going to be more than a document that sits on the shelf. At
the May 1, 2007 ratification of MetroFuture plan, Draisen said, "Implementation will be
hard. It is a bold plan with big ideas that requires change from the way we've been doing
things. It's going to take time, and it's going to take effort." 137 The task of differentiating
the MetroFuture plan from previous plans like Boston MetroPlan 2000 is a difficult one.
According to the Boston Globe, "The plan is similar to another proposed in 1989 by the
group that failed to gain traction and eventually fizzled. Draisen said the difference
between the two is that this time, he created the plan with input from 4,000 residents and
public figures before publicly floating it."138 An Executive Committee member said,
MetroFuture will feel initially like nothing happened. The business of
moving public opinion is complicated. At early stages this drove me nuts.
Most people in the room were already converted. We had public meetings
so we can say that thousands of people participated to give the planning
process credibility. Most of what goes into the plan will be ignored until it
becomes advantageous. We can use MetroFuture to lobby. But it is hard
to make implementation concrete. You can scare people when you make
it too concrete. So you end up with broad-brush recommendations. It is a
frustrating process.139
An implementation task force is currently working to connect MetroFuture to
state funding sources and create incentives for local communities to adopt components of
137 As quoted in Schweitzer, Sarah. "Plan envisions bustling town centers: 'MetroFuture' puts focus on
suburbs." The Boston Globe. May 1, 2007. Online at
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles'/2007/05/'01/plan envisions bustling town centers/ [last
accessed on July 24, 2007]
138 As quoted in Schweitzer, Sarah.
139 Interview 17B.
the plan.'-"' When asked about MetroFuture's impact, one Executive Committee member
said, "I have been pleasantly surprised by the influence that it has already had."' 4 1
Although the plan was just ratified in May 2007, the State Executive Office of
Transportation (EOT) has already adopted the demographic predictions of MetroFuture
as the basis of its statewide transportation forecasting. Since this will inform the
transportation model used by the MPO, this is an important step towards implementation
of the vision. The impact of EOT using the projections from MetroFuture has already
influenced MEPA (Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act) reviews. In turn, this
can influence the approval of large-scale regional transportation projects. A July 11,
2007 MEPA report on the expansion of MBTA line called the Urban Ring discusses the
importance of using MAPC's numbers:
the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC), the regional planning
agency (RPA) for the Boston metropolitan area, has been working on a
long-range plan called MetroFuture, that includes year 2030 population
and employment projections that are different (higher) than the MPO's
2007 RTP [Regional Transportation Plan], and indicate more robust
population and employment growth in the Urban Ring corridor.. .The six-
month extension requested in the NPC... is intended to allow the Boston
Region MPO to make its demographic assumptions consistent with the
Metropolitan Area Planning Council's MetroFuture Plan, and with the
latest development plans and proposals throughout the Urban Ring
corridor. 4 2
The fact that the state asked the Boston MPO to make its numbers consistent with
MAPC's MetroFuture models is an indication that MetroFuture is being taken seriously
140 I am serving on the Metro Future Implementation Task Force.
141 Interview 18B.
142 Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act (MEPA). "NPC (Notice of Project Change) Certificate
EOEA #12565," p. 2. Online at
http://www.nass.-ov/envir/mepa/pdffiies/certificates/071 107/1 2565npc.pdf [last accessed on August 1,
2007]
at the state level. If the MPO incorporates concepts from MetroFuture into its regional
transportation plan and its modeling, the MetroFuture plan will influence the allocation of
TIP funds. If other state agencies start to use MAPC's data and refer to MetroFuture as
the accepted plan for the region, the MetroFuture plan has a chance of being
implemented.
Without other direct implementation mechanisms, MAPC has to make the plan
central to the work of other state agencies. This can be accomplished by demonstrating
that the document is technically sound and accurately models regional employment,
transportation, land use, and demographics. EOT would not have adopted MAPC's
projections if EOT staff did not think its numbers were credible. MetroFuture can also be
made more relevant to state agencies if there is significant political buy-in on the part of
citizens, local elected officials, and other stakeholders. When this happens, state agencies
will not be able to ignore the recommendations in MetroFuture.
While MAPC is making some inroads at the state level, its limited authority,
along with the fiscal constraints that many communities face, makes it difficult to
convince local officials and planners that MetroFuture will help them accomplish their
goals. Referring to MetroFuture, one MAPC Board member said, "MetroFuture is all
nice. People read the report, but nobody does anything. Who is going to change the
bylaw or change the strategic plan?" 43 Another MAPC Executive Committee member
was "optimistic that MetroFuture will have some impact. The MetroFuture process of
bringing people together has been helpful. MetroFuture has lofty goals and I know how
difficult it will be to implement them. But the planning effort is credible. There is a
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good deal of focus from the layer underneath probably where it needs to be." 4 4 When
asked if MetroFuture would change local planning in his community, that same MAPC
Board member said, "the value of MetroFuture is it brought us closer to thinking of
regional issues. Particular parts will be picked up by people with interests in parts. It
won't change what we are doing. Maybe this is because we are already in a MetroFuture
mindset. But we still have to worry about local concerns first."1 The acknowledgment
that local concerns need to be addressed first is common in a region where municipalities
are consistently struggling to balance their budgets. As long as land use planning is
directly tied to the fiscal health of communities, the adoption of MetroFuture's goals
must make fiscal sense to the communities involved, otherwise they will be ignored.
While the implementation of MetroFuture will certainly be a challenge, the
process of producing the MetroFuture plan is as much of a political strategy as the
document itself. By engaging regional stakeholders in a discussion about what they want
their future to be, the organizers of MetroFuture hope that they will change the way that
people think about the interconnections between local and regional planning. Just
bringing the stakeholders together is the first step. This is a typical approach of voluntary
organizations that must first convene stakeholders in order to change their minds. Much
of the power of the MetroFuture process is the ability to demonstrate spatially, through
GIS and modeling, what will happen if land use patterns continue to follow existing
trends. In essence, the MetroFuture process creates a 'crisis' that points to our current
behavior as the cause. This is important because most of the time it is difficult for
144 Interview 16B.
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citizens who live in the 10 1 cities and towns in the region to see how everyday land use
planning decisions add up to negative regional outcomes. By demonstrating what the
region will look like if every community continues apace, MetroFuture implicates the
4,000 participants in the process and asks them to become part of the solution.
However, while the MetroFuture process has engaged more than 4,000 citizens,
planners, government officials, and activists, it is important to note that the plan was not
developed primarily by the local elected leaders (who will be responsible for its
implementation). A MetroFuture Steering Committee and MAPC Executive Committee
members (many of whom are not elected) oversaw the MetroFuture process by setting
some of the terms of the planning process, managing the timeline, and the budget, but
ratification of the final took place at a meeting attended by 500 citizens. When I asked
one MAPC Council member if he thought it would be important for the MAPC Council
to ratify MetroFuture along with the citizen participants, he felt that "MetroFuture was
ratified by more than 500+ people at the May 1st meeting. It would be bad if they went
back to the Board and then the Board said that they were not behind it." 1
4 6
The lack of participation by local elected officials in MAPC's governance is
striking. Despite new executive leadership and time and money invested in generating a
new regional vision, many interviewees cited MAPC's governance structure as an
impediment to its success. It is difficult to get elected local official actively involved
with the work of the Council. Currently there are currently only two mayors, Mayor
David Madden from Weymouth and Mayor Thomas Ambrosino from Revere, who serve
on the MAPC Council. There are a number of town selectman, but most MAPC Council
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members are not locally elected officials. This severely limits their legitimacy as
representatives. According to surveys done for MAPC's strategic plan, there are two
reasons why the Council is not effective at bringing officials to the table: "[flirst,
appointing authorities often appoint Council members who are not particularly interested
in MAPC's work, or who do not see it as very important. Some appointing officials see
the MAPC appointment as a 'throw-away,' often given to someone who has little
authority or influence in the community. Secondly, MAPC has done a poor job of
communicating with Council members, soliciting their advice and involvement, and
making the Council meetings interesting." 4 7 The findings of this report were consistent
with the comments made by interviewees about the effectiveness of MAPC. One MAPC
staff member said, "We are lucky when they appoint a planning director to the MAPC
Board. Sometimes they appoint someone who thinks this is a hobby." 148 Another
Executive Committee member said, "we don't have the kind of appointees to the Council
with stature and qualifications that we would like to see. They are not the most
politically prominent. Some mayors and selectman participate in the Council. It would
be better if the Council appointees could have more influence in their home
communities." 149
Serving on the MAPC Council is just not considered to be very important. In
fact, the following communities have vacant seats: Belmont, Bolton, Boxborough,
Canton, Concord, Dedham, Holbrook, Littleton, Malden, Maynard, Medfield, Nahant,
147 MAPC Strategic Plan, p. 5.
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Needham, Quincy, Rockland, Waltham, Wenham, Winthrop, Woburn. With that many
vacant seats and without local elected officials serving on the MAPC Council, one
interviewee felt the problem is that "MAPC doesn't have the power brokers it needs to be
taken seriously.""' A hypothesis put forward by interviewees for why serving on the
MAPC Council is not considered an important position is because the dues are too low,
and they are automatically taken off the state cherry sheet152 (communities never see the
money so local officials may forget that they are paying for it). The result is that most
cities and towns do not feel invested in MAPC. For instance, one local official said that
his town's budget is $100 million dollars and his town's MAPC dues are only $7,000.153
On a $100 million dollar business, he said, $7,000 dollars does not mean very much.
While the MAPC Council only meets a few times a year, the Executive
Committee meets every month and is described as "where the action is" by one
member. 5 4 While MAPC's Executive Committee is the smaller and more manageable
group that gives MAPC direction, even the Executive Committee was not considered by
some to be effective. One local official said, "the MAPC Executive Committee are
public servants. They care about community, but they are stuck in a rut. They come,
talk, listen, and do nothing."155 He stopped attending the Executive Committee meetings
"5 Metropolitan Area Planning Council. Online at http://www.mapc.org/about mapc/board council.htnl
[last accessed on May 3, 2007]
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because he said most of the time at the meetings was devoted to updates on reports: "why
am I coming to the Executive Committee meetings? I want to come here for substance
not to have them read me a report. They can e-mail that to me. I'm not wasting my time.
People want to be affiliated with things that make a difference.",1 6 MAPC suffers from a
chicken and egg dilemma because people do not want to be a part of something that they
perceive is not influential, particularly when they are serving as a volunteer; however, in
order to be influential, MAPC needs influential people to participate in its work.
It is interesting to note that not all MAPC Council and Executive members felt
that having a weak MAPC Council and Executive Committee was a bad thing. One
Executive Committee member felt that really there was no need to have a strong
committee because "Even if the Executive Committee wanted to be more powerful, we
are a decision-making body, but what are we deciding on? It is more about participation,
process, and sharing good ideas than power."157 Another MAPC Executive Committee
member said that in the absence of authority from the state over land use planning, it
made sense to have a weak board that put its trust in the MAPC staff: "Since the MAPC
Board doesn't exercise authority, MAPC has had to develop staff capacity to have an
impact. Trying to direct MAPC too much might be more harmful than good. MAPC has
a good staff. They hold the staff accountable. Sometimes Boards shouldn't be engaged.
For the MAPC Board to be effective, the staff has to drive the issues." 158 As the
following section of this chapter demonstrates, MAPC is able to influence development
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in the region primarily when its staff take the initiative and are able to strategically use
MAPC's capacity building assistance.
Influence of MAPC through Capacity Building
MAPC helps communities by reviewing draft bylaws, assisting with visioning
efforts, preparing buildout analyses, and apply something called "the visual preference
poll" (showing bring pictures of different development types). 159 MAPC staff members
help member communities think about what types of development they would like to see
and how their zoning bylaws either hinder or promote these objectives. One MAPC staff
member said, we "try to find out where they are so we can help them rewrite their
bylaws. We ask citizens to look at pictures and let us know what you envision." 160
MAPC has the staff expertise to be able to show citizens and local planners what their
bylaws allow for and prevent. This can be a very useful, particularly in places where a
lot of planning is done by volunteer boards whose members do not necessarily know as
much as MAPC staff members about planning and zoning techniques.
According to one Executive Committee member, "MAPC doesn't keep a good
scorecard on what cities and towns do based on MAPC influence. Staff know, but there
is no scorecard."161 When I asked staff members to rate MAPC's effectiveness at
influencing local planning, one measure used is the number of zoning bylaws that they
have helped influence. According to the 2006 Annual Report, "the agency has helped
159 Buildout analyses demonstrate to communities what their current zoning allows. What would happen if
the community is fully developed according to these codes? The benefit of these studies is that they
demonstrate to communities the positive and negative impact of their current zoning codes.
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over 70 cities and towns rewrite zoning bylaws, evaluate smart growth uses for key
parcels, keep traffic under control and expand transit, deal with crime, and prepare for
natural disasters." 62 Often communities will hire MAPC to take care of the mapping
components of their community development plans. They can also ask for assistance
with community visioning (Sharon and Wrentham), and natural resources, housing, and
community development plans (Winthrop), and transportation planning. According to
Marc Racicot, MAPC's manager of Government Services, in 2007 MAPC helped several
communities with their mixed-use zoning bylaws (Millis, Southborough, Stoughton,
Bedford, and Stow). The Town of Stoughton has cluster-zoning on the books, but it is
not usable the way the bylaw is currently written so MAPC is helping to rewrite the
bylaw. Three of these bylaws that MAPC helped rewrite passed town meeting (no easy
feat since local planners interviewed all complained that getting zoning bylaws approved
at town meeting is extremely difficult).
As a result of a State Executive Order 418 (E.O. 418) issued in 2000, localities
were encouraged to prepare buildout analyses to better understand where their existing
zoning was taking them. The state offered $30,000 to help offset the cost of completing
this work. Marc Racicot believes that Executive Order 418 was important for MAPC
because a number of communities saw that MAPC could help them plan in ways they
could not do on their own. MAPC worked "with municipalities to show them how it
would be beneficial to grow smart. We went to every municipality and showed our
PowerPoint and met with the mayors and planning staff." About 70 of the 101
municipalities in the MAPC region participated in E.O. 418. MAPC worked with almost
162 Metropolitan Area Planning Council. "2006 MAPC Annual Report." Prepared and submitted by Marc
Draisen.
30 of them. Communities started to think of MAPC as the "folks who helped them on
,l.. 163418."
MAPC has also been actively engaged in lobbying the State Legislature to
strengthen local planning and smart growth. In the absence of real authority over land
use decisions, many interviewees suggested that this is a critical role. In the 2005-2006
legislative session, MAPC helped lobby for a number of initiatives including: the
recapitalization of the Brownfields Redevelopment fund (with $30 million) and the
extension of the Brownfields Tax credit. In addition, MAPC supported the expedited
permitting legislation signed by Governor Romney on August 2, 2006 that helps
communities expedite permitting in "priority development districts." 164 The law also
provides additional funding for regional planning agencies to provide technical assistance
to localities and to produce a model for statewide expedited permitting.165
On July 25, 2007, Deval Patrick, the Governor of Massachusetts, signed
legislation that allows local cities and towns to join the Group Insurance Commission
(GIC), which currently serves 275,000 state employees and other groups by providing
them with health care and other benefits. Cities and towns will be able to save millions
of dollars by joining. This initiative was a direct result of MAPC's Municipal Health
Insurance Working Group, a two-year effort facilitated by MAPC that brought together
regional stakeholders to propose a solution to the rising cost of providing health care
benefits to municipal employees.
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164 Chapter 205 of the Acts of 2006 is known as the Expedited Permitting Law
165 Metropolitan Area Planning Council. Online at http://:'www.napc.org/reeionalplann ing /Ieislative.htnI
[last accessed on August 4, 2007]
While interviewees talked about the lack of political power of the MAPC Board
and Executive Committee, they consistently felt that MAPC's Metro Mayors Coalition
was very effective at involving local politicians and influencing policy. Established in
2001, the Coalition, which is staffed by MAPC, brings together 12 regional mayors to
discuss common concerns. The Metro Mayors Coalition has been instrumental in
lobbying for state-wide anti-gang legislation known as the Senator Charles E. Shannon Jr.
Community Safety Initiative. As a result of the new legislative initiative $1.2 million
dollars has been allocated to 10 communities in the Metro Boston region and ten in Essex
County to improve public safety. 166 The Coalition also worked together on a joint
application to Homeland Security that resulted in a $1.96 million dollar grant for public
safety equipment. Members of the Coalition are also working on emergency
preparedness plans, a priority after 9-11 and Hurricane Katrina.167 A municipal relief
agenda (helping to improve the financial situation of local cities), has been the focus of
the Coalition's attention. Their work on municipal finance influenced the passage of the
municipal relief law of 2003, which helped communities manage their finances through
capped costs and easier financing. The success of this initiative raised the visibility of
regional issues and MAPC in the process.
The success of the Metro Mayors Coalition is attributed to the political clout of
the mayors. One MAPC staff member said, "Boston is involved and we can use their
political capital. When Mayor Menino shows up we make it to the newspaper." 168 While
166 MAPC Annual Report 2006.
167 Metropolitan Area Planning Council. Online at
http://www.imapc .or 1/projects initiaives/metropolitan mayor-s.html [last accessed July 25, 2007]
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many of the issues the Coalition lobbies for are also relevant to the nearby suburbs,
sometimes there is a divide between the inner city and the outlying communities. Since
the Coalition only consists of the mayors from the 12 inner ring cities, MAPC's
involvement is sometimes perceived as evidence of MAPC's urban bias. The most
notable disagreement between the cities and suburbs was over the Community
Preservation Act (CPA) signed in 2000. The CPA provided state matching funds for
communities to purchase open space, construct and maintain affordable housing, and
preserve historic buildings. In order to access state matching funds, communities have to
vote to tax themselves with a surcharge of up to 3 percent on their annual property tax. 169
Mayors from the inner ring communities felt that they could not support the CPA the way
it was written. Their communities would be contributing to the funds that were being
distributed statewide, but since many of them were not adopting the CPA (because they
are poorer communities), they felt that they would not benefit from the program as much
as wealthier suburbs. This issue became contentious for MAPC when Marc Draisen, the
Executive Director, came out in favor of the urban position and alienated many of
MAPC's suburban members. It was a rare moment when MAPC took sides because the
organization typically tries to follow a consensus approach and to stay out of political
controversy.
Other capacity building work that has been instrumental in making MAPC more
relevant to communities is providing data and mapping services. MAPC worked with the
Boston Foundation to develop an on-line GIS mapping tool that can be used by citizens
and local planners to better understand the planning challenges they face. The website
169 For more information, see http://commrnrpres.env.state. ma.us/content/cpa.asp [last accessed August 17,
2007]
www.MetroCommondata.org was launched in 2006. It is an important resource for local
communities because it brings together census data and demographic, housing, and
economic information on the web that the 10 1 cities and towns in the region want and
need to use. One MAPC Executive Committee member described the
MetroDataCommons as "really cool. I would want to use it when we have a grant." 170
Other local planning directors said that they appreciated the level of technical expertise
that MAPC staff members had and they felt that if they needed to they could turn to
MAPC for technical assistance.' 7
Another MAPC activity that has helped demonstrate the benefits of cooperation
are the four regional services consortiums established by MAPC for joint purchasing of
equipment. One MAPC Executive Committee member saw MAPC's role in
consolidating purchasing as particularly important to making MAPC relevant. He said,
"since cities and towns are constrained by revenue and budgets, government agencies are
looking for ways to bridge boundaries and be more effective about how they spend
money. Federal and state dollars are looking for aggregate pools. MAPC is the
aggregate provider of services."172 In 2006, MAPC helped 31 municipalities buy $18
million dollars of office supplies and highway maintenance equipment. 7 3 MAPC is also
the Greater Boston Police Council's purchasing and administrative agent helping over
300 units of government purchase public safety supplies and police vehicles.174 Under a
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homeland security contract through the Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety,
MAPC also works with local communities to help plan and prepare for emergencies. In
this capacity, MAPC facilitates inter-municipal partnerships for emergency management,
policy, and fire services.
Another role that MAPC plays is staffing the Metropolitan Highway System
Advisory Board, which was created in 1997 by the State. According to MGL ch.81A, §2,
the Massachusetts Turnpike authority is required to submit plans, contracts, and
memorandum of understanding that involve land it owns to the Metropolitan Highway
System for review. MAPC staff members evaluate new highway projects and present
their findings to the advisory board. The Metropolitan Highway Advisory Board, in turn,
advises the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority through comments on how to deal with
land use, environmental impacts, air rights, and the zoning of the land they own. These
comments are advisory only.
Finally, MAPC's eight subregional committees, which consist of local planners
from the different parts of the region, are an important mechanism to bring together local
planners to discuss the challenges they face and to advise MAPC on the effectiveness of
its policies. The subregional committees help to spot shared concerns and to come up
with solutions to local problems. One local official said that "the community exchange
part of the subregional committee agenda is helpful because communities can share
information about projects."17 5 Another local town official described the subregional
committees as having a lot of potential to be useful, but admitted that in their current
form they are a motley collection of citizens, some planners, and some board of
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selectman: "a strange group of people without knowledge of the inner workings of
government to make it meaningful.""' Nevertheless, the same official admitted to
wanting to be at the subregional meetings to make sure that transportation projects that
are important to the town's development get on the subregional agenda: "I attend these
meetings because on a bi-annual basis there is a discussion about subregional
transportation priorities. I go to the meetings and talk to people. There are too many
projects in the region and not enough money so I need to constantly lobby and sell my
town's projects."177 Local planners also receive training in GIS and other technical
assistance at the subregional level. Many of the local planners who were interviewed
said that they felt the subregional councils were more useful to them than MAPC as a
whole.
Influence of MAPC on Projects of Regional Significance
When it comes to influencing projects of regional significance, MAPC's impact is
indirect. MAPC uses MEPA (Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act) as a
platform for making comments on projects of regional significance. If MAPC thinks a
project will have a regional impact, it submits a letter to MEPA commenting on the draft
and final Environmental Impact Reports (EIR). One MAPC staff member said "it would
be good if MAPC could be involved earlier in the process. By the time the draft EIR is
written, a lot of the decisions have already been made. When a project reaches the stage
of draft EIR, they have already gone through much of the public local process. They
have been reviewed by the local planning review. MAPC arrives at a late hour, late in
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the process." As a result, MAPC really has to think something is "egregious" to try to
stop a project.' 17
Another MAPC staff member discussed MAPC's indirect influence: "We don't
have authority to say 'no'. Communities don't have to listen to MAPC, but sometimes
the Secretary of Energy and the Environment can listen to MAPC and require that the
developers take the recommendations made by MAPC into account. We try to leverage
our influence. It isn't direct authority because we don't have veto power, or the ability to
say you can't do this."179 Nonetheless, MAPC can measure its impact because
occasionally the Secretary of the Environment will quote from MAPC's letter or make
the same point that MAPC made. Once the Secretary includes MAPC's concerns in a
certificate, it becomes a state mandate and has the force of law behind it. Depending on
who is Secretary of the Environment, MAPC's concerns may be taken seriously or
ignored. Over the course of a permitting process, a project can be forced to change as a
result of the Secretary of Environment's Certificate (which may be influenced by
comments made by MAPC), but not directly because of MAPC.
To show the range of influence that MAPC has over projects of regional
significance, I examine below MAPC's role in the redevelopment of the South
Weymouth Naval Air Station, Westwood Station, and the Somerville Assembly Square
and Ikea Project. In South Weymouth, MAPC was an active participant in the early
planning stages. MAPC's role in Westwood Station and Assembly Square was much
more limited.
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South Weymouth Naval Air Station Redevelopment
When the South Weymouth Naval Air Station closed in 1997, it was clear that
any redevelopment of the site would take years, involve many stakeholders, and impact
the region as a whole. Since the South Weymouth Naval Air Station straddles South
Weymouth, Rockland, and Abington, in the 1990s, through state legislation, a South
Shore Tri-Town Development Corporation (SSTTDC) was formed with its own charter
to act on behalf of the three towns. The SSTTDC is in charge of the zoning for the
project. The SSTTDC has assumed some of the regulatory powers of the three towns
regarding zoning, public infrastructure, schools, and water. It essentially acts as a 4 th
town because it is a revenue generator and spender.
The initial proposal for the redevelopment of the 1,400 acre South Weymouth
Naval Air Base was a regional mall that would have increased traffic in the area
significantly, requiring a direct highway connection to Rt. 3 that would have cost
between 50-70 million dollars. One MAPC Staff member said, "The question was should
we be spending all this money for infrastructure development for another regional mall?
There is already one that is down the road from the South Weymouth site. MAPC felt
something much better could be done." 180 So did the local leaders in Weymouth.
Through the MEPA process, MAPC commented on the project along with other
stakeholders. While MAPC and the communities' comments made it clear that they were
not happy with the proposed project, what stopped the project was that the developers
saw that they would not get money they needed for the road. They cancelled the project.
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After the initial failed proposal, the LNR Property Corporation, a large real estate
company based in Florida, followed up with a proposal for a village center. MAPC felt
that this proposal was "a lot more like it.""" However, in the draft EIR, MAPC made a
number of comments on the initial proposal regarding the placement of single family
homes at the eastern end of the airbase, a critical habitat for box turtles and a dragon fly
on the endangered species list. This was a "sticking point" for a lot of people. In the
final EIR, the developer decided not to put houses there and significantly altered the
footprint of the project. In addition, the initial proposal was for a four lane highway at
the intersection of Rt. 18 and Rt 3. The road would have crossed the wetlands and
required a variance in accordance with the Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act. The
plan was changed primarily because the developer was "legitimately concerned that they
wouldn't get the variance and permit under the natural heritage and endangered species
act."182 Since the state contributed money for the road, the state also had more review
over the project.
As it is currently proposed, the South Weymouth development is a mixed-use
project with 2,855 units and a substantial proportion of affordable housing. There are 2
million square feet of commercial and industrial uses proposed, so it will raise significant
tax revenue. The developer, LNR, is also working to attract a biotech industrial park to
the site. The idea is that some of the biotech products would actually be manufactured on
site. This is unique since often the Boston region is where research and development
happens while production occurs in less expensive places like North Carolina. There will
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be some retail designed for residents and employees on the site and a small downtown
destination. The LNR proposal provides for development on 400 acres along with the
preservation of about 1,000 acres (some of this will be a golf course). LNR is trying to
move the development to a different part of the site in order to avoid the wetlands since
the local conservation commission, the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP),
and the Natural Heritage and Endangered Species Program (NHESP) will have to issue
permits. LNR wants to avoid complications with these regulatory agencies by what the
MAPC staff member described as "doing the right thing."183
When projects are considered 'major and complicated,' MEPA appoints a
Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC). Since the South Weymouth project meets these
criteria, a citizens advisory committee was appointed by the Secretary of the
Environment. It consists of members of the three towns and neighboring towns such as
Hingham. MAPC has a seat on the CAC. According to the MAPC official, MAPC is
"glad to be a part of the process at CAC because they have more in-depth experience with
local groups so that they better understand the projects." 184 As a result of participating in
CAC, MAPC is more informed. The CAC is involved with every stage of project review.
The developer meets with the CAC to go over the data and comments on the draft and
final EIR before they are made public. It is essentially a pre-public review. MAPC
eventually reviews the EIR and makes comments to MEPA, but being on the CAC
committee is described by the MAPC staff member as "another bite at the apple." 85
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However, MAPC recognizes that it is just one member of CAC and it is a "guest on their
turf.""' If there is something that MAPC officials feel is very important, they can push
harder for or against it later in their MEPA letter.
In the South Weymouth project, MAPC staff reviewed the project throughout the
ongoing design effort. MAPC reviewed the Re-Use Plan for Naval Air Station South
Weymouth and the zoning bylaws. It also helped with peer reviews of the Master Plan
and the Village Center Plan before the draft EIR.187 As a result, MAPC was involved
early and "helped move the process along."188 The peer review report examined project
marketing, as well as its fiscal, economic, demographic, and housing impacts. The report
cost $120,000 and was prepared by MAPC and the Old Colony MPO. LNR paid for half
of the cost of the report and the rest was paid by a grant from the Executive Office of
Environmental Affairs (EOEA) and additional transportation funding. According to the
peer review, the project would generate about $14.2 million in revenue, and cost about
$10.1 million (particularly school costs).189 Thus, the analysis showed that that the
project would be a net positive for the region. According to a MAPC staff member, "It
was particularly important to have a common base of data." 190 By developing data that
was agreed to by a number of different stakeholders, the peer review helped minimize
contention. Several interviewees suggested that MAPC was particularly influential in
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190 Interview 2B.
this process in part because there was money available for the peer review. One MAPC
staff member said, "normally we do too much on too little budget. The staff work 50-60
hour weeks and then they don't do as good a job as they can when they have adequate
funding.' 9"
MAPC's comments on the Draft EIR acknowledged the strengths of the project
and suggested a number of improvements. MAPC's letter to MEPA concluded: "In sum,
MAPC believes that this project merits careful review and analysis, and that if properly
developed it can yield significant benefits to the region. Our comments above are offered
in that spirit, and I hope you will take them into consideration as you prepare your
Certificate on this Draft Environmental Impact Report and in subsequent phases of
review."1 92 The language used in the letter is deferential to MEPA and recognizes that
MAPC's influence is entirely dependent on whether the state agrees with MAPC's
suggestions.
Westwood Station
In January 2007, developers Cabot, Cabot, and Forbes submitted a draft
Environmental Impact Report (EIR) under the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act
(MEPA) for the development of Westwood station, a 4.5 million square foot mixed-use
development.193 While the project is located at an Amtrak stop, MAPC is not convinced
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192 December 11, 2006. Letter from Marc Draisen to Robert W. Golledge Jr., Secretary of
Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, RE: Redevelopment of Former Naval Air Station, S.
Weymouth and Associated Transportation, EOEA # 11085R, DEIR.
193 Westwood Town Hall. Online at http://www.townha ill.westwood. ma.us/inIidex.cfn'?pid=15900 [last
accessed on July 30, 2007]
that the project represents a 'smart growth' approach at this location because the project
is too big for the site and will have negative impacts on the regional transportation and
water systems. One MAPC staff member said,
on paper it is a mixed-use high density project, but there is concern about
the sheer scale and size of it. It will generate considerable traffic.
Although it is next to the rail line, only 3-5% of the trips will be by rail.
Since there will be a lot of retail on the site, it will attract a lot of shoppers.
It will act as a regional mall with 1,000 units of housing and an office
park. The question is how much traffic will it generate? Route 128 and
95 are already over capacity. There has been a plan to widen 128 by a
lane, but the calculation is that the new traffic from the Westwood project
will generate enough traffic to fill up the new lane they are adding. There
are a lot of good attributes to the project, but MAPC would like to see it
scaled down, especially on the retail side. They are redeveloping an old
industrial site, which is good, but they are building around the town well.
They want to build on every square inch. The site plan is intensive. But
MAPC is not tzar of this. We don't get to decide.1 94
While MAPC cannot force the developer to change its plans, MAPC can make its
objections known in the MEPA letter. MAPC's letter to MEPA said, "While this project
has significant smart growth elements MAPC believes that it has not reached its potential
- and the State must move it further along that path." 95
At Westwood Station, MAPC is concerned about regional impacts. The property
is located in the Town of Westwood, but it borders the Town of Canton. The predicted
traffic will be on local roads and Rt. 128. Although MAPC usually likes to stay out of
the way of local decision-makers, MAPC did come out against a decision by the Town of
Westwood (proposed by Westwood to Norfolk County) to close Canton Street to traffic.
This would have cut off neighboring communities from one another. Norfolk County,
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where the communities are located, agreed to do a "trial run" of the street closure.
However, MAPC staff members talked to newspapers and the County and made it clear
that they thought this was a terrible idea. MAPC staff members admitted that it is 'rare'
for them to come out against a community decision because they view the communities
as their clients. MAPC was able to make its opposition to Westwood's street closure
proposal more impartial by basing its comments on its expertise in traffic modeling. In
this way MAPC avoided doing too much political damage to its relationship with the
Town of Westwood. To date, the ultimate decision as to whether or not the project will
move forward rests with other authorities such as the local planning boards, conservation
commissions, and the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act (MEPA).
Assembly Square Ikea Project
The Assembly Square project consists of 1.4 million square feet of retail, 5
million square feet of research and development and office space, and 3 million square
feet of residential space. 196 According to MAPC's 2007 MEPA letter, "When fully
developed, this project will be consistent with many of MAPC's Smart Growth
Principles. Specifically, the project has undergone an extensive public process; it is
located on a brownfield site; at full build-out it will be transit oriented; it will provide a
mixture of uses including jobs and housing, and 12.5% of the housing units will be
affordable. In addition, the project will incorporate some innovative techniques for
handling storm water: the project will incorporate green roofs and will store storm water
196 Boston Metropolitan Planning Organization. "TransReport: A Newsletter of the Boston Metropolitan
Planning Organization," p. 2. November 2006. Online at
http://www.ctps.org/bostonmpo/resources/trpt I I 06.pdf [last accessed August 1, 2007]
for irrigation needs. LEED certification will be sought for the IKEA store."''7 While in
2007 MAPC views the project as consistent with regional goals, the project was not
always a model of transit-oriented development. The project had a number of earlier
iterations that called primarily for 'big box' retail development. Stalled in court by
community activists, it was only after years of negotiation that the project reemerged as a
mixed-use transit-oriented project.
Over the course of project evaluation, MAPC helped with the analysis of the
impacts of different types of development on transportation and employment. However,
when modeling the impacts, MAPC staff tried to be objective because they felt that the
situation was very contentious. One interviewee said that the process became so
contentious that "everyone got scared to the sidelines." 198 MAPC staff recognized that
there were a number of stakeholders involved in the process and they did not want to be
perceived as coming out as for or against a particular viewpoint. While MAPC did not
take a public stand on the project, project proponents and opponents used MAPC's data.
Wig Zamore, a community activist active in the Mystic River Task Force that opposed
the initial project, said that the data that MAPC provided, particularly the transportation
impacts of the project, helped him make his case. He was "grateful for their support in
public comment, but unfortunately, MAPC was not able to be aggressive." 199
197 April 6, 2007. Letter from Marc Draisen to Ian Bowles, Secretary
Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, RE: Assembly Square, Somerville, EOEA # 13989 EENF
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On October 17, 2006, Somerville Mayor Joseph A. Curtatone announced that an
agreement had finally been reached between the City of Somerville and the developers. 200
The PUD (Planned Unit Development) plan for the site was approved in December 2006.
A new Orange Line Station is planned and IKEA and Federal Realty Investment Trust
will contribute $15 million that will go towards design and construction of the new
station (an additional $25 million is paid by the federal New Mark Program).201 One
MAPC staff member said, "it was a battle going on for 8 years. The mayor was in favor
of the project. It is quintessential smart growth project. The project has smart growth,
mixed uses, and is T accessible. It is hard to be against it." 202 When the project is
completed (hopefully in 2009), it looks as though it will meet MAPC's smart growth
goals. However, MAPC's influence throughout the on-going process was minimal since
the organization stayed at the sidelines.
Local Planning and Barriers to Regional Planning
So far, this chapter has explored the history of MAPC, the effect of MAPC's
institutional dynamics on its ability to influence land use planning in the region, MAPC's
new leadership and new plan, MAPC's capacity building role, and how it influences
projects of regional significance. In this final section, I describe what local land use
planning looks like in the 1-495 region of Boston in the absence of a strong metro
presence. Many of the findings from the 1-495 area hold for the MAPC region as a
200 Interview 3B.
201 Boston Metropolitan Planning Organization. "TransReport: A Newsletter of the Boston Metropolitan
Planning Organization," p. 2. November 2006. Online at
http://www.ctps.org /boston mpo.'resources/trpt I 106.pdtf [last accessed August 1, 2007]
202 Interview 19B.
whole. I include this section to highlight some of the challenges of planning in a state
with a weak state planning framework and without a strong regional planning body. 2
While MAPC's governance structure certainly limits its effectiveness, there are
other obstacles as well. MAPC does its regional planning work in a highly constrained
state context. Under the current weak planning framework in Massachusetts, land use
planning is entirely local. Since there is no state requirement of consistency between the
master plan and local zoning, a plan for a mixed-use downtown that is outlined in a
master plan, may, in fact, not be possible under local zoning regulations. Since local land
use planning in Massachusetts relies on the support of local officials rather than a
concerted professionally-managed visioning process, it is no surprise that most of the
recommendations of Boston MetroPlan 2000 were never implemented. The lack of
requirements for zoning consistency with the local master plan and with a regional plan
means that regional or area-wide planning is entirely advisory.
In each community, ad hoc groups form quickly in the face of any serious threat to
community character. The strength of local groups at influencing local land use planning
can make regional planning difficult, particularly when in order to meet regional goals
each community has to adopt unpopular policies like increasing density. In addition,
officials in every locality struggle to maintain strong tax bases, particularly in the face of
cuts in state funding, the need to accommodate rapidly growing school populations (and
the fact that taxes from many residential developments do not cover the costs of
educating the children who live in those houses), and escalating demands for other high-
quality public services.
203 These findings are based on a previous study I conducted with Lawrence Susskind for the Rappaport
Institute of Greater Boston.
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While the 10 1 local communities in the MAPC region often face the same pressures
for development, many of the local planners that I interviewed respond differently to
similar pressures and problems. These differences in how they plan reflect the views of
elected and appointed town officials, variations in community values, and participants in
local legislative bodies (particularly town meetings). Professional planners in these
communities generally take their cue from public officials and volunteer boards rather
than looking to MAPC for solutions. Sometimes MAPC can help to strengthen local
planning (when they help communities with visioning and rewriting bylaws), but these
are more the exception than the norm. For the most part, local land use planning in the
Boston region reflects a local rather than a regional logic.
Several other factors also shape local land use policies in the Boston region. Most
notably, the state law known as Chapter 40B allows the state to overrule local land use
regulations for projects in communities where less than 10 percent of the housing stock is
affordable. If 20-25 percent of the units in a proposed development are subsidized to
affordable levels, a developer can propose to build a housing project on land where
zoning would preclude residential development. Developers can also propose projects
with higher densities than would normally be allowed. In these instances, the state is
allowed to override local regulations. Some planners and officials feel that Chapter 40B
has thwarted local efforts to plan for growth.204 However, others admit the important role
that Chapter 40B has played in encouraging affordable housing construction in
communities where there has traditionally been resistance to it.
204 If a Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) Board does not approve a Chapter 40B project, the developer can
make a case to the State Housing Appeals Committee. The State Housing Appeals committee can overrule
the local zoning decision. For more information see http://www.chapa.orgi40b fact.htnl [last accessed
February 6, 2007]
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Regional cooperation is also made more difficult by the fact that each community
has to raise its own revenue from its property taxes. With tax revenue-raising abilities
strictly limited by Proposition 2 1/2, a Massachusetts law limiting the annual increase in
property taxes to 2.5 percent, it has been increasingly difficult for localities to pay for
schools, employee health care, snow removal, police and fire protection, road repair and
other infrastructure improvements. One of the only ways that communities can raise
more revenue is by attracting new commercial development. As a result, communities
compete with one another to offer better tax abatement packages to lure businesses.
Municipal officials respond negatively to large developments in other towns that might
negatively impact their localities. Lawsuits between municipalities commonly occur
when project impacts spill across borders and benefits are not shared. One town official
who 'won' a large commercial development admitted to not wanting to share any of the
property tax revenue associated with the new development with neighboring towns.
Towns have sued each other for a share of tax revenue from development projects,
especially when development has negative externalities. In 2004, Framingham sued
Natick, arguing that Natick had not consulted with Framingham over plans to expand the
Natick Mall. This was despite an earlier agreement that the two towns would consult
with each other over developments in the area where the mall is located, which is known
as the Golden Triangle. While Natick would receive $1.7 million a year in additional tax
revenue from the mall expansion, Framingham officials worried that they would be stuck
with added traffic, an estimated 9,000 additional trips, and no additional revenue. 2 The
Town of Framingham sued the mall developer, General Growth Properties, to pay for
20s Allison O'Leary Murray. "Towns Spar Over Road Improvements In Mall Expansion." Boston Globe,
Globe West, July 15, 2004, p. 1.
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traffic improvements. General Growth agreed to pay Framingham $1 million to
withdraw its lawsuit against the expansion.
There are numerous other cases of communities in the Boston metropolitan region
suing each other over development projects. Ashland sued Framingham over a
development near the intersection of Routes 9 and 90.206 Wayland appealed
Framingham's approval of the National Development Planned Unit Development that
borders the two communities; a case that was dropped when the developer agreed to give
the town $1.45 million to make traffic related improvements. 207
While lawsuits between neighboring towns are not uncommon, local leaders
increasingly acknowledge the need for more regional solutions, especially when it comes
to infrastructure. Rapid population growth has meant that many communities are
struggling with common problems--particularly providing services--highlighting the need
for more regional cooperation. Some municipalities are discussing cost-share certain
services, such as a regional dispatch systems for police and fire departments. However,
such discussions about sharing resources are often uphill battles, since consolidating
services can threaten local autonomy and the livelihoods of people who currently hold
those positions in each town. One Town Administrator said that when a neighboring town
lost its police chief he offered to share his police chief for a year at no cost to his
neighbor, but officials in the other town rejected his proposal fearing that it threatened
their autonomy. This is a typical story in Massachusetts. Local officials see themselves
as elected by and responsible only to local constituents, who want them to keep their tax
206 Allison O'Leary Murray, p. 1.
207 Matt McDonald, "Developers Reach a Deal with Wayland," The Boston Globe, March 17, 2005, West
Edition, p. 1.
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burden low, provide desired services, and to respond to local concerns. Given the short
time frame of the local election cycle, it is no surprise that regional cooperation and
longer-term regional planning is not a high priority for most municipal politicians, who
focus on their own immediate jurisdiction.
There are a number of issues facing communities in the 495 corridor that local
officials recognize that they cannot solve on their own. Among the most pressing inter-
municipal issues in the region are sewage treatment, drinking water supplies, and
transportation. Towns in the 1-495 region have seen little progress in resolving these vital
issues. Since most 1-495 communities are not connected to the Massachusetts Water
Resources Authority (MWRA), which provides drinking water and wastewater treatment
for most of greater Boston, they cannot accommodate significant new development with
concurrent investments in water and sewage infrastructure.208 Serious concerns about
protecting aquifers and drinking water supplies in the region many communities to adopt
laws governing development near wetlands that are stricter than state standards. 209
MAPC has tried to serve as an educational resource for these communities by producing
a guide to water reuse in the region and providing technical assistance.210
Traffic caused by new development is another critical regional concern.
Residents must often drive through at least one other town to get to a major highway.
2 08 In the 1-495 region, the only communities serviced by the MWRA are Northborough, Southborough,
Framingham, Marlborough, Ashland, and Natick. For a map of the MWRA service area see
http://www.mwra.state.ma.us/02org/html/o606cemap.pdf
209 Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research and Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston. 2005.
Massachusetts Housing Regulation Database. Prepared by Amy Dain and Jenny Schuetz. Online at
http://www.inasshousingregulations.com/ [last accessed August 19, 20071
"' MAPC and the 495/ Corridor Partnership produced "Once is Not Enough: A Guide to Water Reuse in
Massachusetts," November 2005. Online at
http://www.napc.org/reg ionalplann ing/MA PCWater Reuse_ Report 2005 .pdf [last accessed September
4,2007]
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Many of the key highway interchanges are already close to capacity, even though
maximum development levels have not been reached .2 ' This will require municipal
cooperation to resolve.
MAPC has tried to capitalize on the growing understanding of local officials that
doing everything on their own is detrimental to their communities. The more that
regional entities like MAPC can help municipalities reduce their costs by helping them
make a case for additional resources from the state, the more local officials and
politicians will see the value of regional cooperation. MAPC's cooperative purchasing
program directly acknowledges the growing inability of communities to meet fiscal
demands and helps them pool their resources to buy equipment. However, while local
officials are interested in projects that will help them in the day-to-day management of
their communities, they continue to be skeptical about the role that a regional planning
entity, like MAPC, can play. Most local planning officials in the 1-495 region still
perceive MAPC, as being primarily interested in larger cities and in communities that are
closer to Boston.
The more regionalism was more specifically defined in terms of just the 1-495
region, the more favorably local officials in that area spoke about it. Cities and towns in
the region have been working with MAPC, the MetroWest Growth Management
Committee (the sub-regional branch of MAPC), and groups such as the 495/MetroWest
Corridor Partnership, a consortium of local officials and corporations, on 1-495 regional
issues, such as housing affordability, transportation, and water and sewer capacity.
Several planners said the MetroWest Growth Management Committee, which brings
211 Erica Noonan. "Clogged Artery: Eight Communities, Eight Different Directions for Route 9." The
Boston Globe. April 29, 2007.
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together local planners monthly to discuss projects of regional significance, has recently
become a stronger force.
Although municipal officials recognize that some kind of regional planning makes
sense, stakeholders involved in local planning in the Boston region doubt that inter-
municipal cooperation will ever be achieved. Local interests clearly remain first priority
in the Boston region. As one local planner said, "People are interested in inter-municipal
coordination until their ox gets gored." When asked what happened on the other side of
the town's boundaries, one planning official told me that it was not his concern. Another
planner was interested in regional collaboration because "we can't sustain this model.
Each community cannot afford to have its own police chief and town administrator.
Towns have to get over the mentality that they have to have their OWN everything."
Conclusion
As the story of MAPC demonstrates, regional planning without authority is no
easy task. However, in spite of the challenges facing MAPC, the organization has
managed to make itself helpful to localities in the metropolitan area. One MAPC
Executive Committee member described MAPC: "the perception is that MAPC has no
regulatory influence and that we are a lame duck with no teeth and we are not effective.
There are other regional planning agencies with more direct influence, but in light of the
fact that we don't have authority, we have had increasing influence through good
work."212 The more that MAPC can help communities save money on the purchase of
police cars and other municipal services, demonstrate its influence on the legislature, and
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provide technical assistance to local planners, the more MAPC has been able to
demonstrate the value of regional cooperation. If we measure the effectiveness of
MAPC in terms of the extent to which local communities adopt its regional plan, then
MAPC is not effective. However, if we look at the broader impact of MAPC, we see that
MAPC is influencing development in the region. It serves as an opinion shaper, a place
where local officials can convene and discuss issues of concern, and a resource,
providing communities with data and technical assistance.
It remains to be seen if MetroFuture will add to MAPC's influence. Based on my
interviews, it is unlikely that MetroFuture will radically change local land use practices.
It will most likely be adopted in the same ad hoc way in which MAPC's previous
initiatives have been adopted. Some communities may change their planning as a result
of MetroFuture, but this will be a function of local decisions by local leaders more than
anything else. Most communities will probably continue to make land use decisions
based primarily on fiscal considerations. While MetroFuture's adoption may vary, its
best hope for success is that it will become an important political tool that MAPC can use
to influence other state agencies with greater authority.
Through innovation and an understanding of how to influence other stakeholders
who have more authority, MAPC has reinvented itself and become more relevant.
However, it still operates in the context of a weak state planning framework where
localities are each struggling according to a local logic. Without authority over the
allocation of transportation funds or the power to reject local plans that other regional
planning agencies have, it is likely that MAPC will greatly influence future local land use
planning in the Boston region.
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Boston Interviews Between June 2005 and August 2007:
Kristin Alexander, Assistant Planning Director, Town of Acton
Jay Ash, City Manager, City of Chelsea
Peter Ashton, Chair of the Board of Selectman, Town Acton
Sean Caron, MAPC Policy and Planning Counsel, MAPC
Michelle Ciccolo, Assistant Town Administrator, Town of Hudson
Jim Clarke, Director of Planning and Community Development, Town of Weymouth
Amy Cotter, Senior Program Manager, MAPC
Roland Bartl, Planning Director, Town of Acton
Kathleen Bartolini, Planning Director, Town of Framingham
Rick Dimino, President, MAPC Executive Committee
Ed Clancy, Head of the Urban Affairs Committee and the Conservation Committee on
the City Council in Marlborough
Marc Draisen, Executive Director, MAPC
Jay Grande, Planning Board Administrator, Town of Framingham
Elizabeth Hughes, Planner, Town of Boxborough
Donna Jacobs, Director, Metrowest Growth Management Committee
Lisa Lepore, P.E., Director of Infrastructure and Transportation for Mayor's Office of
Strategic Planning and Community Development, City of Somerville
Helen Lemoine, Past Planning Chair, Framingham Planning Board
Al Lima, Former Planning Director, City of Marlborough
Barbara Lucas, Manager, Transportation Planning, MAPC
Mayor Madden, Mayor, Town of Weymouth
Greg Naminsky, Chairman of the Planning Board, Town of Acton
Jeff Nutting, Town Administrator, Town of Franklin
Martin Pillsbury, Manager, Regional Planning, MAPC
Marc Racicot, Manager, Government Services, MAPC
Tim Reardon, Regional Planner, MAPC
Lauren Rosenzweig, Former Planning Board Member and now Board of Selectman,
Town of Acton
Pricilla Ryder, Marlborough Conservation Officer, Marlborough Conservation
Commission, City of Marlborough
Trish Settles, Executive Director, Marlborough CDC
Wig Zamore, Mystic River Task Force
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Chapter 3: Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG): Becoming A
Regional Player
Map of DRCOG Member Counties
Source: Downloaded July 4, 2007 from http://www.drcog.org/
"Our senses tell us that the Colorado that we once knew is rapidly changing. Denver
used to be a compact, attractive city with clear air and a magnificent view of the Front
Range. Now, coming in for a landing at Stapleton Field, we see down below a
metropolitan area sprawling toward the horizon in all directions-often covered by a
blanket of smog obscuring the Front Range. Is this Denver?"213
- Colorado Land Use Commission, 1973
In 1973, the Colorado Land Use Commission was concerned that the state was changing.
Denver was no longer the small cattle town that it had once been. Instead it was
"sprawling toward the horizon in all directions." In 1970, the population of the Denver
metro region was 1,235,936.214 By 2000, it reached 2,400,580.215 In 1999, when asked
213 Colorado Land Use Commission. "Report by the Colorado Land Use Commission: A Land Use
Program for Colorado," 1973, p. ix.
2 Data from the MetroDenver data center. Online at
http://www.metrodenver.org/d ataCenter/Demographpics/population.icm [last accessed on July 23, 2007]
215 Data from the MetroDenver data center. Downloaded July 23, 2007 from Data from the MetroDenver
data center. Online at http://www.netrodenver.org/dataCenter/Denographics/population.icn [last
accessed on July 23, 2007]
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by the Pew Center for Civic Journalism about their key concerns, 60 percent of the
respondents in the Denver region cited traffic, growth, and sprawl. 2 16 Today, Denver
continues to grow in terms of population and land use. Between 2000 and 2002, 22
square miles of open space was developed.m With a 2006 population of 2,711,536 and
the expectation of one million more people by 2030, managing Denver's rapid
development is a major challenge.8 Even without an additional million people,
congestion in the Denver metropolitan region is already ranked third worst in the nation
according to the Texas Transportation Institute. m Fear of congestion and uncontrolled
growth has lead citizens and leaders in the Denver region to adopt a more regional
approach.
Interest in Denver's regionalism is not new. Writing in 2000, Myron Orfield said
that in Denver "there has been a growing recognition of the benefits of a regional
approach to addressing metropolitan problems."220 Bob Ewegen, in a 1999 Denver Post
article, pondered why regionalism was taking hold in Colorado: "As newcomers to this
216 Pitt, Jennifer and Carl Castillo. "Sprawl in the Denver Region," Environmental Defense. Boulder,
Colorado, 2000, p. 2. Online at
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/docuents/ 1302 DenverSprawl Report.pdf [last accessed on July
23, 2007]. The Pew Center for Civic Journalism study was published in 2000. Online at
http://www.pewcenter.org/doingcj/research/r ST2000natl.html#sprawl [last accessed August 19, 2007]
m Denver Regional Council of Governments. "Measuring Progress: Regional Performance Measures and
Indicators" (April 2005). Online at
http://www.drcog.org/documents/Measuring%20Progress%20final%204-05.pdf [last accessed August 19,
2007]
218 Denver Regional Council of Governments. "State of the Region 2007." Online at
http://www.drcog.org/documents/SOR07 Booklet FINAL singlepages.pdf [last accessed on April 23,
2007]
219 Kathleen McCormick, "Regional Thinking," Urban Land (September 2006), 90.
20 Myron Orfield. "Denver Metropolitics: A Regional Agenda for Community and Stability," (April
2000), 10. Online at http:/iietroresearch.org/naps/region 1fm aps/'DV report.pdf [last accessed on July 23,
2007]
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state quickly learn, Colorado doesn't have anything approaching regional government.
Even today, metro Denver more closely resembles the warring city states of ancient
Greece than a cohesive community of interest. Yet, we've managed to regionalize certain
specific services including RTD, sewage, flood control, cultural facilities, and our new
baseball and football stadiums."221 Ewegen attributed some of the success of regionalism
to DRCOG whose "only real power is the power to seek a consensus." 222
Denver and DRCOG, the Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG), a
voluntary association of governments that includes 52 county and city governments in the
Denver metropolitan area, has started to show up in the literature about regionalism in
much the same way that Portland and Metro did in the 1990s (see Appendix for list of
membership). DRCOG is a nonprofit association of local jurisdictions who each pay
membership dues. Each of the 52 member local jurisdictions has a local elected official
who serves on the DRCOG Board of Directors that directs the organization. One local
planning director described DRCOG "as local government" because it is made up of local
elected officials. 223 The governor appoints three non-voting members to the Board. The
City and County of Denver each have one representative (because Denver pays for two
memberships).224 DRCOG is funded through membership dues and state and federal
grants. In 2006, DRCOG had an operating budget of $12,746, 216 and expected
revenues of $12,899,426. In addition, DRCOG also administered almost 6 million
m Bob Ewegen. " 'Dr. Cog' wrote Rx for Denver." The Denver Post. April 12, 1999.
m Bob Ewegen (1999).
223 Interview 13D.
2 Denver Regional Council of Governments. Online at
http://www.drcoe.ore/index.cfm?page=DirectorsAndStaff [last accessed on July 18, 2007]
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dollars of pass-through grants to local governments.
With the passage of FasTracks, a regional light rail system funded by a $4.7
billion dollar bond measure approved by the region's voters, the Mile High Compact, the
Metro Vision Regional Plan, and a voluntary Urban Growth Boundary, Denver is viewed
as a successful example of voluntary regionalism. "The Denver metropolitan area has
been a model of regional cooperation, with municipalities and counties working together
improve infrastructure and accommodate growth," writes Kathleen McCormick for a
2006 issue of Urban Land magazine.226 The fact that 58 percent227 of the region's voters
decided to tax themselves (through an increase in sales tax from .6 to .10) $4.7 billion
dollars in order to fund a regional light rail project signals that something is happening at
a regional level.228 Speaking about the region's support for FasTracks, Denver's Mayor
Hickenlooper said: "This strong consensus really defines the metro area as a region that
works together." 229 More than 30 mayors from the region and a dozen chambers of
commerce came together to support the FasTracks proposal, a record number in a region
where jurisdictional sales tax wars have traditionally been more common than regional
cooperation.
225 Denver Regional Council of Governments. "DRCOG Board Update." September 21, 2005. Online at
http://www.drcog.org/documents/Update%209%202005%20web.pd [last accessed July 19, 20071
226 Kathleen McCormick (September 2006) 88.
227 Online at http://www.smartgrowth.ore/news/bvstate.asp?state=CO&res=1024 [last accessed July 2,
2007]
228 The T-REX Project was the region's first large scale rail project which created 19 miles of light rail and
expanded Interstate 25 and 1-225. This project cost $1.67 billion. Online at
http://wvww.metrodenver.or/DataCenter/CityCountyProftiles/ [last accessed August 19, 2007]
229 Jeffrey Leib. "Voters climb aboard FasTracks tax boost YES: 57.2% NO: 42.8% PRCTS: 88.4%."
Denver Post. November 3, 2004, p. B-01.
230 Jeffrey Leib (November 3, 2004), p. B-01.
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The question is how citizens, politicians, and the business community in the
Denver region came together to lobby for a major investment in regional public
transportation that requires increasing taxes? The Denver region's recognition of the
need for a regional mass transportation solution and the adoption of a tax to pay for it,
provides smart growth and regional governance advocates with hope that other American
metropolitan areas may be ready for regional solutions. The fact that Denver is a
considered a leader for regionalism and regional mass transit is particularly surprising
given that in the 1990s Denver's development patterns were being compared to Los
Angeles. In addition, Denver is typically considered more conservative than other parts
of the country where more progressive planning policies have typically taken hold.
Another reason for academic interest in Denver's regionalism is the Mile High
Compact (MHC), described by its authors as "a landmark voluntary agreement" signed in
2000 by cities and counties in the Denver Regional Council of Governments
231(DRCOG). Communities that sign onto the Mile High Compact, take an extra step in
the adoption of the goals outlined in Metro Vision, DRCOG's voluntary regional plan.
By signing the Mile High Compact, jurisdictions commit themselves under Colorado
State Law to follow the goals of Metro Vision. 2 Signatories to the compact agree that
their comprehensive/master plans will follow the principles of Metro Vision. According
to DRCOG, the MHC "commits participants to working together to manage and direct
growth throughout the Denver region by adhering to the principles outlined in Metro
231 As of October 2006, 42 cities and counties in the region have signed the MHC making up 87.3% of the
regions population. Participating population is 2,326,272 of a total regional population of 2,664,894. Online
at http://www.drcog.org/docunents/MH COMPACT Oct_06.pdf [last accessed August 19, 2007]
232 Although here it is important to note that the legal authority of the Mile High Compact has never been
used. It is understood as a symbolic document rather than a legal one.
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Vision."m As of April 2007, 44 jurisdictions have signed the MHC (see Appendix for
list). Peter Kenney, Co-Founder and Principal of the not-for-profit, Civic Results, which
started Denver's Metro Mayors Caucus (MMC), a coalition of mayors from 37 cities and
towns in the region that worked together with DRCOG on the development and execution
of the Mile High Compact, 234 describes the Mile High Compact as "voluntary
regionalism that's working."m However, as this chapter will explore, the effectiveness
of voluntary regionalism is not always clear. A local planning director I interviewed
echoed the opinion of many interviewees when he said of the MHC: "it makes good
press, but it is not a useful tool for enforcement." 236 He cited examples where signatories
to the MHC have not followed Metro Vision's principles. However, so far no community
that signed the MHC has ever been penalized for not following Metro Vision's principles.
Local officials may participate in the DRCOG meetings and agree to plan in the spirit of
the regional plan, but without mechanisms for enforcement, the regional planning
direction continues to be dictated by local concerns.
The Denver region turns out to be an excellent case study for the middle range of
metropolitan authority, the independent variable for my research. If we define
metropolitan authority as the presence of money and power, the Denver Regional Council
of Governments (DRCOG) has more authority than Boston's MAPC since DRCOG is the
233 Denver Regional Council of Governments. Online at
http://,vww.drcog.org/index.cfmi?page=MilellighCompact [last accessed on August 19, 2007]
234 The success of the Mile High Compact is often attributed to the participation of the MMC. However,
MMC members and DRCOG officials I interviewed both acknowledged the importance of the
collaboration between MMC and DRCOG for the Mile High Compact.
235 Alliance for Regional Stewardship, Alliance Leadership Forum, Meeting Notes and Summary, La Jolla
California, May 2-3, 2002. Online at http://www.regionalstewardship.org/Docunents/ForunNotes(SD).pdf
[last accessed on July 5, 2007]
236 Interview 16D.
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Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) for the region, but less than Portland Metro's
because it does not operate in the context of a strong state land use planning framework
(although Colorado state law does require that local jurisdictions have comprehensive
237plans they are currently only advisory). According to one local planning director,
"DRCOG is not a regulatory agency and they are the first ones to tell you that."238 In
fact, DRCOG staff members were proud of the progress they had made using non-
regulatory tools.
So how is regionalism happening in Denver without the heavy hand of regulation
that we expect to see in Portland? Is voluntary regionalism in Denver successful at
influencing local planning? To what extent is voluntary regionalism really a function of
DRCOG's control over transportation funds rather than a culture of regionalism? Is
Denver a model for other regions? Is DRCOG really able to accomplish its mission of
being "a place where local officials can work together to solve the region's problems"?239
If so, what are the keys to DRCOG's success? Does capacity building play a similar role
in Denver that it does in Boston and Portland? How can other regions learn from
Denver? These are some of the questions that I answer through interviews with local
officials about how DRCOG influences local planning decisions.
237 The Colorado Chapter of the APA lobbied for a bill that will allow the statutory framework for cities to
adopt and implement their master/comprehensive plans rather than having plans that are advisory only.
The bill, HB-1246, the Predictability in Planning Act, passed the Colorado House and Senate in 2007 and is
waiting for signatures to become law.
238 Interview 16D.
239 Denver Regional Council of Governments. Online at
http://www.drcog.org/index.cfm?page=WhatisDRCOG? [last accessed on August 19, 2007]
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History and Institutional Development of DRCOG
Like most regional planning agencies, DRCOG took many years to develop as an
organization. Over time and through several iterations, it developed into its current
organizational form. As the Denver region grew from 452,000 to 620,000 in the 1950s,
local jurisdictions saw the need for a regional approach to planning. The Inter-County
Regional Planning Association (ICRPA) was created in 1955 with Adams, Arapahoe,
Jefferson counties, and the City and County of Denver. Not surprisingly, transportation
was one of the first regional issues it tackled. One of the major initiatives of the ICRPA
was support of a major east-west highway connection now known as highway 1-70. In
1957, ICRPA called for the construction of a freeway around the metropolitan region
(now 1-25) and in 1958 it approved its first regional transportation plan. The Valley
Highway, which is now 1-25 opened in 1958 and 1-70 opened in 1964. ICRPA's 1956
study of the region's sewage and water needs led to the creation of the Metropolitan
Denver Sewage Disposal District in 1960. The ICRPA also conducted a 1959 study on
how to relieve airport congestion at Stapleton by providing alternative airports for private
aircraft. 4
In the 1960s as the region continued to grow to 937,677, the ICRPA (now called
the ICRPC for Commission) produced the Metro Growth Guide (1961), the first regional
plan.4 ICRPC signed the first memorandum of agreement with the Colorado
Department of Highways in 1963 in order to meet new federal planning requirements for
240 Denver Regional Council of Governments
http://www.drcog.org/documents/Oth%20DRCOG%20historv%20.pdf [last accessed on July 18, 2007
241 Denver University Study. Online at
http: //www.du. edu/transportation/ Resources/pdfs/Vo 1l1 SecV I D.pdf [last accessed on July 6, 2007]
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the 3c (continuing, cooperative, and comprehensive) planning process. In 1966, the
ICRPC was reorganized and in 1968 it was renamed the Denver Regional Council of
Governments (pronounced DR. COG for short). In 1969, DRCOG supported legislation
for the development of the Regional Transportation District (RTD) and the Urban
Drainage and Flood District. Both districts were later created by state law. The RTD
could tax the region to "develop, operate, and maintain a system of mass transit" for the
area that now consists of the City and County of Denver, Boulder county, parts of
Jefferson, Douglas and the western portions of Arapahoe and Adams counties.242 In the
1970s, DRCOG expanded to include the eight counties in the region and produced a
regional housing plan. In 1971, the Joint Regional Planning Program (JRPP) was created
bringing together DRCOG, the RTD, and the Colorado Highway Department (now
known as the Colorado Department of Transportation or CDOT) to conduct joint land use
and transportation planning. In 1973, under the Older Americans Act, DRCOG was
designated the Area Agency on Aging.
In 1975, in response to the oil crisis, DRCOG started a carpool matching program.
DRCOG has subsequently focused on providing alternative means of transportation in the
region. In 1977, the Governor designated DRCOG as the Metropolitan Planning
Organization (MPO) for the region. In order to meet the federal MPO requirements,
DRCOG, the RTD, and Colorado Highway Department signed a Memorandum of
Agreement that they would jointly plan for the Denver region. In 1978, DRCOG adopted
2 Denver University Study. Online at
http://www.du.edu/transportation/Resources/pdfs/Vol 11 Sec V D.pdf [last accessed on July 6, 2007], p.
4.
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the Regional Growth and Development Plan, a regional plan that provided the first
comprehensive database of environmental resources for the region.
In the 1980s, DRCOG expanded its scope of services to include elevator and
escalator safety programs, providing meals to the elderly, conducting studies on jail
overcrowding and energy emergencies, and identified ways that communities could share
services. It also produced the Transportation Planning Prospectus (1981), Regional
Framework Plan (1985), and began the process of integrated assessment plans combining
the annual updates for the Clean Water Plan, the RTP (Regional Transportation Plan),
and the RDF (Regional Development Framework). During this time, DRCOG identified
the need for transportation improvements on the 1-25 corridor and recommended the
construction and financing of a new convention center. In 1990, DRCOG's control over
regional transportation planning was increased by Colorado Senate Bill 208 requiring
243DRCOG Board approval for RTD transit projects. DRCOG's 1990 approval of RTD
proposal for the Metro Area Connector, MAC, a 3.2 mile light rail corridor downtown
served as the beginning of the region's light rail system.
The adoption of federal legislation known as the Inter-modal Surface
Transportation and Equity Act (ISTEA) in 1991 provided local governments with more
control over federal transportation funds and strengthened the role of MPOs. ISTEA
increased DRCOG's influence over regional transportation funds. In its capacity as the
MPO, DRCOG works with the Regional Air Quality Council and the Colorado
243 "The (RTD) Board shall take no action relating to the construction of a regional fixed guideway mass
transit system until such system has been approved by the designated Metropolitan Planning Organization.
Each component part or corridor of such system shall be separately approved by the Metropolitan Planning
Organization. Such action shall include approval of the method of financing and the technology selected for
such projects." [32-9-107.7 CRS] as quoted in The Review of RTD's FasTracks Plan. Final Report. April
21, 2004. DRCOG. Online at http://www.drcog.org/docunents/SB208_ ReportFinal 4-2 1-04.pdf [last
accessed on August 19, 2007]
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Department of Health to develop transportation projects that improve regional air
quality. 244 DRCOG also works with the Colorado Department of Transportation
(CDOT), and the Regional Transportation District (RTD) on transportation planning for
the region. The DRCOG Board of Directors and a smaller committee known as the
Transportation Committee do the work of the MPO. The Transportation Committee is
composed of 10 voting members: the DRCOG Executive Director, the DRCOG
Chairman, two DRCOG Board Members, the Chairman of Colorado's Transportation
Commission, a Governor appointed member of the Colorado Transportation
Commission, the Executive Director of CDOT, RTD's Chairman of the Board, RTD's
General Manager, and another RTD Board member. 245 In addition, a representative from
the Colorado Air Quality Control Commission (AQCC) and the Regional Air Quality
Council serve as non-voting members. The DRCOG Board can accept or reject the
Transportation Committee's recommendations; however, all MPO decisions must be
approved by the DRCOG Board and the Transportation Committee. This allows local
elected representatives who serve on the DRCOG Board to influence DRCOG's
transportation funding decisions.
Since the 1990s, DRCOG has embarked on a major regional visioning and
planning process known as Metro Vision 2020. In 1992, DRCOG adopted the Metro
Vision 2020 Vision Statement, Principles and Policies and in 1993, it adopted the 2015
Interim Regional Transportation Plan outlining future transit and road improvements. In
244 DRCOG's 1993-1995 Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) met the air quality standards laid out
in the Clean Air Amendment and ISTEA's guidelines.
245 Denver University Study. Volume II, Section VI. D. "Denver Regional Council of Governments
(DRCOG) Overview and Structure." Online at
http://www.du.edu/transportation/Resources/pdfs/VoI II Sec VI D.pdf [last accessed on July 6, 2007]
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1997, after two years of committee work and public input, DRCOG adopted the
MetroVision 2020 plan outlining the goals for the future development of the region
without regard to fiscal limitations. These goals include: 1) compact and efficient future
development, 2) safe and environmentally friendly mobility choices that are integrated
with land use planning, 3) the development of mixed-use, pedestrian oriented urban
centers in the region, 4) maintaining the Cities of Boulder, Longmont, Brighton, and
Castle Rock as distinct freestanding communities, 5) minimizing semi-urban, large-lot
development on region's edges, 6) creating a permanent, linked park and open space
system, 7) developing senior-friendly communities, 8) maintaining and improving air and
water quality standards, and 9) minimizing exposure to excessive noise from land and
transportation uses.246
DRCOG has worked to link the Regional Transportation Plan that it produces as
the MPO for the region with the goals of Metro Vision. The Metro Vision 2020 Regional
Transportation Plan, Fiscally Constrained (adopted in 1998) outlined the regional
transportation priorities that can be met with the state, local, and federal funds
available. 247 The ability to link regional transportation funding with the goals of Metro
Vision gives DRCOG influence over the development of major transportation
infrastructure projects that MAPC lacks. The current Regional Transportation Plan is
know as the 2030 Metro Vision Regional Transportation Plan (2030 MVRTP).
246 Denver Regional Council of Governments. "DRCOG Policy Statement on State Legislative Issues for
2007," p. 1. Online at
http://www.drcog. org/docunients/2007%2OState%20policy%20statement 0 Owcb.pd f [last accessed on
August 19, 2007]
2 Denver University Study, p. 8. Online at
http://www.du.edu/transportation/ Resources/pdfss/VolI 11 SecVI D.pdf [last accessed on Downloaded
July 6, 2007]
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According to DRCOG, the 2030 MVRTP "defines a balanced, multi-modal transportation
system that is closely linked to the growth and development elements of the Metro Vision
2030 Plan." 4 8 It was adopted in January 2005 and has been updated in January 2006,
June 2006, and January 2007.
In 2000, DRCOG and the Metro Mayors Caucus worked together to develop a
county and city inter-jurisdictional compact known as the Mile High Compact (MHC).
The Mile High Compact, which has been signed by 44 of the region's local jurisdictions
(88 percent of the region's population) binds signatories to following the principles laid
out in the Metro Vision plan.24 9 As mentioned earlier, the Mile High Compact is seen as
evidence of a regional commitment to working together in the absence of regulation.
In 2005, DRCOG updated Metro Vision 2020 to Metro Vision 2030. The 2030 plan
focused on developing more pedestrian oriented development and redeveloping the
region's urban centers. The approval of $4.7 billion dollars for RTD's expansion of the
light rail was factored into the Metro Vision 2030 plan. Currently, the DRCOG Board is
working on the Metro Vision 2035 update.
Over the course of DRCOG's history, it has evolved to meet state and federal
mandates for transportation and land use planning. It should also be noted that DRCOG
has produced a number of studies that have been important for the development of
projects in the region. The 1973-1983 Metro Airport Study identified two sites for a new
248 Denver Regional Council of Governments. "Summary Document. 2007 Cycle 1 Amendments to the
2030 Metro Vision Regional Transportation Plan." May 16, 2007. Online at
http://www.dreog.com/documents/Cvcle%201 %20Amendinents%20Simmary.PDF [last accessed on July
19, 2007]
249 Denver Regional Council of Governments. "Shaping the Region with One Voice." DRCOG Brochure.
Online at http ://www.drcog.org/documenits/50th/ 20DRCOG%20history%/ 20.pdf [last accessed on July
18, 2007]
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commercial airport, the current DIA site and the Rocky Mountain Arsenal site. A
DRCOG task force also identified the need for the Metropolitan Corrections Diagnostic
Center, which was built in 1990. DRCOG's Convention Center Metropolitan Financing
Task Force recommended that the state finance the new convention center, which opened
in 1990 with state funding. DRCOG's study of RTD's FasTracks project was the major
planning document that citizens referred to before the referendum when they were trying
to decide whether to approve the tax increase to pay for the project.
The Importance of DRCOG
As the MPO, DRCOG has oversight over Transportation Improvement Program
(TIP) funds for regional transportation projects that receive federal funding. In 2004,
DRCOG obligated $229.7 million dollars to 129 transportation projects.5 When asked
if being the MPO made a difference in the level of local participation, one DRCOG
official said, "Absolutely, they come for the money!"25 1 The fact that DRCOG is the
MPO for the region is critical to getting officials to come to the table. Unlike MAPC,
there are no vacant board member seats and the DRCOG meetings are well attended by
local elected officials. All of the Board members that I interviewed admitted that one of
the key reasons that they attend the DRCOG Board meetings was because they want to
get the TIP funding. They want to be at the table when the criteria for how the TIP
money is spent are set. They feel that it is important to be an active participant in the
20 Denver Regional Council of Governments. "Draft Annual Listing of Federally Obligated Projects," May
1, 2005, Draft, p. 3. Online at littp://www.drcog.org/docunents/"FY20040bligatedProjectList.pdf [last
accessed on March 6, 2007]
251 Interview 2D.
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DRCOG Board discussions because decisions that DRCOG makes can have a negative
impact on them. One local planning official said, "If you are not at the table, you might
get screwed. There is a healthy amount of mistrust."m A DRCOG staff member said,
"it is important to be at the table so you are participating and people know you. That is
the nature of politics and society."m Another official had a more cynical view stating
that people come to the table to make sure that they get the money and their neighbors do
not. 254
In addition to being the MPO, state statutes give DRCOG several other types of
authority over regional planning. DRCOG is in charge of developing the Regional
Transportation Plan (RTP), the Regional Development Plan (RDP), and the Clean Water
Plan, which addresses regional water quality and wastewater.255 DRCOG "oversees all
regional water quality issues, dealing with rivers, streams, lakes, reservoirs, wetlands and
groundwater systems. Regional issues include watershed quality trends, standards and
classifications, wastewater treatment and disposal practices, groundwater quality,
recharge zones, land use patterns, wetland protection, non-point source pollution, storm
water runoff, urban lakes, water supply and other environmental constraints." 25 1 Since
water (particularly the shortage of it) is such a critical issue in the Denver region,
DRCOG's involvement in planning and permitting for water provides the organization
252 Interview 7D.
253 Interview ID.
254 Interview 12D.
255 Denver Regional Council of Governments. Metro Vision 2020 Plan, p. iv. Online at
http://www.drcog.org/documents/2020 Metro Vision Plan-1.pdf [last accessed on August 19, 2007]
256 Denver Regional Council of Governments. Online at
littp://www.drcog.org/index.cfm?page=WaterResources [last accessed on August 19, 2007]
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with added influence over regional development. In this capacity, DRCOG approves the
siting of wastewater treatment facilities and recommends them for state approval. As the
Lowry Range project discussed later in the chapter demonstrates, DRCOG's approval of
wastewater treatment plants is one of the few regulatory ways that DRCOG can prevent
and influence new development.
DRCOG's work is guided by Metro Vision 2030 (originally Metro Vision 2020
and it is currently being updated to Metro Vision 2035). According to DRCOG, Metro
Vision 2030 is a long-range regional plan that offers direction for local communities,
"protects and enhances the region's quality of life," "respects local plans," "encourages
communities to work together," and "is dynamic and flexible." m The Metro Vision
Plan is careful to point out that "the plan does not replace the vision of any individual
community; it's a framework for addressing common issues. Metro Vision is sensitive to
the decisions local governments make in determining when and where growth will occur.
Metro Vision also recognizes that each community is confronted by a variety of issues
and has its own view of growth." 25 8 The language used in the Metro Vision document is
consistent with other voluntary regional plans that have been adopted by regional
planning agencies across the country. The document outlines a series of goals and makes
recommendations for how local communities can help achieve these goals, but it does not
mandate local compliance. DRCOG is careful to acknowledge that the real planning
257 Denver Regional Council of Governments. Metro Vision 2030 Plan. Adopted January 19, 2005, p. 2.
Online at http://www.drcog.org/documents/WcbMetro%20 Vision%/ 202030%2Oplan%2Ofinal%201-05.pdf
[last accessed on August 19, 2007]
258Denver Regional Council of Governments. Metro Vision 2030 Plan. Adopted January 19, 2005, p. 2.
This sentiment is certainly echoed in the interviews with local officials who felt that close in communities
such as Denver and Englewood face very different challenges than the suburban communities at the
region's edge. Interviewees frequently mentioned that the City and County of Boulder are much more
focused on growth management than the rest of the region.
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decisions happen at the local level and not to overstep its role. Metro Vision describes
the region, discusses what happens if no policy change is made, outlines agreed upon
goals for more compact development and suggests methods for local implementation of
regional goals.
Since DRCOG does not have the ability to enforce Metro Vision, it has to use
other methods of implementation. Many counties and cities have signed onto the Mile
High Compact, which adopts the Metro Vision plan, not because they "have" to, but
because they feel that they will benefit from adopting it. DRCOG uses its control over
limited transportation funding as a mechanism for gaining compliance with Metro Vision.
One key reason that counties and cities have signed the Mile High Compact is because
they believe that the more they are in compliance with the principles of the Metro Vision,
the more likely they are to receive TIP (Transportation Improvement Program) money
from DRCOG. One local planning director said, "My view of DRCOG is pragmatic.
The institution exists to appropriate federal money for transportation funding and in order
to get that funding, we make sure we follow the rules." 259 Cities and counties that have
signed the Mile High Compact and that follow the principles of Metro Vision are given
more points towards their TIP applications. There are a total of 100 points given to
projects applying for transportation funds and 16 of them are related to compliance with
Metro Vision and signing the Mile High Compact. One point (for a total of 10 points) is
given if a community meets each of the following goals: "preserve open space, develop
urban centers or freestanding towns, increase population density, share revenue, establish
urban reserve, adopt senior-friendly policies, implement affordable housing, establish
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259 Interview 16D.
storm water utility, prepare alternative mode plans/provide connections, and sign the
Mile High Compact." 260 An additional 6 points are given if the transportation project
helps meet certain land use goals outlined in Metro Vision such as serving an urban
center (6 points are awarded for projects in Denver Central Business District and 5 points
are given for projects with a fixed guideway transit station).261
According to one DRCOG staff member, DRCOG Board members and staff
determine TIP funding eligibility by asking, "Does this proposed transportation
improvement serve an urban center or is it within the UGB? Has the community signed
the MHC? Does the local comprehensive plan acknowledge the relationship between the
UGB and local planning? We are looking for those connections." 262 In the context of
scarce resources, every point counts so communities are willing to follow some of the
principles of Metro Vision if they think it will pay off in the end with transportation
funding. The fact that adopting the components of Metro Vision could help communities
in their TIP applications did not escape local officials. When the Metro Vision Plan was
first adopted, local planners had to explain to their City Councilors and County
Commissioners why following the components of Metro Vision was beneficial to them.
At a City Council meeting in 1999 in the City of Louisville, Paul Wood, the city's
planning director pointed out that, "A jurisdiction can earn additional evaluation criteria
points by adopting an urban growth boundary. The City has submitted four TIP
260 Presentation by George Scheuernstuhl, Director, Transportation Planning and Operations, Denver
Regional Council of Governments. "Land Use, Transportation, and Project Selection," p. 18. Online at
http://www.grta.ore/Recional forui/RegionalForum files/Presentations/Denver%2 ODRCOG.ppt.pd f
[last accessed on July 20, 2007]
261 Presentation by George Scheuernstuhl, Director, Transportation Planning and Operations, Denver
Regional Council of Governments.
262 Interview ID.
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applications for transportation improvements. Projects must attain 100 points, on average,
to be eligible for TIP funding. By adopting the urban growth boundary as an amendment
to the City's Comprehensive Plan, the City improves its chances for funding."2 6 3
Subsequently, the City of Louisville adopted an urban growth boundary, a key
component of Metro Vision 2020, and signed the Mile High Compact. While linking
Metro Vision to the TIP point system has been an important mechanism to gain local
compliance, one local planning director felt that the point system was unfair because it
penalized less dense communities: "if you had all those things [in the Metro Vision plan]
you wouldn't be applying for the money." 264
Local consistency with Metro Vision is rewarded. According to Metro Vision,
"To the extent possible, DRCOG should recognize consistent local plans with regional
incentives, such as discretionary capital improvement funds and technical planning
assistance... each local government is asked, on a voluntary basis, to accept or
incorporate the plan as an element of its own comprehensive plan to address the regional
perspective."26s To promote consistency, two DRCOG subcommittees, the Metro Vision
Policy Committee and the Regional Planning Advisory Committee, created a checklist of
relevant components of Metro Vision that should be included in every local
comprehensive plan. By 2000, 22 communities in the DRCOG region had changed their
263 AUGUST 17, 1999, City Council Meetings, City of Louisville, Downloaded July 20, 2007 from
http://www.ci.louisvillC.co.us'Council/1 999Minutes'1 7August 1 999.htm
264 Interview 18D.
265 Denver Regional Council of Governments. Metro Vision 2020, p. 40. Online at
http://www.drcog.org/documents/"020 MetroVision Plan-1.pdf [last accessed on July 2, 2007]
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comprehensive plans to meet Metro Vision's goals.2  Theoretically, local governments
report on their consistency and inconsistency with the elements of Metro Vision. If a
community is not in compliance with Metro Vision, either Metro Vision can be changed
or the DRCOG Board will work with the local community to suggest revisions to their
comprehensive plans that would be consistent with regional goals. However, in practice,
DRCOG does not actively evaluate the consistency of local plans with Metro Vision and
local planning officials said that Metro Vision had very little influence on day-to-day
local planning decisions.
While implementation of regional goals at the local level was not guaranteed, I
found that most communities at least acknowledge Metro Vision in their comprehensive
plans. This is markedly different from master plans in the Boston region where Boston
MetroPlan and MAPC were rarely mentioned as guides for local planning. In the City of
Denver, Metro Vision 2020 was adopted as a part of the Denver Comprehensive Plan.267
Denver's strategy for growth management in its 2000 comprehensive plan is to "Lead in
supporting the adoption and implementation of DRCOG's Metro Vision 2020 Plan for
regional growth and report annually on compliance with Plan 2000."9268
Smaller cities are also incorporating DRCOG into their planning documents. For
instance, the City of Longmont's Comprehensive Plan states,
266 Jan Schenk, "How are local governments planning for growth?" The Denver Post. January 6, 2000. Pg.
11-01.
267 City of Denver, "Denver Comprehensive Plan 2000: Metropolitan Cooperation," p. 211. Online at
http://www.denvergov.org/Portals 1 I46/docurnents/PLAN2000/'METCOOP.pdf [last accessed on July 20,
2007]
268 City of Denver, "Denver Comprehensive Plan 2000: Metropolitan Cooperation," p. 215. Online at
http://www.denvergov.org/Portals/ 46/documents/PLAN2000M ETCOOP.pdf [last accessed on July 20,
2007]
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The City is part of the larger Denver Metropolitan Region. Longmont's
growth and development decisions can affect others in the region and their
quality of life, and the actions of others can affect Longmont and its
quality of life. Consequently, the City is a member of the Denver Regional
Council of Governments, a voluntary organization of local governments.
The City acknowledges that Metro Vision 2020 is the comprehensive guide
for development of the region and that it provides a regional framework
for local decisions on growth and development within the Denver
Metropolitan Region. Finally, the City has adopted the Mile High
Compact, an intergovernmental agreement between jurisdictions in the
Denver Regional Council of Governments. The Longmont Area
Comprehensive Plan supports many of the core elements of the Mile High
Compact, including designating a specified area for urban development;
creating a balanced multi-modal transportation system; participating in a
regional open space system; and incorporating public participation
processes into all planning efforts.269
Like the City of Longmont, the City of Lone Tree's Comprehensive Plan emphasizes the
importance of DRCOG, Metro Vision, and the Mile High Compact:
The City supports and participates in regional planning efforts through the
Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG). The City is a
signatory to the Mile High Compact, an agreement that sets forth thirteen
stipulations for regional planning. That agreement incorporates by
reference DRCOG's Metro Vision Plan, a longrange regional growth
strategy for the Denver Metropolitan Area that includes an Urban Growth
Boundary. This boundary identifies the preferred extent of urban
development in the metropolitan area through the year 2030. The area
slated for urban development on the City's General Land Use Plan map is
recognized by and consistent with the DRCOG's Metro Vision 2030
Plan.270
Similarly, Douglas County's Comprehensive Master Plan acknowledges that "The Urban
Land Use Section also draws from the Metro Vision 2020 Plan, adopted by the Denver
Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG) in recognition and support of regional goals
269 Longmont Area Comprehensive Plan (adopted August 26, 2003), p, 13-1. Online at
http://www.ci.longimont.co.us/planning/lacp/pd fs/Qovernment.pdf [last accessed July 20, 2007]
270 City of Lone Tree. "Comprehensive Plan, City of Lone Tree, Approved by City Council on April 17,
2007," p. 2 -6 . Online at http://www.cityoflonetree.con/DocunentView.asp'?DID=146 [last accessed on
July 20, 2007]
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and objectives for open space, freestanding communities; a balanced, multi-modal
transportation network; urban centers; and environmental quality."2 7' The plan also cites
the Metro Vision goals of maintaining the City of Castle Rock as a freestanding
community as one of the reasons for reevaluating the Eagle Ridge site saying, "The
development of Eagle Ridge as an urban community in unincorporated Douglas County
is inconsistent with the County Comprehensive Master Plan and the Metro Vision 2020
Plan to maintain Castle Rock as a freestanding community."272 When siting a solid-waste
facility, the Douglas County Comprehensive Master Plan suggests that "Critical land use
concerns considered when evaluating the suitability of a landfill or transfer site include:
compatibility with surrounding land uses and the Denver Regional Council of
Governments Metro Vision 2020 Plan."273
Even Adams County, which has not signed the Mile High Compact and was
described in many interviews as being pro-growth, mentions the concept of the self-
certified urban growth boundary in its comprehensive plan. Adams County planning has
been influenced by DRCOG's water policy. Stricter regulations under the Clean Water
Plan, which DRCOG administers, also limit the type of development that Adams County
can permit. Since the County does not provide sewage and water facilities, the only
projects it can approve are those that use septic tanks. 274 The Adams County planning
271 "Douglas County 2020 Comprehensive Master Plan," May 2001, p. 4-1.
272 "Douglas County 2020 Master Plan, May 2001," p. 5-35. Online at
http://www.douglas.co.us/CMP2030/Existing_ 2020 CMP.html [last accessed on August 19, 2007]
273 "Douglas County 2020 Master Plan, May 2001," p. 10-16. Online at
http://www.douglas.co.us/CMP2030/Existing 2020 CMP.htmnl [last accessed on August 19, 2007]
274 Adams County Comprehensive Plan. January 2004, p. 19. Online at
http://www.co.adans.co.us/documents/page/planning/Iong_ range/ADCO COMPR EH EN SIVE PLAN2.pd
f [last accessed on August 19, 2007]
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director said that, while they are not actively adopting Metro Vision, "they are not acting
consciously to frustrate the principles of Metro Vision."
While jurisdictions in the Denver region acknowledge Metro Vision goals in their
comprehensive plans, local land use planning is still primarily determined by local
elected officials interpretation of the comprehensive plans and fiscal concerns. When a
community updates its comprehensive plan, there is usually consistency between zoning
and the comprehensive plan; however, over time and depending on how local elected
officials view planning, this can change. The comprehensive plan is a chance to publicly
set out goals, but according to one local planning director,
It is more the vision and the issues of the community which change over
time. For short hand, you might call it politics, but I think that is too
limiting. A comprehensive plan is basically a vision. If the city were the
perfect community, what kind of community would we be? The comp
plan 1) publicly sets out what the vision and goals are and 2) through a
public process allows the appointed (Planning Commission) and the
elected officials to take the weighing of in these times, in this situation
which are the public goals that are compelling? It is a visioning document
of what we want to become and it is implemented by a variety of other
documents. For example, if we are in tough economic times we are
probably going to be more amendable to a commercial development than
other times.
The primacy of local elected officials' views of planning over the comprehensive plan
was mentioned by several other planning directors. While Metro Vision is referenced in
the comprehensive plans of many communities, local elected officials make the final
determination about how to interpret the comprehensive plans. Since DRCOG is
advisory only and communities do not fear DRCOG's reprisal if regional goals are not
met, planning in the Denver region is primarily driven by local concerns.
275 Interview 1OD.
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Strength of Metro Vision
The Metro Vision 2030 plan is in many ways a consensus document that focuses
on issues that are agreed upon by DRCOG Board members. While consensus documents
are considered easier to enforce because the majority of the stakeholders agree to them,
interviewees suggested that it also made the document very weak. One DRCOG Board
member expressed his frustration with the voluntary, and hence consensus nature of the
DRCOG planning process. He said, "if you look at Metro Vision, one of the things that
is a real tension is the fact that it is a voluntary document. The fact that it is voluntary
and that people can opt out of participating causes the document itself to be watered
down substantially. It is not like you can adopt a set of policies by majority vote. It has
to be something approaching universal consensus otherwise people just walk away."276
Because DRCOG has to get buy-in from jurisdictions with opposing views on planning,
in many cases the Metro Vision plan does not challenge municipalities to make hard
decisions about planning and growth management. One local elected official candidly
expressed his view about DRCOG, "as an elected official I can use DRCOG as a
guideline and philosophy, but if DRCOG's planning process is contrary to the beliefs of
the constituents in my district, guess what, they throw the rascal out... I have to be
electable." 277 This same official stated, "DRCOG is a guideline and we do everything we
can to try to adhere to it." The idea that they did not want to be constrained by DRCOG,
but that they would try to adhere to DRCOG was a common sentiment among
interviewees. However, the extent to which each local jurisdiction followed Metro
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276 Interview 3D.
277 Interview 6D.
Vision varied considerably. While most elected and planning officials told me that their
plans were in compliance with Metro Vision, there are no formal mechanisms to ensure
that municipalities and counties are planning according the DRCOG guidelines.
Without the power to enforce most of the guidelines, the implementation depends
on how well guidelines fit with local goals. These local goals are primarily set by the
local elected officials who set the tone for local planners. In a recent debate at DRCOG
over the expansion of the UGB, DRCOG Board member and Jefferson County
Commissioner, Kathy Hartman stated, "DRCOG should have limited ability to determine
the development plans of independent entities like the county. We've been abiding by the
growth boundary in practice, but I'd say my fellow commissioners are not comfortable
with the concept." 278 Hartman recognizes that the opinions of local politicians are still
critical for the adoption of any land use policy. Local planners interviewed often agreed
with the goals outlined in Metro Vision, but were primarily concerned about the positions
expressed by their local elected officials towards planning. 279
An important component of Metro Vision Plan is the Urban Growth Boundary
(UGB). The UGB attempts to limit the development of the region to 750 square miles by
2030. This is a 'belt tightening' of the region, which is expected to reach 1,100 square
miles if all of the communities are built out according to their existing zoning. The fact
that municipalities in a metropolitan area would "voluntarily" agree to limit development
278As quoted in Steers, Stewart. "Growth Predictions Spurs Boundary Debate." Rocky Mountain News.
Rocky Mountain News. July 19, 2007. Online at
http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/local/article/0,1299,DRMN I 15 5636824,00.html [last
accessed July 20, 2007]
279 Several interviewees made a point of describing the different types of communities in the region. The
principles of Metro Vision, they argued, made more sense for the inner ring cities and towns, but not the
outer ring suburbs and rural counties.
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without a state mandate is impressive. Many DRCOG communities have adopted the
language of the UGB in their local comprehensive plans. In this sense, the UGB may
have helped reshape the way that local officials talk about development, but it appears to
be less effective at actually changing development patterns. Local officials I interviewed
talked about developing within their UGB allocations and going to DRCOG to get more
UGB allocations. However, the general view as expressed by one planning director was
that DRCOG "hasn't stopped us from growing or affected us in many ways. DRCOG is
never mentioned when we look at approving development projects. We ignore the
UGB. "280
Determining and administering the UGB has been a source of tension at DRCOG.
Several interviewees said that determining the initial UGB process was contentious. "We
all jockeyed around at the start of the UGB," one local planning official said. "The issue
was basically everyone overstated their existing amount of urbanization in the mid 1990s
because we didn't know if we should trust DRCOG. It has worked well. We have
updated the boundaries to the 2025 and the 2030 without adding any significant square
miles because we overestimated in 1995. We have kept the physical boundaries about
the same from 2020 to 2030 line and now we have to figure out 2035 line." 281 Another
local planning director admitted, "we got a very generous number because it really
reflected trend lines. We were also a beneficiary of being a major player at the Metro
Vision table. Our mayor was a major player at generating support for Metro Vision." 282
280 Interview 18D.
281 Interview 7D.
282 Interview 13D.
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In the case of determining the initial UGB allocation, local officials acknowledge the
payoff that came with being an active participant on the DRCOG Board.
While the UGB as a growth management tool is certainly notable, in practice, the
effect of the UGB is debatable. It is described more as documenting existing conditions
rather than limiting growth. According to DRCOG's own assessment of the UGB policy,
it has had mixed results. Between 2000 and 2002, 22 square miles were added to the
region, which is consistent with the rate of land consumption between 1995 and 2000,
before the urban growth boundary was established.283 This signals that the rate of land
use change has not slowed and if this development pattern continues, the region will
reach the 750 square mile UGB goal long before 2030. As a result, the UGB will have to
be expanded to accommodate future growth.
The sense that the UGB has not been effective is echoed in many interviews. The
UGB is flexible to the point that several officials felt it "was barely meaningful." While
one of the key selling points is the fact that it is 'flexible and voluntary,' the problem with
this kind of policy is that it really does not have any 'teeth.' Rich McClintock director of
the Livable Communities Support Center said, "It's good news that (DRCOG) said,
'Let's keep the growth boundary at 750-square miles. That's a very strong symbolic goal.
But the boundary ... doesn't achieve the goal of limiting sprawl."2 84 A DRCOG Board
member stated, "essentially with the UGB, you have communities that really believe that
we should be attempting to have compact development and the UGB should be a true
283 Denver Regional Council of Governments. "Measuring Progress: Regional Performance Measures and
Indicators," (April 2005).
284 Quoted in Chuck Plunkett. "Growth plan fails to limit large-lot sprawl 'Exurb' boom not addressed."
Denver Post. December 15, 2004, p. A-01.
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boundary and as you grow over time you should be attempting to grow within that
boundary and then there are communities that have never really supported the idea. They
have been willing to have an UGB as long as it is flexible. And anytime they want to do
any development outside of it, it gets expanded."285 Some communities view the UGB as
a real constraint while others recognize it more as a guideline and they are not opposed to
asking DRCOG for more UGB when they reach their allocation.
Since the UGB is flexible, different communities have adopted different
approaches for managing their UGB allocations. An example of the different local
interpretation of DRCOG's UGB policy is evidenced by the Urban Growth Areas (UGA)
approach adopted by several cities and counties. The UGA approach allows jurisdictions
to keep an urban growth budget without mapping it to specific locations. Most DRCOG
staff members see the flexibility of the UGB/A as an advantage. One DRCOG staff
member said,
everyone so far has been playing by the rules of the UGB. No one has
thumbed their nose at us. Partly because we give them flexibility.. .We
have the ability to move the UGB around and this has been one key to our
success politically. We don't have a mandate to create a UGB so we have
to bring people to the table as a coalition building approach. We have to
be moderate in keeping people in the fold and participating in this. One
way of doing this is providing flexibility. The ultimate flexibility is this
UGA (Urban Growth Area) approach where they don't have to draw a
boundary. But it is still meaningful that those communities are living
within a budget. There are also some other flexibility provisions that allow
communities that have a UGB to move it around. But there are some
caveats. Specifically, if these regional funds have been invested in
transportation facilities or wastewater facilities it makes it more difficult to
move the boundary around.286
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DRCOG staff members are aware of the political limits of planning without state
mandated authority over land use. They recognize that they do what they can given the
tools they have. It is this realistic approach about the limits of regional planning that at
once allows DRCOG to be effective in certain areas and at the same time prevents it from
tackling controversial issues.
As a voluntary organization, DRCOG can only be effective if local officials are
on board. While local jurisdictions appear to be "playing along," DRCOG has weak
mechanisms to ensure compliance. Technically communities who have signed the Mile
High Compact should be following Metro Vision and the UGB, but the Mile High
Compact so far has not been used as an enforcement document. Without regulatory
authority, DRCOG depends on the localities to individually implement the UGB. When I
asked whether DRCOG had a map of the UGB posted in its website, one official told me,
"we do have a generalized map of the UGB. We are a little reluctant to post more
detailed maps. The boundary is ultimately administered by the local governments. We
don't want to give wrong information about that. We prefer that developers talk with the
local jurisdiction. We do our best to keep track of the changes made by the local
jurisdiction, but there is sometimes a lag time"287 (see Appendix for map). The notion of
having a UGB that is not carefully mapped out by the regional planning agency is quite
different from Portland's UGB (which will be discussed in the next chapter). While
Portland Metro determines which land will be added to the UGB, DRCOG depends
entirely on localities to interpret and implement the UGB. DRCOG lacks the state
mandate for the UGB that makes Portland's possible; however, Denver's UGB is more
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politically palatable for communities than Portland's. If communities really object to the
UGB recommendations in Metro Vision, they can essentially choose to pay lip service to
them or ignore them.
Communities have accepted the UGB because it is flexible. Since the original
Metro Vision 2020 plan was adopted in 1997, the UBG has been expanded several times.
It is expected that the UGB will be expanded in the 2035 revision of Metro Vision, which
will take place this year. The fact that the UGB continues to be expanded is seen by
some of the slow growth officials as being problematic. "There is a continual willingness
to expand it," said one DRCOG Board member, "essentially any time a community asks
for more they get it. I think the reason is very much because of this necessity for
consensus. It basically means when staff is negotiating with a community on a growth
boundary, they are to a large extent scared to say no because the community can just
walk away. That may be overstating the case slightly and I think there is some meaning
to the UGB, but pretty marginal." 288 There is supposed to be a UGB bank where
communities are able to ask DRCOG for more land if they need it. Other communities
who do not need their UGB allocation are encouraged to put their excess UGB into the
bank to be shared by the region. One local planning official described this notion as an
"extremely naive assumption that isn't going to happen." 289 Since there is no mechanism
to replenish the "bank," one Board member referred to it as more of a "store." There is
also a reluctance on DRCOG's part to ask communities to upzone to increase their
densities. This is a mechanism that is used in the Portland region to intensify
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development of the area within the UGB. The Metro Vision requirement that
communities increase their density by 10 percent is very limited considering that some of
the communities have very low densities to begin with. In addition, the fact that
properties of more than 1 acre are exempted from the UGB means that developers have
an easy loophole around the UGB requirement. A negative consequence of the
exemption of properties of more than one acre from the UGB is that developers can get
around applying for UGB by promoting less dense developments. There are cases of
developers creating communities with houses on 1.1 acres just so they do not have to
apply for UGB. In Adams County, a 2,000 unit development was recently approved on
1.1 acre lots. Adams County officials argue that the approval of this project does not
violate the UGB or Metro Vision because in Colorado lots of more than one acre are not
considered urban. However, the Metro Vision Implementation Committee (MVIC)
discussed how the approval of this project should not have happened. The mayor of
neighboring Thornton and County Commissioners of Boulder County agreed that what
Adams County did was in violation of the Metro Vision plan, but DRCOG could not stop
the development because DRCOG's "only teeth is through transportation funding and
there are no state highways or significant transportation money that they needed for their
development." 290 In addition, Adams County has not signed the Mile High Compact.
While the UGB has technically been around for 10 years, members of DRCOG
are still struggling to define the terms of the UGB. One of the challenges for the UGB is
that land that has been zoned for development, but has not yet been built, is exempted
from the UGB so the UGB does not change development patterns that have already been
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approved. Several ad hoc committees at DRCOG have been assigned to look into the
definition of the UGB and how to handle larger lot developments. Another challenge is
that communities don't know what to do with the land that is outside of the UGB: "one of
the craziest issues is that we don't have any idea what to do with the area right past the
line," one local planning official said.291
A major challenge to the UGB is the fact that much of the rapid greenfield
development in the Denver metro region is happening outside of DRCOG's MPO area.
Weld County, to the northeast of the DRCOG region, is the fastest growing county in
Colorado, but it is not in the MPO so it is not a member of DRCOG and the UGB does
not apply. Currently, DRCOG has been engaged in dialogues with Weld County in
anticipation that eventually Weld County will have to be included in DRCOG's planning
area. With the new Census definitions of the metropolitan region, in fact, some parts of
Weld County will be required to become a part of the MPO. Officials in the City of
Longmont, which is at the edge of the DRCOG region and borders Weld County, are
anxious for DRCOG to incorporate Weld County because they face direct competition for
sales tax revenue from Weld County. Since Weld County does not have an UGB,
developers have turned to Weld County as an easy place for residential and commercial
development. Officials in the City of Longmont, which borders Weld County, feel that
Weld County's development has meant a loss of sales tax revenue in Longmont.
However, while members of DRCOG would like Weld County's development patterns to
be more in line with the DRCOG region, officials in Weld County may be reluctant to
change their development patterns since this might hurt their ability to raise tax revenue.
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Without the cooperation of Weld County; however, DRCOG's attempt to draw an UGB
is constantly frustrated by Weld County's rapid development. Unlike in Portland where
the state land use laws regulate what happens outside of the UGB (except in the parts of
the metropolitan areas that are in the State of Washington), DRCOG does not have means
of influencing developing outside of its member jurisdictions. This limits the
effectiveness of the UGB as a mechanism for controlling regional growth.
At the time of this writing, many of these issues are still unresolved. Since there
is no requirement that comprehensive plans match with the zoning or with Metro Vision,
it is also very hard to enforce the UGB. Theoretically, the mechanism that keeps
communities in check is peer pressure. DRCOG members should feel embarrassed if
their communities are not performing up to the norm. However, this is a weak
mechanism in an institution whose survival depends on cooperation. Officials on the
DRCOG Board are reluctant to "call out" their neighbors who they believe are violating
the spirit of the Metro Vision plan. Many officials feel that their communities are
implementing the Metro Vision plan, but several officials I interviewed hinted that their
neighbors "were not in compliance with the UGB." This suggests that compliance may
be in the eye of the beholder. One planning official said that one of the planners at
DRCOG could probably tell me which jurisdictions were in violation of Metro Vision
and the UGB procedures, but he would probably not tell me if he thought it might get out.
Some officials described the planning staff at DRCOG as very "timid" when it came to
''calling out" jurisdictions that were not in compliance.
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A Regionally Significant Project: The Lowry Range Project
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Source: Online at http://www.flbgr.org/AOC status mags/flbgr map blowup.html [last accessed July 4,
2007]
In order to measure the effectiveness of DRCOG, I examine to what extent
DRCOG influenced a 'project of regional significance.' In the Denver region, the project
of regional significance that is on everyone's mind is the Lowry Range Project, a 40-
square mile former military property, to the east of the Denver region. 2 The Lowry
Range Project represents a potential direct challenge to DRCOG's authority over regional
land use planning because it is development of greenfields on land outside of the UGB.
Environmentalists describe the land as the last open prairie land in the region and
292 In 1991, the Lowry Range was designated a Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS) and in 1998, 23,000
acres of the site were placed into State Land Board Stewardship Trust for conservation. Arapahoe County,
"Lowry Range Sub Area Plan," January 21, 2007. Online at
http://www.co.arapahoe.co.us/Departments/PW/Lowry Range Final.pdf [last accessed on January 21,
2007]
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question the development of open space not connected to the transportation network,
particularly any mass transit. The situation, however, is complicated because the
Colorado State Land Board owns the Lowry Range. The Land Board is charged with
selling off property it owns to create a perpetual revenue stream for K- 12 education. The
former bombing range outside of the Denver region is considered a prime site for
redevelopment, particularly since the development of the Denver International Airport
and the opening of the highway E-470 in 1999. Under the current development plans,
13,000 residential units would be sited on 3,000 acres (with 260 acres which would be
reserved for commercial development, 705 acres would be reserved for open space, and
the rest of the 23,000 acres would remain undeveloped). The development price tag for
the project is estimated at $1.5 billion.293 The State Land Board is expected to bring in
between $100 million to $300 million over 20 years from leasing, property taxes, and
fees.
Since the State Land Board property is outside of DRCOG's UGB, different
stakeholders perceive DRCOG's role in relation to the Lowry Project differently. A
DRCOG staff member described the Lowry range project as a "dramatic example of a
potential development that is not currently covered by UGB, but that would need to apply
for UGB. It is also an example of the cooperation that exists between the State Land
293 Todd Hartmann. "State Picks Parcel for 3,000 Acres: Critics Saying Parcel Outside of Aurora is Getting
'Steamrolled.' " Rocky Mountain News. December 21, 2006. Online at
http://www.rockynountainnews.com/dmn/local/article/0,1 299,DRMN 15 5227866,00.html [last accessed
on June 28, 2007]. Rebchook, John. "Development Plan OK'd for Lowry Range." Rocky Mountain News.
June 15, 2007. Online at
http://www.rockymountainnews.coin/drmn/ral_ estate/article/0, 1299,DRMN 414 5601871,00.html [last
accessed on June 28, 2007]
294 Shaun Boyd. "State Land Board Oks Development the Lowry Range." CBS4 Denver. June 25, 2007.
Online at http://cbs4denver.com/seenon/local story 176202210.html [last accessed on July 4, 2007]
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Board and Arapahoe County. They are working in our process to obtain more UGB in
the next update."29 5 However, other stakeholders were frustrated by DRCOG's inability
to influence the project and more pessimistic about the Lowry Range Project process.
While the State Land Board points to the fact that most of the land will be conserved as
an argument for the environmental nature of the project, according to Environment
Colorado, a statewide environmental lobbying group that branched out of Colorado
Public Interest Research Group (COPIRG), the Lowry Range Project, as it is currently
proposed is an egregious example of leapfrog development. Speaking about the State
Land Board, Matt Baker, the Director of Environment Colorado, said, "It's very, very
unusual for an agency of the state of Colorado to be promoting sprawl and ex-urban
development at all, let alone at this scale." 296 If the project goes through, COPIRG and
Environment Colorado argue that DRCOG's ability to manage growth in the Denver
region would be severely compromised because it would signal that the UGB is
essentially meaningless: development can happen outside of the UGB because DRCOG
had no implementing authority.
The challenge for DRCOG is that its authority to stop the development of Lowry
Range is questionable. The most relevant authority that DRCOG has over the Lowry
Range project is the fact that DRCOG has to approve wastewater treatment facilities.
The Range View Metropolitan District, the water service district that would provide
water for the Lowry Project, applied to build a wastewater treatment plant several years
ago to service a juvenile detention center near the Lowry Range site. This permit was
295 Interview ID.
296 Quoted in Shaun Boyd. "State Land Board Oks Development the Lowry Range." CBS4 Denver. June
25, 2007.
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granted, but when Range View Metropolitan District asked for the ability to expand the
capacity of the wastewater treatment plant so that it could be used to service the Lowry
Range site, DRCOG rejected this application. So far, this is the strongest statement that
DRCOG has made against the project. One DRCOG official admitted that this was just
the first step in a longer battle: "I wouldn't say we have stopped development. The State
has been moving fairly slowly. We have been working with the City and the County so
that hopefully when the State Land Board finally decides what they want to do we can
incorporate it into our plans and they will address the issues we want addressed." 297
Many officials I interviewed in January 2007 viewed the Lowry Range Project as
a "pet project" of the previous governor, Bill Owens, and anticipated that the new
governor (Bill Ritter) might not try to go forward with the project. Another DRCOG
staff member said,
There are some members of the DRCOG Board who are looking to the
new governor to reexamine what is being planned at the Lowry Range,
more from the infrastructure point of view more than anything else. Yes,
there is no urban growth boundary that we have allotted to development,
but the bigger issue is that we can't afford to maintain the transportation
infrastructure that we have today let alone set aside new funds to build for
development that could be coming in the future. How do we say that it is
ok to build so far out when we are having this problem in the more
urbanized area right now?298
DRCOG staff members and board members struggle with the Lowry Range issue because
while the development does not fit into the vision for the region, Metro Vision, it is
uncertain what authority they have over the project. If the State Land Board wants to go
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ahead with the project and Arapahoe County and the City of Aurora agree, DRCOG will
in all likelihood have to agree to the terms of development.
While DRCOG staff and Board members deliberate about how to respond to the
Lowry Range development, the project clips along. A developer, Lend Lease, has been
chosen for the project. The developer is in negotiations with the City of Aurora and
Arapahoe County over how much of the land will be conserved, and protected since part
of the land contains the City of Aurora's aquifer. The Mayor of Aurora, Ed Tauer, is
skeptical about the project because it lacks the necessary infrastructure and is
disconnected from existing development. In response to the request to expand the UGB
to include the Lowry Range project, he said, "If you are going to add more land there
should be a compelling reason... The effect on roads and wastewater... those are basic
questions that should be worked out before you move forward with development.",299
Pam Kiely from Environment Colorado also voiced her opposition to the process saying,
"The land board is light years ahead of where they should be. Currently they are
evaluating what the housing mix, street layout, and town center design should look like in
a development at Lowry. Yet, as a state and as a region we still need to answer the
fundamental question of whether or not development should even occur at all on this
property." 30 0 As the regional planning agency, DRCOG would be the appropriate place
to answer this question of whether development should happen on the site in the first
place; however, the agency has been reluctant to take the lead in challenging the project.
299 Quoted in Carlos Illescas, "Lowry Project: Aurora Concerned About Impacts from Massive
Redevelopment of Bomb Range," The Denver Post. July 10, 2007.
300 Quoted in John Rebchook, "Lowry Range Bombing Range Process Criticized," Rocky Mountain News,
November 9, 2006. Online at
http://www.rockvmountainnews.com/drmn/real estate/article/0, I 299,DRMN 414_5 13 1535,00.html [last
accessed on June 28, 2007]
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While it appears that DRCOG may not be able to stop the project, at least it is
serving as a forum for discussion. DRCOG staff members are reluctant to step in and
make any firm comments or decisions about the project. Arapahoe County has prepared
a subarea plan that addresses some of DRCOG's concerns. Since the County has
authority to approve or reject plans, regional concerns may be addressed at the local
level, rather than at DRCOG. According to a May 2007 DRCOG report, "DRCOG staff
is monitoring these activities as the Metro Vision 2035 Plan is being prepared. The
scenario modeling conducted in late 2006 did include alternatives that had development
at the Lowry Range. As the process continues, the Board may consider additions to the
UGB/A, which could include a proposal for a portion of the Lowry Range." 301 if
DRCOG adds UGB/A allocation for the project, it will send a strong signal as to the total
flexibility of its UGB.
As of June 22, 2007, the developer, Lend Lease Communities, reached agreement
with the State Land Board and the project is slated to go forward. The development is
expected to break ground in 2009 and to be completed in the next 25 years. Another
meeting about the Lowry Range project was held at DRCOG on August 15, 2007.
Arapahoe County asked DRCOG for the expansion of the UGB by 5.16 miles in Metro
Vision 2035 to accommodate the project. 0 It remains to be seen how DRCOG will
respond to this request and what will happen with the Lowry Range project. The role that
DRCOG has taken on is one of being a convener of an ongoing dialogue about regional
301 Denver Regional Council of Government. "The Lowry Range and State Land Board Proposal. DRCOG
Issues Paper." May 2007. Online at http://www.drcog.org/documents/IssuesPaperTheLowrvRange5-
07.pdf [last accessed on June 28, 2007]
30 2 Powerpoint Presentation by Arapahoe County to the DRCOG Board on August 15, 2007. Online at
http://www.drcoe.orgz/documents/Lowrv/ 20Range%20-%20A rapahoe 0 20County.PDF [last accessed on
August 19, 2007]
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development rather than a regulator. This role is probably effective at changing the
project so that it has fewer negative consequences for the region, but it is unlikely that
this approach will result in a decision not to go forward with the project.
DRCOG As A Regional Leader
Metro Vision and the Mile High Compact are viewed as national models of
innovative regional planning; however, DRCOG's effectiveness as a leader in the region
is less certain. According to one DRCOG Board member, "DRCOG tries to fall over
backwards not to impose itself on people. They are there to help, but they are not there to
tell you what to do." 303 One local planner felt that DRCOG struggles to be relevant: "it
is difficult to make regional planning relevant unless for most of us the regional planning
goals that we are asked to support are not difficult and so COG doesn't become a
hindrance and therefore it remains pretty irrelevant." 304 This observation suggests that
DRCOG can accomplish goals that are agreed upon, but these are not always the hard to
tackle policy issues. Since DRCOG relies on local implementation of the regional
planning goals, the goals that are laid out often do not challenge communities to rethink
the way that they plan.
A Board member echoed the idea that DRCOG is not very effective saying,
I kind of view DRCOG as the UN. A lot of their concepts are good, but to
get decisions made and to get planning done, you'll see the old adage
about turning a battleship. You have to make very slow progress and I
think DRCOG does do that. What DRCOG focuses on is what can we
agree on together that are good concepts, best management practices. I
think DRCOG is an educational program where they are trying to get the
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best information possible out to the planners and elected officials so that
they can make the best decisions based on the information they receive.
Would we look to DRCOG for direction on how we to manage or operate
our planning process in our County? No. I think they are a guide. They
are practices that we follow, but I don't think we are ever going to turn to
DRCOG and ask, 'what should we do?'
The fact that local officials are listening to ideas about best practices is in itself important.
However, it suggests that the kind of change that DRCOG is making to local
development plans is incremental at best. Another planning director seconded the idea
that DRCOG is like the U.N. saying that "DRCOG is less effective than the United
Nations. There is a great deal of political posturing, making examples of whoever is not
there." 306 The comparison with the U.N. is cause for concern (given the U.N.'s current
reputation as ineffectual) about the effectiveness of the institution. On the other hand, as
with the U.N., just getting local officials to sit at the same table and talk about their
concerns is an important step towards making policy change. When compared with
MAPC in Boston, participation of local elected officials at DRCOG Board meetings was
significantly higher.
At the same time that board members and local planners questioned the
effectiveness of DRCOG, they also felt that their participation in DRCOG is important.
The fact that elected officials sit at the table with one another can create a sense of
understanding and commonality that does not otherwise exist. One local planning
director said, "the most important thing that DRCOG does is that the County
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Commissioners and mayors know one another. "07 Officials who sit at the DRCOG
Board meetings cannot hide the development of projects from one another and are forced
to talk about some of the shared impacts. One Board member discussed why being on
the DRCOG is important for him:
From a personal standpoint as a Board member, I find it very interesting
because I get different perspectives. My county is fairly conservative. I
find it interesting to go and I meet with some of the other mayors who are
from cities that are a little more progressive. It is kind of interesting to see
their concepts and how they look at things. Personally, it is a good
educational tool for me just to see how people think and how they
perceive things. I find it amazing how some of the perceptions are entirely
different in their area than what I see historically in the district that I
represent. But if I can understand their perception and why they feel the
way they do, when I have to interact with them on an issue that is
important to my county or to my constituency in my district then I know
why they feel the way they do and what we can do to mitigate some of our
differences so we can make progress together... if we want to make
progress together. Sometimes we just don't want to." 308
This same County Commissioner mentioned that the DRCOG Board meetings are a good
opportunity for him to learn about how his constituents feel about issues. On one issue in
particular, he said that he found that the cities he represents were opposed to him. He
said, "when I am looking across the table on a particular issue and I see community
leaders of cities in my county lined up against me, then I say whoa!" Local elected
officials who sit on the DRCOG Board use participation on the Board as a way to better
understand regional issues and in some cases to better understand how their own
constituents feel about particular projects.309
307 Interview 16D.
308 Interview 6D.
309 DRCOG is not the only forum for local elected officials. The Denver Metro Mayors Caucus (MMC), an
initiative of Civic Results, a Denver based not-for-profit, also brings together local elected mayors to
discuss regional issues. In some ways, the Metro Mayors Caucus presents direct competition to DRCOG
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Local officials also felt that DRCOG can act as an important voice for the region
when it comes to state policy and in particular the allocation of Colorado state funds.
DRCOG advocates for particular issues of regional significance at the state house.
DRCOG's Legislative Principle Statement says, "the organization assumes the
responsibility for identifying and promoting regional interests in its various fields of
planning and management to state and federal legislative and administrative bodies." 310
Particular issues such as transportation and air quality, which clearly cut across
boundaries, were issues that local officials felt comfortable discussing at the regional
table. One local planner said, "one of the big things that COG does by working with the
regional air quality council, is it tries to promote regional air quality issues. Those seem
to be the hardest issues for municipalities to take ownership over. They seem too big.
Metro air quality seems too big for every community. Highway and transit means things
to people. It means money, and capital projects, and shapes land use. Things like UGBs
and other cooperative things are the price to pay for having a regional voice. The other
benefit that is accrued to all the cities is that DRCOG is the vehicle used to fight CDOT
for money."311 Not surprisingly, it is the tangible benefits that local officials attribute to
regional cooperation that keeps local officials coming to the regional table. Discussing
the important role that DRCOG plays in helping to secure state resources for the Denver
because many of the mayors who serve on DRCOG also serve on the Metro Mayors Caucus. On the other
hand, since the MMC is working towards many of the same goals as DRCOG, the MMC has been able to
help advance a regional agenda. The MMC and DRCOG partnered on the Mile High Compact. While
DRCOG relies on its authority as the MPO to bring local elected officials to the table, the MMC is a
vehicle for local mayors who want to see more regional cooperation to come together and act politically.
While DRCOG is often reluctant to make political stands, the MMC can. In this sense, MMC complements
the work of DRCOG.
3 Denver Regional Council of Governments, "Policy Statement on Legislative Issues for 2007." Online at
littp://www.drcog.con/docunents/20072 0 OState%20policy%20statenent%20web.pdf [last accessed on
August 19, 2007]
311 Interview 7D. CDOT is the Colorado Department of Transportation.
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region (often referred to as the Front Range region), that same planning director said,
"naturally we think that the rest of the state is getting too much money and we are not
getting enough.. .There is the constant dynamic that you would expect between the Front
Range and the rest of the state. And having this club of more than 45 jurisdictions who
can sometimes speak as a whole can be real effective. There is an equity sharing
agreement that they have negotiated with CDOT which is probably based solely on the
participation of 45-50 municipalities."312 In 2004, DRCOG Board members launched a
campaign to win more equitable distribution of the Colorado gas sales tax to the Denver
region. According to DRCOG, the "Denver region's proportional share of the state's
long-range transportation funding from CDOT has been reduced from 43 percent to 28
percent."313 As a result of this campaign, DRCOG signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with the Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT) which
states: 1) the Transportation Commission agrees to consult with DRCOG before
finalizing the state long-range plan, 2) creates a congestion relief program that DRCOG
will help model, 3) allows for "pooled" strategic project funding in the long-range plan
which has helped DRCOG allocate $1 billion to projects that relieve air pollution, 4)
adopts methodology for allocating incremental revenues and emphasizes mobility.3 14
Having a common goal of getting more transportation money from the state certainly
gives local officials reasons to work together. DRCOG is able to use its staff expertise as
a means of advocating for the region at the state level.
312 Interview 7D.
m Denver Regional Council of Governments, "DRCOG Regional Report." (March 2004), p. 1. Online at
http://www.drcog.org/documeits/RR%203-04.pdf [last accessed on July 21, 2007]
m Denver Regional Council of Governments, "Transportation Equity Funding." Online at
http://www.drcog.coin/index.cfn?page=TransportationFundi ngEquity [last accessed August 19, 2007]
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Becoming A More Effective Institution
There was consensus among the stakeholders that I interviewed that DRCOG had
become a more effective institution in the last 10 years. A DRCOG staff member said,
"being a DRCOG Board representative from a local government was not considered a
very attractive assignment, but that has changed in the last 10 years or so." 11 When I
asked what caused people to start taking DRCOG more seriously several hypotheses were
put forward by the interviewees: 1) Leadership, 2) the Metro Vision Plan, 3) A shared
enemy, 4) A common understanding of the problem of growth; and/or 5) A common
goal. In the late 1990s, there was growing concern in the region that Denver was on its
way to becoming Los Angeles. The growth rate in Colorado was two times the national
average and rapid development in the region was coupled by growing traffic jams.3 16
Citizens started to be concerned. Environmental groups and citizens got together to
propose stronger state land use regulations. A statewide ballot initiative (called the
Responsible Growth Initiative or Amendment 24) that would have given Colorado
stronger state land use planning regulations is cited by many officials at DRCOG as one
of the reasons that the elected officials at DRCOG started to work together. Amendment
24 would have required "cities and counties over a certain size to prepare maps of future
growth areas, accounting for all the costs of roads, water, and sewer systems planned for
the next ten years." 317 The ballot initiative failed in part due to the $6 million dollars of
315 Interview ID.
316 At the Monday, October 4, 1999, Interim Study on Development and Growth, Jim Westcott, Director of
the State Demography Section at the Colorado Division of Local Government said, "In Colorado, since
1990, population growth has been at about 2.2 percent, twice the national average." Online at
http://www.state.co.us/gov dir/leg di r/Ics staff/1 999/'co nsched/99 DevG row I 004sum.htm [last accessed on
July 6, 2007]
317 Kathleen McCormick (September 2006), p. 97.
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advertising against the initiative financed mostly by the real estate community. 31
Officials in the region realized that one way to stave off the citizen initiative for stronger
statewide planning was to regulate themselves. This was one of the reasons given for
why the Mile High Compact agreement was signed in 2000. It was the fear of more
regulation that prompted local officials to regulate themselves.
Although the citizen ballot failed, it did have the effect of getting the elected
officials to start seeing DRCOG as a mechanism for designing their own planning agenda
rather than having imposed on them from by the state. Local officials are quick to point
out that the reason that regionalism is working in Denver is not because of the heavy
hand of state authority, but because of local control. At a Colorado state senate meeting
in 1999 about growth management, Mayor Tauer of Aurora said, "It is the opinion of the
Metro Mayor's Caucus that local control is what is making Metro Vision 2020
successful." 319 As an alternative to state regulation, local officials started to see DRCOG
as an important vehicle for creating some traction of regional issues. The Mile High
Compact allowed local jurisdictions to agree to voluntary commit themselves to certain
planning goals and demonstrate that they did not need a statewide mandate. Recognizing
the seriousness of the Mile High Compact, one DRCOG official said, "those that haven't
signed the Mile High Compact understand that when they do sign it, they are committing
318 Kathleen McCormick (September 2006), p. 97.
319 State of Colorado. "Interim Study on Development and Growth, October 4, 1999." Online at
http://www.state.co.us/gov dir/leg dir/lcsstaff/I 999/consched/99DevG row 1 004sun.htn [last accessed on
July 7, 2007]
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themselves to plan in cooperation with neighboring jurisdictions. There may not be any
teeth to it, but there is a certain amount of peer pressure to adhere to the tenants of it. ,320
The Metro Vision plan was also credited with the newfound effectiveness of
DRCOG. One DRCOG official said, "There have always been regional plans dating
back to 1955 when DRCOG was formed, but the Metro Vision version of the regional
plan was new and innovative and it included innovative features like the Urban Growth
Boundary and Urban Growth Centers. It occurred at a time when there was both
nationally and locally a resurgence of interest in regional planning and part of that was a
recognition that local problems are regional problems and vice a versa." 321 The Metro
Vision plan borrowed ideas from places like Portland, which had engaged in regional
visioning. In the planning process, four different development alternatives were
presented for discussion and evaluation. The initial plan was created after two years of
public meetings and negotiations among DRCOG Board members. In terms of
implementation, the fact that the Metro Vision plan was linked to the allocation of TIP
funding through a point system was also cited as an important reason that the Metro
Vision plan is taken more seriously than previous plans.
Bill Vidal, DRCOG's executive director in the late 1990s, was also mentioned as
an important agent of change. Vidal internally reorganized DRCOG, and brought a new
perspective on collaboration. The success of DRCOG was attributed to "a combination
of Bill Vidal's leadership and a convergence with an interest in regional planning in
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1990s." Mr. Vidal instituted some reforms at DRCOG. He changed the advisory
committee structure at DRCOG so that it is now composed of 1/2 + 1 elected officials
and 1/2 local planning staff. This change was important because before the reform, the
advisory committees were composed of primarily local planning staff members, who
were not always in step with the elected officials. According to one DRCOG staff
member,
even though these local planning directors and senior planners work for
the member governments, they are not always on the same page as their
own elected officials. So there was a disconnect. Here these
recommendations were coming forward from these advisory committees
composed of planners, and their own elected officials didn't necessarily
agree with them. Because as savvy as some of the planners are, they
really are not elected officials, they don't always have the political filters
that the elected officials have, they are not involved in the board dynamics
and compromising so there was an intentional effort to involve the elected
officials, board members, in the decision makers at the advisory
committee. They wanted to them to be involved earlier on.323
The shift in DRCOG to more actively involve elected officials in policy-making made a
difference in the perceived political legitimacy of the organization. It also had the effect
of making it easier to implement policies, which had been agreed to by the local elected
officials, who would ultimately have to be accountable to the voters, rather than local
planners. However, this change also had some negative consequences. Local planners
felt that the move further distanced them from the organization. One planner who used to
serve on the Regional Planning Advisory Committee, DRCOG's standing committee that
was made up of planning directors and their designees, said, "The amount of information
156
322 Interview ID.
323 Interview ID.
that we have from DRCOG is probably not the same as when I went to a standing
meeting once a month."m4
Several DRCOG Board members also talked about the importance of the T-REX
project (the $1.67 billion expansion of the light rail by 19 miles and 17 miles of highway
improvements in the Southwest Corridor) as an important turning point for DRCOG. It
"proved the importance of regionalism."325 While the FasTracks project is currently the
focus of media attention, the T-REX project was the first attempt by the region to invest
in the improvement of regional public transit. The initial idea for the project came from a
321992 DRCOG study on traffic congestion.326 The proposal was for the development of a
light rail line and a highway development. In order to secure funding for the project local
officials had to make their case to Washington. Funding was secured and the project
construction began in 2001. This was cited by some as a critical first step in
understanding the benefits of working together at DRCOG. Several officials described
the success of the T-REX project as critical to the subsequent success of the FasTracks.
During the T-REX project, officials felt that they had "learned" how to work together and
DRCOG had played a critical role in this.
DRCOG's planning work was also cited as important to its influence in the region.
Working with the Regional Transportation District (RTD) and the Colorado Department
of Transportation, DRCOG developed a series of studies called Major Investment
Studies, which examined the region's major transportation corridors. According to
COPIRG, "Those studies charted the course for the development of FasTracks, an
324 Interview 10D.
325 Interview 5D.
326 Online at http://www.tfhrc.gov/pubrds/septoctO 1 /trex.htn [last accessed August 20, 2007]
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extensive network of multi-modal transportation options, including commuter rail, light
rail, bus rapid transit and High Occupancy Vehicle Lanes. RTD Denver included the
visions and plans set forth in Metro Vision 2020 and these series of Major Investment
Studies in its proposed FasTracks Plan."327 Since the development of FasTracks will
dramatically change regionat development by providing an alternative means of
transportation and many opportunities for TOD projects, DRCOG's role in planning for
FasTracks is certainly notable.
The success of other regional projects such as the Denver International Airport
were also cited as critical for the current success of DRCOG. However, there was some
debate among the officials that I spoke with about the role that DRCOG played in the
DIA project. Some officials felt that the idea for DIA came from years of DRCOG
planning for the region. Others were surprised when I asked about DIA saying, "what
does DRCOG have to do with DIA? It was the City of Denver." One official said,
"DRCOG had no part to play in the siting or construction of DIA. It was a bi-lateral
agreement between Denver and Adams County."328 Both assessments may have some
truth to them. DRCOG did help with the initial selection of the site for DIA (the DRCOG
study proposed two sites), but during the political maneuvering that took place after the
planning stage, the City of Denver and Adams County were the principle stakeholders.
After years of negotiation, the final agreements that made the DIA project possible were
between the City of Denver and Adams County. Adams County agreed to annex land to
327 COPIRG, "Smart Growth Hall Of Fame 2001, Ten Examples Of Good Planning Decisions In
Colorado." Online at 1h ttp ://www. cop ir.org/spraw I action/hal loffame/CFastracks. 1h till I [last accessed on
July 6, 2007]
328 Interview 16D.
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Denver for the construction of the airport access road, known as Pefia Boulevard after
Mayor Pefia, who was instrumental in putting the DIA deal together. Denver and Adams
County agreed to share sales tax revenue for future retail and hotel development along
Pefia Boulevard. Without the cooperation between Adams County and the City of
Denver, the project would never have happened.
While most people interviewed agreed that DRCOG played an important role in
the region, the interests expressed by DRCOG as an institution are not always the same as
local concerns. One local planner said, "I am not sure how much they have a real
understanding of local government and the realities that local government face. That is
not their business. They are on a much higher plain." 329 Another local planning director
accused the DRCOG staff of "cherry picking opinions of communities and they put this
forward as consensus." 330 A DRCOG staff member recognized the challenge of
metropolitan planning noting that "local governments all across country are critical of
member governments. The MPO is the gatekeeper in distributing money. There are rules
and people don't always get what they want." 331 He acknowledged that, "there are some
legitimate criticisms. Our member governments know their business. We try to include
them in all the decision-making advisory committees. They have the expertise. They
know what is happening on the ground. But it is not a perfect process. Even among
themselves, one jurisdictions may disagree with another jurisdiction about how best to do
things."332 Since DRCOG is a Council of Governments, decisions are made by local
329 Interview 10D.
330 Interview 18D.
33 Interview ID.
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elected officials who sit on the DRCOG Board. Their collective decisions, however, do
not always reflect the interests of individual comnunities.
Capacity Building at DRCOG
Capacity building was discussed by local elected officials and planners who rely
on the DRCOG staff for data about travel demand, population, and employment as well
as planning support and technical assistance. One local planning director said, "DRCOG
is very good at technical matters, demography, forecasting, and trip generation. From a
policy standpoint, it is a less useful institution." 333 A local official stated, "at DRCOG
you have planners from the whole region in the DRCOG area who are giving input on
these issues. You are getting the best information possible. You have staff who are doing
the research to verify and bring in better facts and information." Another planning
director said, "We use their employment data because they do that reasonably often. We
ask them for what they have and we look at it, but we don't usually stop there." 334
Another planning director was critical of DRCOG's data saying, "we use some of their
data. We disagree with quite a bit of it. We do a bottom up approach and they do a top
down." 335 As the MPO, DRCOG is charged with constructing a travel demand
forecasting model, which local government officials admit that they do not have the
capacity or resources to build.
333 Interview 16D.
334 Interview 10D.
m Interview 18D.
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Local communities rely on DRCOG and RTD for help with new area station
planning connected to the FasTracks expansion. DRCOG's Transit-Oriented
Development Program is an important program because rather than telling communities
what they "should" be doing, it exposes them to information, and provides them
opportunities for informed dialogue. DRCOG cannot provide communities with funding
for transit-oriented development, but it can help them better understand the process, the
challenges they are likely to face, and tips for how to overcome them. According to Tom
Boone, the director of the program, they have between 15-20 workshops planned this
year. DRCOG is currently working with Denver, Lakewood, Jefferson County,
Longmont, and Golden on a transit-oriented development committee to promote TOD
projects near the new stations. Of the 57 new stations planned under FasTracks, 51 of
them have transit oriented development potential and DRCOG considers 18 of them to be
"major TOD opportunities on land totaling more than ten acres." 336 One planning
director that is working with DRCOG said, "the main things that they [DRCOG] are
focusing on and that we appreciate that they are doing are for example, Tom Boone is
their TOD person at DRCOG. They are working with ULI (the Urban Land Institute) and
RTD to really provide a lot of information to local governments regarding transit oriented
development because there are going to be so many stations opening up. And to be
honest with you I never thought in my career that I would be working on TOD in my
community. There is no reason that each jurisdiction that is going to be on this line needs
to reinvent the wheel. That is something that I can say is a real service that they are
336 Shannon Cox Bakers, Ken Gillis, and Byron Koste. "Intelligent Development: Denver Plans for
Growth." Urban Land (September 2006): 113, 108-113.
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providing."m Other planning directors who were more skeptical of DRCOG in general
agreed that when it came to data and providing technical assistance about TOD project,
DRCOG's help was appreciated. However, even DRCOG's technical assistance was not
always considered valuable. One local planning official said that the information that
DRCOG gives about TODs is "not too useful." 338
Since DRCOG does not have state mandated authority over local land use plans,
its influence is sometimes subtle and it takes time to see its effect. It is through on-going
planning work with local communities that DRCOG can help change the development
framework. One DRCOG staff member described regional planning in Denver as ad hoc
regionalism. He said,
We definitely are looking long range because you can see the effect of our
plans on local plans over time. A good example is urban centers. They
have been in our plans in one way or another for several iterations, but that
term now shows up in local plans when they are looking at their own
development, where do they expect urban centers to be. I think that we
are seeing the same thing now with respect to the urban growth boundary.
It has been around long enough. As folks are updating their
comprehensive plans, they are incorporating that into their process. We
were out meeting with the Jefferson County planning staff yesterday and
they now in the unincorporated areas are saying that development has to
be consistent with their 'community plans,' their subarea plans, and with
the urban growth boundary and they are expecting that those two are the
same." 339
The planners who have been at DRCOG for a long time recognize that their influence
over planning is not immediate, but that over time, and through their persistence,
planning ideas that were originally promoted at the regional level will be adopted at the
337 Interview 10D.
338 Interview 18D.
339 Interview 17D
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local level. Rather than viewing effectiveness as the short-term adoption of regional
goals, they understand that changing local perceptions about what is desirable
development takes considerable time and effort. Perhaps it is this understanding of the
incremental nature of regional change that makes DRCOG relevant in the absence of a
state mandate.
Regional Cooperation
Local control continues to be very important to local jurisdictions. As one local
planning director said, "I don't think Metro governance in this region will be very strong
in the future. Local control is a very important thing for local jurisdictions. Usually
people cooperate when things are so great or so bad that they will do something together.
I would say not in my career, but you never know." 340 The preference for local control
vs. regional cooperation makes the progress that DRCOG has made all the more
impressive.
In addition to local control, another challenge DRCOG faces to regional
cooperation is the way that local jurisdictions are financed. Local planners that I met
with discussed their limited budgets and their need for sales tax. The Gallagher
Amendment restricts the amount of property taxes communities can raise making sales
tax a critical driver of development Colorado. The creation of Broomfield City and
County is a result of a debate over sales tax. Broomfield used to be a part of Boulder
County, which had a "no growth" policy. However, in an effort to promote more
commercial development the City and County of Broomfield were created so that the
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land would no longer be under the jurisdiction of Boulder County. Driving on Route 36
from Boulder to Broomfield, there is a clear line (marked by new residential and
commercial development) where Boulder County ends and Broomfield City and County
begin. Boulder County has made a concerted effort to buy up much of the land on either
side of the highways for open space. Broomfield, on the other hand, has a much more
intense development pattern that focuses on commercial development. Broomfield
officials are not alone in their desire to maximize sales tax. Many of the officials I talked
with mentioned the importance of sales tax. One local planning director said, "revenues
are highly dependent on sales tax so even if it isn't a good planning decision projects get
approved because otherwise you don't get the revenue." 34 1 Without revenue sharing,
many are skeptical that DRCOG will be able to change the development pattern of the
region. However, there is a reluctance to really talk about regional revenue sharing at
DRCOG. One local planner mentioned "years ago they [DRCOG] did a really good
study about retail sales tax sharing in the early 1980s. It was probably the best piece of
work that I saw them do, but it was very controversial and it disappeared." 342 Given the
controversial nature of revenue sharing, it is no surprise that this study did not produce
any results.
Despite the lack of regional revenue sharing, there are examples of localities that
are sharing revenue. In 2003, the City of Denver and the City of Aurora agreed to share
revenue at the 1,800 acre, 1.5 billion dollar High Point Project located five miles from
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DIA and twelve miles from downtown Denver. 4 3 The High Point project anticipates
1,600 single-family homes and 1,400 multi-family residences, more than 500,000 square
feet of retail, and eventually more than 1,500 hotel rooms.344
High Point Project Map
174 Aerpod
E470
Source: Online at http://www.destinationhighpoint.con/AboutUs/Location.aspx
August 10, 2007)
[last accessed
The revenue sharing agreement between Denver and Aurora was agreed to by Denver's
Mayor John Hickenlooper and Aurora's Mayor Ed Tauer. It was a major
accomplishment given the history of tension between the City of Aurora and Denver.
According to Mayor Hickenlooper, "It's a model of cooperation. When Ed Tauer and I
started talking about how we're not going to poach -- this is an area where we can start.
343 Press Release, June 29, 2004. Online at
http://www.destinationhighpoint.com/PDFs/HighPointGeneralPressRelease.pdf [last accessed on July 4,
2007]
344 Online at http://www.destinationhighpoint.com/Residential/ and
http://www.destinationhighpoint.com/Retail/ [last accessed on July 4, 2007]
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Too often projects are driven by economic needs rather than good planning."p1 The
revenue sharing agreement between Denver and Aurora was an important step for
regional cooperation between two jurisdictions with a long history of rivalry over sales
tax. However, it appears that this deal was not a result of DRCOG influence but rather
the leadership of two local elected officials who acknowledge the importance of regional
cooperation.
Intergovernmental agreements are important examples of cooperation between
cities and cities and cities and counties in the Denver metropolitan region. According to
a DRCOG study, there are close to 1,000 Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) between
the 31 communities in the Denver Metro area on issues ranging from open space to
corrections services.346 The municipalities in the County of Boulder and the County of
Boulder created a super IGA (Intergovernmental Agreement) to limit sprawl. Cities in
Boulder agreed not to annex more land from the County provided that the County agreed
not to pursue commercial development and instead to focus on open space acquisition.
This IGA between the cities and County of Boulder is important because much of the
tension in the DRCOG region is between cities and their county governments. Other
communities have followed Boulder's lead and created IGAs, but none have been as
thorough as Boulder County's. To what extent these IGAs are a function of DRCOG is
questionable. Most interviewees did not see any connection between IGAs and DRCOG.
345 Quoted from Erin Johansen. "Denver, Aurora Partnership Sets New Standard." Denver Business
Journal. May 10, 2004. Online at http://www.destinationhighpoint.coniPDFs/PC_5.7.04 DBJweb.pdf
[last accessed on July 4, 2007]
346 Jan Schenk. February 6, 2000.
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So What Are the Outcomes?
According to DRCOG's own measurements, the success of Metro Vision at
changing the overall development in the region is mixed, but mostly positive. Table I
(see Appendix) shows the Metro Vision Policy goal, the trend, and describes the current
status of each indicator. Of the 23 indicators, DRCOG finds that "17 show positive or
stable trends." 347 However, there are very few cases (5 out of 23) where DRCOG can
demonstrate a positive change in an outcome in a Metro Vision goal. In most cases, the
extent to which Metro Vision has influenced the region is minimal. This does not mean
that DRCOG is totally ineffectual. Regional planning is a slow process, which takes time
to achieve, particularly when, as in Denver and Boston, the majority of the goals are
being implemented at the local level in the context of a weak state planning framework,
when the regional planning agency is voluntary, and when regional cooperation is valued
more than implementation. The difference between Denver and Boston is that DRCOG
can use its control over the MPO to create incentives for communities to adopt Metro
Vision. This means that a greater number of communities have incorporated components
of Metro Vision into their comprehensive plans. Since local elected officials meet
regularly at the DRCOG Board meetings, there is also a degree of peer pressure to
comply with some of the regional goals. The difference between Denver and Portland is
that Metro Vision serves as a guideline rather than a mandate for local communities. It
informs local planning, but it does not dictate it. Local communities in the Denver region
may sign the Mile High Compact and integrate Metro Vision goals into their
comprehensive plans, but they do not have to report back on each of the different goals of
347 Denver Regional Council of Governments. "Measuring Progress: Regional Performance Measures and
Indicators," (April 2005) 1.
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Metro Vision the way that they do in Portland. They also do not have to meet certain
targets. This means they are free to interpret the broad goals of Metro Vision without
significant consequences.
In Denver, it is clear that different communities continue to have their own
planning cultures, values, and goals. The values held by the City Councilors or County
Commissioners in each jurisdiction determine to what extent communities adopt the
guidelines laid out in Metro Vision. Local planning is not fundamentally different
because of Metro Vision or DRCOG. Local decisions still come first. For example, just
because the City of Boulder and the City of Thornton have both signed the Mile High
Compact, are members of DRCOG, and abide by the Urban Growth Boundary does not
mean that planning priorities in these two cities are the same. In fact, the City of Boulder
maintains a strict UGB and growth management policy while the City of Thornton has
different priorities. To accommodate the different types of communities who are its
members, DRCOG promotes policies that are flexible enough that communities with
vastly different local planning cultures can all participate. The upside of this flexibility is
that DRCOG is able to bring a diverse group of stakeholders together. If DRCOG was
not flexible and voluntary, many of the communities might not participate. The
downside of being accommodating of different perspectives is that DRCOG is not viewed
as a leader in the region. In addition, its ability to implement the regional plan through
local adoption is minimal. DRCOG avoids tackling controversial subjects, is uncertain
about how to influence projects of regional significance like the Lowry Range project,
and reluctant to "call out" jurisdictions who are not in compliance with Metro Vision.
Despite the drawbacks of DRCOG, at least local planning officials recognize the
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importance of DRCOG and acknowledge the goals of Metro Vision, if only because
DRCOG is the MPO and controls transportation funds.
One important role that DRCOG plays is in the planning and development of
large-scale regional transportation infrastructure projects such as the light rail system and
improvements to the highway system. DRCOG has worked to integrate these projects
into the overall vision for the region. While DRCOG may be one step removed from the
implementation of these projects, the fact that large-scale infrastructure projects are
connected to DRCOG's land use planning activities is significant for the implementation
of the Metro Vision. The FasTracks project, in particular, provides DRCOG with an
opportunity to promote transit-oriented development throughout the region.
Capacity building in the sense that DRCOG is providing data and planning
expertise is important to local communities who do not have the same level of resources
that DRCOG has. The role of capacity building in influencing local land use planning is
difficult measure since it takes place over long periods of time. Persistent and patient
planners at DRCOG watch as ideas that were once only present in regional discussions
filter their way into local comprehensive plans. Over time, the vocabulary of planning
that DRCOG helps establish and the capacity building tools DRCOG provides help
change the planning framework. However, what appears to be more important to
changing local land use planning is the participation of local elected officials on the
DRCOG Board.
What makes DRCOG more effective than MAPC is that it is the MPO so it has
the ability to link transportation money with regional planning goals. Because DRCOG
is the MPO, it brings local elected officials to the table and provides them a place to meet
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and have a regional dialogue. This level of regional dialogue is absent in Boston and is
critical to regional planning. It is clear from my interviews with DRCOG Board
members and observation of the DRCOG meetings that being an active member of
DRCOG is important because it can have the effect of changing the way that local elected
officials perceive planning at the local and regional level. As DRCOG Board Members,
local elected officials begin to understand how local planning decisions have regional
impacts. They also learn how to cooperate with local elected officials from neighboring
communities. Active participation of local elected officials in regional planning also
means that the decisions DRCOG makes are viewed as more legitimate than those made
by regional planners, who are not elected. While this finding is consistent with the idea of
voluntary regionalism that is popular in the literature on regionalism, I argue that in
Denver, what we see is not entirely voluntary because something is at stake.
Participation in DRCOG may be voluntary, but the fact that DRCOG controls the
allocation of transportation money makes the difference between being an irrelevant and
relevant regional institution. One mechanism for making voluntary regional planning
agencies more relevant is to better connect them with transportation funds and create
innovative ways (such as the point system in the allocation of TIP funding) to create
compliance.
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Appendix:
DRCOG Member Governments:
Counties:
Adams County
Arapahoe County
Boulder County
City and County of Broomfield
Clear Creek County
City and County of Denver
Douglas County
Gilpin County
Jefferson County
Municipalities
City of Arvada
City of Aurora
Town of Bennett
City of Black Hawk
City of Boulder
Town of Bow Mar
City of Brighton
Town of Castle Rock
City of Centennial
City of Central City
City of Cherry Hills Village
Town of Columbine Valley
City of Commerce City
Town of Deer Trail
City of Edgewater
Town of Empire
City of Englewood
Town of Erie
City of Federal Heights
Town of Foxfield
Town of Georgetown
City of Glendale
City of Golden
City of Greenwood Village
City of Idaho Springs
City of Lafayette
City of Lakewood
Town of Larkspur
City of Littleton
City of Lone Tree
City of Longmont
City of Louisville
Town of Lyons
Town of Morrison
Town of Nederland
City of Northglenn
Town of Parker
City of Sheridan
Town of Silver Plume
Town of Superior
City of Thornton
City of Westminster
City of Wheat Ridge
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Signatories to the Mile High Compact as Of April 2007
DRCOG Member Governments:
Counties:
Arapahoe County
Boulder County
Clear Creek County
Denver County
Douglas County
Gilpin County
Municipalities
City of Arvada
City of Aurora
Town of Bennett
City of Black Hawk
City of Boulder
Town of Bow Mar
City of Brighton
Town of Castle Rock
City of Centennial
City of Central City
City of Cherry Hills Village
City of Commerce City
Denver
City of Edgewater
Town of Empire
City of Englewood
Town of Erie
City of Federal Heights
Town of Georgetown
City of Glendale
City of Golden
City of Greenwood Village
City of Idaho Springs
City of Lafayette
City of Lakewood
City of Littleton
City of Lone Tree
City of Longmont
City of Louisville
Town of Lyons
Town of Morrison
City of Northglenn
Town of Parker
City of Sheridan
Town of Superior
City of Thornton
City of Westminster
City of Wheat Ridge
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Table 1: Indicators of Metro Vision's Success
IIndicator I Metro Vision Policy Goal Trend Current Status
Urban Area The region is 750 square miles Negative 22 square miles were added to the
Consumption by 2030 region between 2000 and 2002
Urban Density 10 % increase in density, Positive 3.6% increase in density between 2000
promotion of smaller lot sizes and 2002
and multifamily housing
Semi-Urban Not encouraging parcels of 1- Stable 17% of region's land, but only 8% of
Development 35 acres where the land has not households
already been platted
Urban Center Significant population growth Stable Urban centers not on track to meet
and employment will be in 2030 goals
urban centers
Freestanding Permanent open space or rural Stable Each community is different, but
Community Buffer buffer between communities of overall they have been successful, but
Boulder, Brighton, Castle development pressures change every
Rock, and Longmont year
Freestanding Boulder, Brighton, Castle Stable Housing units have remained constant
Community Town Rock, and Longmont and employment has dropped in town
Center maintains viable mixed-use centers
town center
Funding of Major Expand highways on Negative State and federal highway funds have
Transportation congested routes, encourage declined. In 2020 RTP expected
Projects that Add access control, improve multi- amount needed as $6.1 billion. This
Capacity to System modal connections, provide dropped to $5.1 billion in 2025 RTP.
other means of transportation In preliminary 2030 RTP has dropped
besides single-occupant motor to $3.1 billion. Adoption of FasTracks
vehicle was positive. 2030 RTP draft shows
shortfall of $22 billion.
Congestion Reduce increase in travel Negative All measures of congestion are getting
delays that result from worse. Cost of congestion was $930
congestion million in 2000, a 70 % increase over
1990. By 2030, the cost is expected to
triple. Each Denver residents spends
an average of 27 hours per year in
traffic.
Safety Transportation system that Stable More than eight crashes per every 100
promotes safety households.
Roadway Surface Maintaining existing Stable In 2003 roads in good or fair condition
and Bridge infrastructure and improving is at 60% (47% in 2000). Shortfall of
Conditions paving conditions revenue to adequately maintain roads
and bridges causes deferred
maintenance.
Alternatives to Reducing demand for single- Stable Single-Occupant Vehicles are still the
Single-Occupant occupant vehicles and most common form of transportation
Vehicles increasing transit option
Air Quality Reduce mobile sources of air Positive The number of good days according to
pollution through promoting the Air Quality Index has increased
transit and the development from 227 in 1995 to 181 in 2002-2003.
pattern Region exceeded national ozone
standard in 2003.
Water Quality Water quality protection and Negative Colorado Water Quality Commissions
management will protect fish classifies more water bodies and
and aquatic life impaired.
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Table 1: Indicators of Metro Vision's Success (Continued)
Indicator Metro Vision Policy Trend Description
Water Supply and Urban development only in Stable DRCOG will fall almost 10% short of
Demand areas with adequate water the 2030 demand for industrial and
supply or where water can be municipal water
provided from the existing
water supply system.
Waste Water Effective regional wastewater Positive Facilities are improving treatment
Capacity system that meets demands processes. Facilities are keeping up
with demand.
Per Capita Open Protecting at least 100 square Positive In 2000, region had 120 acres of open
Space and Parks miles of open space by 2020. space per 1,000 residents.
Goal of 90 acres of open space
per 1,000 residents.
Protected Regional Preserving open space in key Stable Region halfway towards meeting 2020
Open Space in areas: canyons, river corridors, goals.
Focus Areas special geographic features,
and buffers around
freestanding communities.
Regional Preserve natural resource areas Stable In the DRCOG region 149 species and
Biodiversity of and wildlife habitat. natural communities are vulnerable or
Species and imperiled. This is 4.1%of the states
Significant Natural biodiversity.
Communities Status ___________________ _________________
Economic Maintaining and improving Negative Unemployment in the region is up.
quality of life Average wages have dropped since
2000. Since 2000, rate of new business
starts is down.
Population Accommodate anticipated Positive Educational attainment of population
Inon growth rose
Housing Provide various housing Stable From 1990 to 2002 the ratio for the
opportunities region was consistently 70 percent
single-family housing and 30 percent
multi-family. Over past 15 years
housing prices have increased faster
than wae levels.
Health Maintaining and improving Stable Region's composite health index
quality of life. Health is not (obesity, tobacco use, motor vehicle
specifically mentioned. accidents, physical activity, and health
insurance coverage) has not changed.
Community Life Community life contributes to Negative Crime levels, spending on parks and
quality of life in region recreation, spending on culture, and
voter participation were a part of a
community index. Local government
investment in cultural and recreation
has declined. Voter participation is
constant. Crime levels have increased.
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Denver Interviews Between January 2007 and August 2007:
Lorraine Anderson, DRCOG Board Member and City Councilor, City of Arvada
Janet Bell, Long-Range Planning Manager, Jefferson County
Gideon Berger, TOD Associate, Denver Regional Transportation District
Graham Billingsley, Director of Land Use, Boulder County
Tom Boone, TOD Project Manager, DRCOG
Bob Broom, City Councilor, City of Aurora
Rob Coney, Director of Planning, Adams County
Sue Conaway, Planning Manager, Arapahoe County
John Fernandez, Long-Range Planning Manager, City of Aurora
Steve Glueck, Planning Director, City of Golden
Andy Goetz, Professor, University of Denver
Tom Gougeon, Chief Development Officer, Continuum Partners LLC
Tom Honn, Planning Director, Weld County
Peter Italiano, Community Development Director, Douglas County
Julio Iturreria, Planner, Arapahoe County
Froda Greenberg, Principal Planner, City of Longmont
Bill Johnston, DRCOG
Peter Kenney, Metro Mayors Caucus, Principal and Co-Founder, Civic Results
Pam Kiely, Land Use Associate, Environment Colorado
Larry Mugler, Planning Director, DRCOG
Glenda Lainis, Planning Director, City of Thornton
Michael Lecesse, Executive Director, ULI Colorado
Kathleen Osher, Executive Director, Transit Alliance
Jennifer Schaufele, Executive Director, DRCOG
Will Toor, County Commissioner, Boulder County
Marilee Utter, President, Citiventure Associates, LLC
Kacey Wilkins, Manager, ULI Colorado District Council
Melanie Worley, County Commissioner, Douglas County
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Brown areas= 2004 Urbanized Area
Red areas= 2030 UGB/A
Source: DRCOG Scenario Workshop Powerpoint Presentation, Metro Vision 2035,
Regional Growth Scenarios. Online at
http://www.drcog.org/index.cfn?page=MetroVisionScenarioWorkshop
[last accessed September 9, 2007]
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Map of DRCOG's UGB:
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Chapter 4: Portland Metro: A Nested System in Transition
M G~ 24 C"nCW M"p
Source: Source: h ttp :/xwww.portlandonline.com/planning/index.cfn?a=bcchgh&c=echhd last accessed
September 3, 2007
This chapter explores the institutional arrangements in Portland and how they
shape local planning. I begin by explaining why Portland Metro is the focus of so much
controversy in the urban planning literature. Then, I provide a brief history of Metro and
the Oregon State Land Use System that provides Metro with a strong regulatory
framework in which to operate. Section 1 looks at the institutional arrangements that
give Metro its authority and allow local officials to interact with Metro, influence
decision-making, and give Metro political legitimacy. Section 2 evaluates the
effectiveness of Metro's planning policies by focusing on local implementation of
regional plans and policies. Using instances of metro/local interaction, I explore in-depth
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some of the policies that Metro has instituted and the extent to which they have reshaped
local land use planning. Finally, I offer a summary of why planning in Portland is
different from Boston and Denver.
Do We Really Have to Keep Studying Portland?
Portland Metro is a collection of 25 cities and 3 counties in the Portland
metropolitan region covering roughly 460 square miles. With the only elected
metropolitan council in the country, academics and urban planners have studied Portland
Metro to the point of exhaustion. According to Myron Orfield, "[tihe Portland
metropolitan region is often held up as a national model of how to plan for growth in
ways that keep communities attractive and a region livable. Our elected regional
government, state land use and planning system, urban growth boundary, investment in
mass transit and bicycle and pedestrian systems, protection of open spaces, and
environmental quality standards are all praised as innovative, visionary, and effective." 348
In the urban planning literature the Portland case is touted as the most successful case of
metropolitan intergovernmental coordination in the U.S.; however, there is growing
concern about the effectiveness of Metro and the urban growth boundary (UGB) at
managing regional growth.349 Once considered a model for regional planning in the U.S.,
Portland is increasingly viewed as a unique political, cultural, and institutional
348 Myron Orfield. Portland Metropolitics: A Regional Agenda for Community and Stability. A Report to
the Coalition for a Livable Future July 1998. p. 1.
349 By effectiveness, I am referring to the ability of Metro to have its plans adopted at the local level and to
influence local planning decisions. The recent passage of Measure 37 has been interpreted by some as the
beginning of the unraveling Portland Metro's authority.
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experiment that cannot be reproduced.
One argument against viewing Portland Metro as a model for metropolitan
governance is that people in Portland are different: they are whiter, more liberal, more
environmentally conscious, and more homogenous so this makes them able to "do"
regionalism while it is not possible in other parts of the country. Even David Bragdon,
the President of the Metro Council, cites the region's homogeneity as a key to Portland's
success. He cautions against attempting to reproduce the Portland experience arguing
that the success of Portland Metro is due to a number of unique factors: the homogeneity
of the region, the relative youth of political institutions, a tradition of policy innovation in
the 1970s, the importance of agriculture and forestry to Oregon's economy and proximity
to urban areas, and finally to recognition that "urban problems were going unsolved." 351
While it is true that Portland's population is more racially homogeneous than many
metropolitan areas, increasingly the Portland region is home to a growing Latino
population. The Portland region also has a strong tradition of civic environmentalism in
the Pacific Northwest, which may have helped in the adoption of progressive land use
policies; however, whether this is a necessary precondition for developing a stronger
metropolitan and state planning framework is debatable. Arthur C. Nelson disputes the
idea that the Portland experience cannot be replicated. "Although some may contend that
Metro's rise is attributable to metropolitan Portland's unique-political economic climate
and the governance concept it represents is not generalizable, this is a mistaken view.
350 People in Oregon, and in Portland in particular, are perceived as being more environmentally minded
and more willing to cooperate. Often Portland's homogenous population is cited as a reason for Portland's
metropolitan governance.
351 David Bragdon, "Case Study in Regional Planning: Portland's Metro Council," September, 2003 SPUR
Newsletter, p. 1. Online at http://www.spur.or&/ [last accessed August 18, 2007]
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Metro's rise is attributable more to finding ways to solve problems common to all regions
than to anything peculiar about metropolitan Portland," he writes.352
Part of the problem with studying Portland is that researchers often are not
objective. Robert Bruegmann argues that many studies of Portland appear to be
ideologically tinged and fail to offer objective evaluations of Portland's successes or
failures. Since Portland "has become the prime symbol of the anti-sprawl campaign,"
Bruegmann writes, "the question of whether the 'Portland system' works has enormous
ideological significance."353 Critics of Metro, who are often opponents of strong
regulatory approaches to regional governance, cite evidence that the UGB creates
unintended negative effects such as boosting housing prices and triggering sprawl in
other parts of the region. Samuel Staley and Gerard Mildner argue that housing has
become increasingly unaffordable in the Portland Metro region citing data from the
second quarter of 1995 to the second quarter of 1997. They find that "[m]ore than 80,000
single-family homes became 'unaffordable' to Portland residents as a result of housing-
price inflation."354 They also conclude that densities have not increased at the expected
rate: "Actual densities inside the growth boundaries, for example, ranged from two-thirds
to one-fourth below the levels permitted by local plans."355 The National Association of
Home Builders (NAHB) also blames the strict UGB policy for Portland's ranking near
352 Arthur C. Nelson, "Portland: The Metropolitan Umbrella," in H.V. Savitch and Ronald Vogel, eds.
Regional Politics: America in a Post-City Age. Urban Affairs Annual Review 45 (USA: Sage Publications,
1996) 54.
35 Robert Bruegmann, Sprawl: A Compact History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005) 207.
34 Samuel R. Staley and Gerard C.S. Mildner, Urban Growth Boundaries and Housing Affordability:
Lessons from Portland, Policy Brief 11 (Los Angeles: Reason Public Policy Institute, October, 1999).
3ss Staley and Mildner (1999).
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the bottom of the Housing Affordability Index (HAl). However, Philip Langdon argues
that the NAHB Housing Affordability Index (which divides housing price by income)
underestimates incomes in Portland resulting in a skewed housing affordability
ranking. According to Langdon, if the true income measures were used, Portland
would not be considered as unaffordable as the NAHB study suggests. Similarly,
Anthony Downs disputes the notion that housing prices have risen faster in Portland than
other metropolitan regions.35 7 While the effectiveness of some of the policies may be
debatable-in part because as Bruegmann points out, "no one has figured out how to sort
all the variables"-what is certainly true is that the debate about Portland Metro reflects
the divisive nature of land use policy in the U.S. 3 58
For those who question the replicability of Portland Metro, the fact that Measure
37 was approved in 2004 by Oregon voters with 61 percent of the vote-a win for
property rights advocates who argue that Oregon's strict land use planning system
violates property rights-is offered as evidence that the political moment that created
Portland's metropolitan council has been lost. Measure 37 allows landowners who
purchased their land before Oregon's landmark agriculture or forest use zoning was
adopted in 1973 to develop their lands according to the original land use zoning or to be
compensated. According to Oregon's Department of Land Conservation and
Development (DLCD), "Measure 37, as provided under ORS chapter 197, states that the
owner of private real property is entitled to receive just compensation when a land use
356 Philip Langdon. New Urban News. March 2005. Online at
http://www.nCwurbannews.com/PortlandMar05.html [last accessed on April 17, 2007]
m5 Anthony Downs, "Have Housing Prices Risen Faster in Portland Than Elsewhere?" Housing Policy
Debate 13, no. 1 (2002): 7-31.
358 Bruegmann (2005), 210.
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regulation is enacted after the owner or a family member became the owner of the
property if the regulation restricts the use of the property and reduces its fair market
value. In lieu of compensation, the measure also provides that the government
responsible for the regulation may choose to 'remove, modify or not apply' the
regulation."5 9 The Reason Policy Institute, a property rights advocacy group, argues that
"Measure 37 represents a major advance for the national property rights movement by
establishing a system that restores the rights of private landowners that had previously
been taken away via regulatory action." 360
Not surprisingly, Measure 37 is considered a setback for Metro, which manages
the Portland region's Urban Growth Boundary. If Metro determines that land outside of
the Urban Growth Boundary should not be developed, but the landowner can sue for
compensation or develop land according to previous zoning designations, then Metro will
have difficulty maintaining a tight UGB. Since cities and counties who are members of
Metro do not have the funds to fully compensate landowners who file a claim under
Measure 37, they may be inclined to allow landowners to develop their properties despite
Metro's UGB designation. While advocates of Measure 37 claim that Metro's days are
numbered, the true impact of Measure 37 is still undetermined. Many of the Metro
Councilors that I spoke with were concerned about Measure 37, but did not feel that it yet
prevented them from doing their work. While the impact of Measure 37 is still uncertain,
in urban planning circles it sent a strong message: if strong land use planning is being
359 Oregon State Government. Online at http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/MEASURE37/index.shtml [last
accessed on August 17, 2007]
360 Leonard Gilroy, "Statewide Regulatory Takings Reform: Exporting Oregon's Measure 37 to Other
States," Reason Policy Institute, April 2006, Study 343, Executive Summary. Online at
http://www.reason.or.1ps343 .pdf [last accessed on August 17, 2007]
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challenged in liberal, homogenous Portland, maybe the Portland model of strict
regulation of land use is no longer a viable model for regional planning.361
During the course of researching Portland, I have kept in mind the growing
challenge to land use regulation in Oregon and other parts of the country. I recognize
that there is a growing skepticism about the replicability of metropolitan governance that
relies on regulation. However, as the rest of the chapter will explore, I think there are
important lessons to be learned from the Portland experience about the multiple roles that
regulation plays in the development of a system of metropolitan governance that can
influence local decision-making.
History of Metro
Much of the academic writing about Portland is primarily concerned with how
such a strong system of metropolitan governance came about. 362 Carl Abbott asserts that
one reason for the success of Metro is the fact that it was created incrementally. Abbott
states that "[i]ncremental policy making has allowed Portlanders to develop a habit of
planning. Portland's civic community is comfortable and familiar with planning
processes, issues, and terminologies." 363 Abbott sees a "series of small decisions" as
critical to Portland's success. 364 He emphasizes the importance of the creation of stable
361 Right now many Measure 37 claims are in court so it is uncertain what impact Measure 37 will have on
the long-term sustainability of the Oregon land use planning system.
362 Arthur Nelson, and Carl Abbott are two authors who have written extensively about the history of
Portland Metro.
363 Carl Abbott, "The Portland Region: Where City and Suburbs Talk to Each Other-And Often Agree."
Housing Policy Debate 8, no. 1 (1997): 42, 11- 51.
364 Carl Abbott (1997), 41.
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political coalitions and citizen support to back the innovative intergovernmental
arrangement: "Metro is the product of continuing interaction among a concerned public,
elected officials, and agency staff. Both an organization and an idea, Metro and its
predecessor agencies have evolved with the help of hundreds of citizens who have dealt
with the issues of metropolitan government..."" In addition to citizen involvement,
Abbott argues that the coalition between the suburbs and the city were important to
Metro's initial development. Instead of pitting these two interests against each other, as
is often the case in metropolitan regions, there was an understanding that there was
enough growth in the region that they could negotiate a fair share for both city and
suburb.366
From the mid 1950s to the present, there have been several metropolitan
arrangements aimed at promoting regional cooperation in the Portland region. In 1960,
the League of Women's Voters produced a study of the region called A Tale of Three
Counties that exposed the region's uncoordinated and inefficient management.3 67 From
1957-1966, the Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC) was established to make use
of Federal Housing funds for regional planning allocated by the Housing Act of 1954.
The MPC was charged with conducting data inventory (of the supply of industrial,
commercial, and recreational lands), population projections, and baseline studies.
According to Carl Abbott, "it also provided a forum where politicians such as Portland's
365 Carl Abbott, "Abbott: A History of Metro, May 1991." Online at http://www.metro-
region.org/article.cfm?articleid=2937 [last accessed on August 15, 2007]
366 Carl Abbott (1997), 43-44.
367 Nelson, Arthur C, "Portland: The Metropolitan Umbrella," in Regional Politics: America in a Post-City
Age. Urban Affairs Annual Review 45, eds. H.V. Savitch and Ronald Vogel (USA: Sage Publications,
1996), 259.
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William Bowes, Multnomah County's M. James Gleason, and Washington County's
Clayton Nyberg could meet to discuss regional issues."3 68 In 1961, the Oregon
legislature created the Portland Metropolitan Study Commission (PMSC) with 38 staff
members to study the region. The PMSC recommended the creation of Tri-Met (the
regional public transit authority) and the creation of a metropolitan service district to
provide urban services to the region.369 In 1959, the Oregon State Highway Commission
created the Portland-Vancouver Metropolitan Transportation Study (PVMTS), which
consisted of three counties, the Port of Portland, the MPC, and other cities in the region.
The PVMTS was charged with conducting area-wide highway planning that would meet
federal requirements.370 The PVMTS existed until 1967 when it was absorbed by the
Columbia Region Association of Governments (CRAG). 371
The importance of these institutions was that stakeholders were learning to work
together and plan at the regional level. In 1966, the Columbia Region Association of
Governments (CRAG) replaced the PVMTS and served as the region's Council of
Governments developing regional transportation and land use plans. The timing of the
creation of CRAG coincided with the federal requirements for Metropolitan Planning
Organizations (MPO). CRAG became the MPO for the region. From 1966-1973,
membership in CRAG was voluntary. The organization was largely considered to be
ineffective and communities opted out and did not pay their dues. 372 However, in 1973
368 Carl Abbott, "Abbott: A History of Metro, May, 1991."
369 Arthur C. Nelson (1996), 259.
70 Carl Abbott, "Abbott: A History of Metro, May, 1991."
"' Carl Abbott, "Abbott: A History of Metro, May, 1991."
372 Arthur C. Nelson (1996), 261.
185
CRAG's membership was mandated by the state in order to ensure participation and dues
payment. This move increased local participation in CRAG.
Most importantly, CRAG was engaged in a comprehensive regional planning
effort and proposed the first urban growth boundary for the region in 1977. 33 According
to Nelson, "[d]espite its shortcomings, CRAG became the nation's first regional body
granted legislative authority to require cities and counties to conform their land use plans
to regional standards." 374 In addition to planning for the region, CRAG served as the A-
95 clearinghouse (1967), was the area-wide planning agency for HUD (1967), the LEAA
Regional Planning Unit, and the 208 Wastewater Management Agency (1974).375
In 1977, the Oregon State Legislature approved the development of the
Metropolitan Service District (MSD), which was charged with regional solid waste
planning and management and operating the Washington Park Zoo. The idea behind the
MSD was to create more efficient delivery of regional services. Together, CRAG and the
MSD laid the foundation for regional governance in the Portland region.
Metro in its current form began to take shape on January 1, 1979. It was
established after the voters from Clackamas, Multnomah, and Washington Counties
approved a 1978 ballot measure creating Metro, a directly elected metropolitan
government charged with functional planning, management of the UGB, solid waste
operations (1981), and management of the Convention Center and Metropolitan
373 For information on the UGB see http://ww .netro-rcgion.org/article.cfmu?ArticlcID=2 77. Downloaded
August 17, 2007.
374 Arthur C. Nelson (1996), 262.
375 This comes from Carl Abbott's diagram about the history of Metro available for download from the
Metro website.
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Exposition-Recreation Commission (1986-1987). The ballot measure passed with 55
percent of the vote.3 The wording of the ballot measure that created Metro was
'Reorganize Metropolitan Service District, Abolish CRAG' so some critics of Metro
suggest that the citizens were tricked into creating a more powerful metropolitan agency
when really they wanted to do away with the agency all together. 377 Essentially, CRAG
and the Metropolitan Service District were merged together and renamed Metro.
The 1978 ballot measure created Metro, with an elected 12 member regional
council. It was and continues to be the first and only elected metropolitan government in
the country. Metro inherited the urban growth boundary that CRAG had proposed and in
1979 Oregon's Land Conservation and Development Commission certified that the urban
growth boundary was consistent with statewide planning goals. In addition, Metro and
the Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation (JPACT), which was composed
of local elected officials and representatives from transportation agencies, were
designated the MPO for the region by the federal government. While the structure of
Metro was now in place, the organization had a much smaller staff and focused more on
regional service delivery and transportation planning than on land use. In fact, while the
376 Arthur C. Nelson (1996), 262.
377 Dan Phesly, a citizen who opposed the Damascus Boring Concept Plan sums up this view: "I think that
is really atrocious when we talk about Metro and the authority they have. But I feel like the same old con is
coming. Metro when it was established the ballot title was reorganized Metropolitan Service District and
abolish CRAG a centralized government. Instead we created Metro, they hid. When they got their charter,
the name of that ballot title was Limit Metro Powers, Reform It's Structure, and Give Local Voters Control.
It didn't do any of that, they were based on lies and continue, the goal of Metro was affordable housing,
with Metro on the job from '91-'95, Portland went from .55th most affordable city in the Nation to 183rd.
They were really the 8th most expensive in the nation." p. 11. Damascus Boring Concept Plan Advisory
Committee Meeting Summary, November 8, 2005. Online at
http://www.co.clackamnas.or.us/dtd/danascus/l /ac/ac I 10805.pdf [last accessed on August 17, 2007]
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UGB was adopted in 1979, until 1990, Metro only had one 1/2 time person working for it
on the UGB.37
In 1992, a 'home-rule' charter granted Metro more authority over regional
planning and growth management. Voters in metropolitan Portland agreed to allow
Metro to expand its role from metropolitan service delivery to regional planning and
growth management. According to several Metro officials, local mayors played an
important role in expanding the function of Metro.380 However, when they made this
decision, critics of Metro argue, that they never intended for Metro to take on all the
additional roles that it currently has.38 1 The 'home-rule' charter established Metro as an
"elected, visible and accountable regional government that is responsive to the citizens of
the region and works cooperatively with our local governments." 382 The charter was
important because Metro was granted its authority by the citizens in the region rather than
by the state. Since the citizens of the region voted for the expansion of Metro's role,
Metro could claim that it represented the interests of the citizens and was not just an arm
of the state. The charter shifted Metro's focus to growth management and required that
Metro adopt a future vision, "a long-range statement of the region's outlook and values.
378 Interview 9P.
379 The charter reads: "We, the people of the Portland area metropolitan service district, in order to establish
an elected, visible and accountable regional government that is responsive to the citizens of the region and
works cooperatively with our local governments; that undertakes, as its most important service, planning
and policy making to preserve and enhance the quality of life and the environment for ourselves and future
generations; and that provides regional services needed and desired by the citizens in an efficient and
effective manner, do ordain this charter for the Portland area metropolitan service district, to be known as
Metro." Online at http://www.metro-region.org/article.cfnArticlclD=629 [last accessed on April 16.
2007]
380 Interview 9P.
381 Several interviewees mentioned the tension around the expansion of Metro's responsibilities
382 Metro. Online at http://www.mietro-region.org/article.cfimArticlelD=629 [last accessed on April 16.
2007]
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It also required a comprehensive set of regional policies on land use, transportation, water
quality, natural areas and other issues of 'regional significance' called the Regional
Framework Plan." 8 3 The Regional Framework had to be adopted by the end of 1997.
These initial planning documents serve as the foundation of Metro's current planning
framework.
The Critical Role of the State
Metro's planning takes place within a nested system (see Chart 1). In Oregon, a
system of strong state planning spells out a number of statewide goals. These set the
stage for what happens at the metropolitan level. In the late 1960s, there was growing
concern about rapid and unplanned growth in Oregon. In 1969, the State legislators
passed Senate 10 Bill, which mandated that localities adopt comprehensive planning and
set forth 10 goals they should embrace. While the law was a critical first step, it lacked
the necessary tools for implementation (enforcement and technical assistance) so many
communities did not develop comprehensive plans.384 In 1973, Governor Tom McCall
and a coalition of farmers and environmentalists campaigned for the reform of Oregon's
land use planning laws. Senator McCall made an impassioned plea to the 1973
legislature to pass legislation against uncontrolled growth:
Sagebrush subdivisions, coastal 'condomania,' and the ravenous rampage
of suburbia in the Willamette Valley all threaten to mock Oregon's status
as the environmental model for the nation. We are dismayed that we have
not stopped misuse of the land, our most valuable finite natural resource.
We are in dire need of a state land-use policy, new subdivision laws, and
383 Metro. "The Nature of 2040: The Region's 50-year Plan for Managing Growth." Pamphlet from Metro,
p. 3 .
384 Oregon State. Online at httlp://www.oregon.Cov/LCD/history.shtnl [last accessed on August 17, 2007]
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new standards for planning and zoning by cities and counties. The
interests of Oregon for today and in the future must be protected from
grasping wastrels of the land. We must respect another truism: that
unlimited and unregulated growth leads inexorably to a lowered quality of
life.:
McCall spent the year traveling the state campaigning for the regulation of land use. He
was able to build legislative support for land use planning. Within the Senate, it was an
unlikely pair, a farmer from Linn County, Hector MacPherson, and a liberal Democrat
from Portland, Ted Hallock, who were the key sponsors of the bill.386 In May 1973, the
legislature passed Senate Bill 100, which created two state level agencies: the Land
Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) and the Department of Land
Conservation and Development (DLCD). LCDC and DLCD were asked to "define and
attain very specific land-use objectives both in cities and in the countryside." 387 The goals
that they came up with form the basis of Oregon's now famous Statewide Land Use
Planning Program. Subsequently, Senate Bill 101 created further statewide protections
for agriculture.
The setting of these statewide goals was critical to changing the way that land use
planning is accomplished in Oregon. 388 They require: 1) (Goal 1) citizen involvement in
land use planning; 2) (Goal 2) a comprehensive local plan created by citizens and local
385 Quote from Governor McCall's opening address to the 1973 legislature, January 8, 1973. Oregon
Department of Land Conservation and Development. "History of the Program." Online at
http://wvww.oregon.gov/LCD/history.shtml [last accessed on August 17, 2007]
386 Online at http://www.orecon.gov/LCD/history.shtml [last accessed on August 17, 2007]
387 Robert Liberty, "Give and Take Over Measure 37: Could Metro Reconcile Compensation for
Reductions in Value with a Regional Plan for Compact Urban Growth and Preserving Farmland."
Environmental Law 36 (2006) 191, 187-220. Online at http://www.lclark.edu/org/envtl/objects/36-
1 liberty.pdf [last accessed on August 19, 2007]
388 Online at http://www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD'docs/goals/goalsappendix.pdf [last accessed on April 16,
2007]
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officials and reviewed and 'acknowledged' (approved) by the Land Conservation and
Development Commission; 3) (Goal 3) the restriction of agricultural lands to full-scale
farming; 4) (Goal 4) forest conservation planning that restricts the use of forest lands; 5)
(Goal 5) local government inventories of natural resources, open space, and scenic and
historic places; 6) (Goal 6) consistency of local plans with state and federal
environmental regulations; 7) (Goal 7) careful planning in areas that are prone to natural
disasters and or hazards; 8) (Goal 8) coordination of local, state, the federal government,
and the private sector to protect recreational opportunities; 9) (Goal 9) local planning for
economic development; 10) (Goal 10) requires all communities to allow all types of
housing in their communities and the continued supply of land for residential use; 11)
(Goal 11) public facilities planning to guide growth; 12) (Goal 12) a connection between
comprehensive plans and transportation plans; 13) (Goal 13) communities to manage
growth in ways that are energy efficient; 14) (Goal 14) the creation of an urban growth
boundary that determines which land will be urbanized and which land will be reserved
for agriculture and forestry; 15) (Goal 15) each community along the Willamette River
will restrict development along the river and provide access for recreation; 16) (Goal 16)
coastal communities to include estuary plans in their comprehensive plans; 17) (Goal 17)
communities must plan for and protect their coastal shorelands; 18) (Goal 18) local
governments to prevent building on beaches and to provide recreation access; 19) (Goal
19) coordination among state and federal agencies to protect ocean resources. 389
The Oregon Statewide planning goals make planning a priority in Oregon's
communities (Charts 1 and 3). All communities must adopt comprehensive plans and
389 Oregon Statewide Planning Program. Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development,
Brochure.
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zoning that is in compliance with the statewide goals. In order to make sure that local
comprehensive plans are in compliance with both state and regional goals, there is a
periodic review, a state-run process that all communities must go through, which can take
several years. For communities in the Portland region, the state's Land Conservation and
Development Commission (LCDC) 390 and Metro take a look at their codes, ordinances,
plans and compare them to changes in state law and regional requirements. While this
process takes a long time, the result is that local communities "should be assured that the
rules and plans comply with federal and state and regional regulations." 391 This helps
provide local officials with a degree of certainty about their future direction and can serve
as a way for them to legitimize unpopular local planning decisions.
In other states, compliance with state goals is not required. In addition,
comprehensive plans are often not implemented in many states because there is no
requirement of consistency between the comprehensive plan and zoning.3 92 Local
planners operating in the Oregon planning framework were surprised when I described
how difficult it is to get zoning changed in a state like Massachusetts. Referring to the
Massachusetts system that requires a 2/3 vote at town meeting in order to change a local
zoning ordinance, one local planning director in the Portland region said, "if we had to do
planning at 2/3rds vote, nothing would change. Citizens are opposed to change." 393 This
390 LCDC is a seven member commission of citizen volunteers who are appointed by the Governor and
confirmed by the state senate. LCDC directs the work of the Department of Land Conservation and
Development.
391 Interview 1OP.
392 In Massachusetts if a community decides to adopt a comprehensive plan (also called a master plan),
there is no requirement that it is consistent with statewide goals. Finally, local master plans in
Massachusetts do not automatically change local zoning codes so there are many cases where the master
plans say one thing and the zoning regulations say something quite different.
393 Interview lOP.
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is a telling statement suggesting that citizens in Portland are not necessarily more
enlightened or inclined to vote for progressive planning (as some have argued) than their
counterparts in Massachusetts. Instead, a strong state land use planning framework
forces the adoption of a more rigorous planning process and insulates it from the local
political opposition that typically makes regional planning more difficult. Local politics
is still important, but there are certain planning requirements that local planners are
required to meet.
Goal 14 requiring every community to have an urban growth boundary (UGB) has
been critical for Metro. The Urban Growth Boundary (UGB) policy was put in place in
an effort to retain Oregon's strong agricultural economy. It provides a clear line of
demarcation between urban and rural areas. All the land throughout the state was
classified and zoned according to soil type to ensure that rich soil types would not be lost
to urban and suburban development. Soil that is zoned as exclusive farming zoning
(EFZ) is supposed to remain agricultural unless there is a compelling reason for its
development. Rather than each community in the Portland metropolitan area formulating
its own UGB, the state grants Metro the authority to administer one UGB for the whole
Portland metropolitan area.394 Land within the UGB is developable (as "urban"), while
land outside of the UGB, with some exceptions, is reserved for agriculture and forestry.
Metro is responsible for ensuring that there is a 20-year land supply in the Portland
region to support housing and industrial development. I will discuss some of the
challenges that Metro faces administering the UGB later in the chapter.
3 Here it is important to note that the City of Vancouver to the north of Portland is within the Portland
metropolitan statistical area (MSA), but because it is in the State of Washington Metro does not have
authority over its development. The City of Vancouver does not have an urban growth boundary.
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SECTION 1: Metro Authority and Legitimacy
Metro's legislative and fiscal authority make it a unique example of
intergovernmental coordination in the area of metropolitan growth management (Chart
2). Metro's authority comes from: 1) the ability to determine the Urban Growth
Boundary (UGB) for the Portland region; 2) oversight over local planning to ensure
consistency with the regional plan; 3) a voter approved 'home-rule'charter which grants
Metro "authority to assume responsibility for issues of 'metropolitan concern' "-395- 4) an
elected Metro Council which gives Metro more legitimacy than any other metropolitan
body in the U.S.; 5) participation of local elected officials in the Metropolitan Policy
Advisory Committee (MPAC) and the Joint Policy Advisory Committee on
transportation (JPACT); 6) participation of local planning directors in the Metropolitan
Technical Advisory Committee (MTAC); 7) Metro's role producing and disseminating
regional data and providing technical assistance to local governments; 8) authority over
regional transportation funds since Metro is the Metropolitan Planning Organization
(MPO) for the region; 9) Metro's ability to ask voters for "broad-based revenue sources
such as a property tax, sales tax or income tax"396; and 10) Metro's role as the
Metropolitan Service District (providing regional services such as solid waste disposal,
395 Metro. Online at http://www.metro-region.org/article.cftn?articleid=211 [last accessed on August 17,
2007]
396 Metro. http://www.imetro-rCion.org/article.cfm?articleid=21 I [last accessed on August 17, 2007]
Metro's property tax levy goes towards operation of the Metro's Oregon Zoo. In addition, Metro has asked
voters to fund limited-time measures such as the Open Space Acquisition Bond fund and the construction
of the Portland convention center. The Construction Excise Tax passed in 2006 is a tax charge on new
construction in the region that is used to raise money for planning of areas brought into the UGB.
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recycling, regional parks, the Oregon Zoo, the Oregon Convention Center, as well as
regulation of solid waste in the metropolitan area).m
Metro's Home-rule Charter
While the state land use planning system grants Metro significant authority over
regional land use policy, Metro's home-rule charter is a 'bottom up' source of authority
coming from the voters. According to one Metro official, the home-rule charter,
elections, and ballot measures make Metro a political player in the region:
when you talk to local government officials you hear the word 'home-rule'
charter pretty readily. It rolls off their lips. They are quite aware of what
a 'home-rule' charter means.. .We had to have a state constitutional
amendment that the voters statewide had to approve to allow us to have a
'home-rule' charter. We had to have our own voters approve that 'home-
rule' charter. We had to have an independent charter commission draft
that 'home-rule' charter and refer it out to the voters. So our accountability
to the public and the authority that the 'home-rule' charter created went
farther than the state mandated authority. We have that accountability to
our public which gets reinforced daily by having an elected council. We
have been on the ballot on a very regular basis and when you are on the
ballot a lot you get a higher consciousness by the public, 'Oh, I'm voting
for Metro.' So we are not invisible. We are pretty well known. We are
on the ballot every 2 years for elected officials. We have been on the
ballot for money measures probably a dozen times over the course of the
years. We have been on the ballot for the Charter and a Charter
amendment. There were two land use measures we have been on the
ballot for (neighborhood density). We have been on the ballot repeatedly.
There is a pretty high level of understanding. If you poll the word Urban
Growth Boundary, there is 95 percent name recognition-unbelievable. 398
Metro's political visibility and accountability to voters allows it to take on tasks that in
other regions are considered the sole responsibility of local officials. Citizens are
397 One interviewee described Metro as the "organization of misfit toys" since Metro has a wide array of
roles including running the zoo and providing solid waste disposal services.
398 Interview 9P.
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involved in Metro's decision-making because Metro has asked citizens what they want at
the ballot box. Citizens also recognize that Metro is an important player in the region.
Elected Metro Councilors
The fact that Metro councilors are elected, and Metro is the only elected
metropolitan body in the U.S., lends it a level of democratic legitimacy that other
intergovernmental arrangements do not have. No other regional council in the country
has councilors who are specifically elected by a regional constituency to deal with
regional issues. Metro is governed by an elected council of seven Metro Councilors who
are elected by district.399 Each Councilor's district consists of constituents from different
parts of the region so Metro Councilors often represent a diverse range of "regional"
interests. Elected councilors may represent constituents from urban and suburban
communities so they are charged with creating policies that address the needs of both.
Metro Councilors feel that this gives them more legitimacy (than even local officials who
sit on regional councils) to make regional decisions because they are engaged in a
dialogue with a diverse range of constituents about how they want the region to develop.
One Metro Councilor described their unique role, "Metro Councilors are elected in
elections that really turn on issues of growth management so in terms of growth
management issues, I think we have a lot of legitimacy. We are elected. And we are
elected in elections in which growth management is the primary issue. Local elected
officials are elected in elections which turn on issues such as law enforcement or the local
399 Originally, there were 12 elected council members.
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scene, the installation of a stop sign or something. "40 While local elected officials run
on a platform of helping their communities, Metro Councilors run on a regional platform,
which they argue makes them better qualified to make regional decisions.
Metro's Large Budget
Metro's large budget and ability to raise revenue is another source of authority.
The 2006-2007 budget for Metro is $316 million dollars. This funding covers the many
activities that Metro conducts. 40 1 The proposed budget for 2007-2008 of $465 million
comes from voter approved bonds (such as the Open Space bond passed in 1995 for
$135.6 million dollars and in November 2006 for $227.4 million)402, property taxes
(19%), grants primarily from state and federal agencies (9%), excise taxes from the users
of Metro services and facilities (7%), local government shared revenues (5%), inter-fund
transfers (8%), interest (4%), other revenue (2%), and enterprise revenue (46%) 403 which
come from the "use of Metro facilities or franchises and the purchase of Metro products
and services." 404 Metro is able to use its large budget to help accomplish some of its goals
400 Interview 13P.
401 One of the reasons that Metro has such a large budget is because among other activities it employs
people to manage the Oregon Zoo and Portland Convention Center.
402 Between 1995 and 2001, Metro preserved over 7,516 acres of greenspace. This was a part of the
Metropolitan Greenspace Master Plan. Ethan Seltzer, "It's Not an Experiment," in The Portland Edge:
Challenges and Successes in Growing Communities, ed. Connie Ozawa (Washington, D.C.: Island Press,
2004) 50.
403 Metro. Online at http://www.metro-region.ore/librarv docs/finance/07-08 proposed at-a-glance.pdf
[last accessed on April 16, 2007]
404 Metro. "Metro Budget 2006-2007," p. C-3. Online at http://www.metro-
region.org/library docs/finance/06-07 c metrobudget revenueanalysis.pdf [last accessed on August 17,
2007]. According to the FY2006-2007 budget, solid waste and recycling fees account for 51 percent of the
enterprise revenues. The Oregon Zoo accounts for 14 percent. Fees from the Oregon Convention Center,
Metropolitan Exposition Center, and Portland Center for the Performing Arts account for 24 percent of the
enterprise revenues. The final 11 percent come from fees charged by Metro's Data Resource Center, Metro
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by providing capacity building services as well as financial assistance to communities
working on projects that match with the regional vision.
Capacity Building Role
Metro also plays an important capacity building role. In the late 1980s, Metro
created the Regional Land Information System (RLIS), a geographic information system
(GIS) that links publicly available data with a base map.405 According to Ethan Seltzer,
the RLIS
provided regional planners with a number of 'firsts' essential for
supporting existing and emerging regional planning efforts. It provided
the first parcel-base map for the region, showing the impact of the UGB in
bold relief, region-wide, for the first time. It provided the first composite
comprehensive plan and land use maps for the metropolitan region.406
The data and geographic expertise that Metro offers continues to be an important
resource for local governments who do not have the financial resources or expertise to
maintain and gather such data.
Metro also conducts studies of transportation alternatives, which are important for
localities that do not have the capacity or resources to conduct them. 407 When land is
brought into the UGB, Metro often helps communities coordinate and pay for the
planning process. This has been the case in the Damascus Boring area where 12,000
Regional Park fees, the Regional Contractor License Program, and parking charges at the Metro Regional
Center.
405 Ethan Seltzer (2004), 41.
406 Ethan Seltzer (2004), 41.
407 The study of the expansion of the streetcar conducted by Metro has been important to inner ring suburbs
like Lake Oswego.
198
acres were brought into the UGB in 2002 (this is discussed in more detail later in the
chapter). Metro also helps local communities meet statewide goals by helping them
inventory their streams and natural habitat (Goal 5). This particular activity landed Metro
in political hot water when local governments disagreed with Metro's stricter Goal 5
classifications. At first, Metro approached Goal 5 in traditional regulatory fashion, but
after considerable pushback from local officials, shifted to a more voluntary approach
where it worked with communities to help them comply.
Metro Councilors and staff also play an important educational role. They visit
communities to give presentations to neighborhood groups about the history of Metro, the
State land use planning law, and answer questions about Region 2040. Metro also runs a
program called Get Centered!, "a multi-year campaign dedicated to helping visionary
developers, architects and elected officials spur investment and build the region's vibrant
downtowns and main streets."40 8 Metro's Get Centered! program offers events, case
studies, and reports to help those interested in building downtown centers find the
necessary tools and resources. In addition, Metro produces handbooks and reports about
best practices and guidelines for how to build more livable communities. In some cases
Metro is able to supplement these educational activities with funding. Metro's Transit
Oriented Development (TOD) program acquires sites and helps write down the cost of
land to promote more transit oriented projects, particularly near Tri-Met's MAX light rail
stations.
408 Metro. Online at ittp://www.metro-region.org/article.cfm?articleid= 12285 [last accessed on June 12,
2007]
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Transit-Oriented Development (TOD) Program
Established in 1998, Metro's TOD program has helped a number of communities
develop hard to develop projects near the light rail stations. As a result of the program,
about 15 projects have been developed and several more are under construction.4" The
TOD program has allocated about $17,344,541 to land acquisition, easements, and
consulting and project fees.41  One Metro staff member said the goal of the program is to
"develop new building types, push the market where we can and develop transit
ridership."4 " Metro helps write down the cost of development and also helps with the
planning and implementation of projects. Metro helped the City of Beaverton conduct a
study with local real estate developers about the challenges of TOD projects. Metro also
worked with Beaverton to buy a TOD site for 2 million dollars and to conduct a review of
its parking regulations. 41
In the City of Gresham, several mixed-use projects (Gresham Civic
Neighborhood and the Crossroads) have been built with the help of Metro's TOD
program. Since Gresham wanted to capitalize on the development of light rail, the City
planned for new uses around it. The Gresham Civic Neighborhood Plan (1995) was
supportive of more transit-oriented development and required adjustments to local
zoning. Metro was very supportive of this plan. According to Ed Gallagher, Gresham's
Planning Director, "The area of Gresham Station was a farm field just 10 years ago. The
civic neighborhood plan, strong vision, market demand and a good developer came
409 Metro, "Draft: Transit-Oriented Development and Centers Program Annual Report 2007," p. 3.
410 Metro, "Draft: Transit-Oriented Development and Centers Program Annual Report 2007," p. 6.
4" Interview 17P.
412 Interview 17P.
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together to make it happen. The city worked closely with Metro, applied resources to
public streets, transit oriented tax credits." 41" The success of Gresham Station, a TOD
project, is attributed in part to Metro's focus on capacity building and support of local
planning. The Metro staff member saw the value of the TOD program because
"communities see a different side of Metro. We bring money to the table. We bring
money to the project. We have added some street credibility to Metro as an organization
that is on the ground and not just in an ivory tower."4 14
Programming Transit Projects
Metro also serves as the lead agency for metropolitan rail projects. Tri-Met, the
operator of the regional rail system, implements the rail projects, but Metro is in charge
of project design and the EIS (environmental impact study). The initial idea for
Portland's light rail system came about as a means of reprogramming Federal
Transportation Funds. The Mayor of Portland and the Governor proposed development
of the light rail system, but Metro planned for it. After the construction of the light rail,
subsequent regional land use plans have been connected to the significant regional
investments in public transit. As a result, the connection between transportation and land
use planning is stronger in Portland than in other metropolitan areas. One Metro official
explained Metro's success at connecting land use and transit:
413 Get Centered! Gresham, March 31, 2005, Center for Advanced Learning Case Study Presentation.
Online at www.metro-region.org/library docs/ landuse/greshamsummary.doc [last accessed on August
18, 2007]
414 Interview 17P.
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we set priorities and stick to those priorities and we have a greater level of
influence over the land use patterns around the stations than just the UGB
itself. Our 2040 Growth Concept is very much designed around
emphasizing higher density development around the transit stations. From
a zoning and regulatory point of view, our framework for the region is
mirrored by the local zoning to implement that framework which really
emphasizes the zoning around those stations, our parking policy, our
MTIP funding (we allocate other categories of federal funds towards a
wide variety of transportation projects throughout the region: streets, bike
paths, sidewalks), the criteria for allocating that money emphasizes those
centers. We have a TOD program, which actually buys land adjacent to
rail stations to get development. We use that land value to actually
underwrite that development.
Here is it is important to note the way that Metro's authority over land use,
transportation, and ability to provide capacity building assistance all come together to
influence regional land use.
MPO Role and Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation
By having significant influence over transportation money, transportation
planning, and land use planning, Metro can play an important role in helping to build
connections between regional transportation and land use decisions. Since Metro serves
as the MPO for the region, it programs federal (and some state and regional) funds for
regional transportation projects. Local officials searching for scarce funds for
transportation projects turn to the MPO. One Metro official described the power that
comes from being the MPO:
The power of the MPO authority is you must have regional cooperation.
You can't do it without regional cooperation. Local elected officials have
to have a table that they sit around to make decisions. And you've got
money. There is money on the table. Money on the table produces the
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need to at least communicate. And if you can communicate, you might be
able to coordinate.41
Local officials and heads of transportation agencies serve on the Joint Policy Advisory
Committee on Transportation (JPACT) that submits its recommendations to the Metro
Council about which transportation projects should be funded (Chart 5). JPACT is
composed of a 17-member advisory committee of elected officials and representatives of
agencies who are involved with regional transportation planning. JPACT meets once a
month and decisions are made by the majority vote of a quorum (the Chairperson only
votes in the event of a tie). JPACT's mission is "to coordinate the development of plans
defining required regional transportation improvements, to develop a consensus of
governments on the prioritization of required improvements and to promote and facilitate
the implementation of identified priorities."41 7 The Metro Council either has to approve
JPACTs' recommendations or send them back to JPACT for revision; therefore, local
officials play an important role in allocating regional transportation funds.
One local planning director described the importance of being the MPO for the
region as follows: "If you hate Metro, it only goes so far because the regional share of
transportation money goes through Metro."41 8 Approximately $600-$700 million dollars
from local, regional, state, and federal sources are spent on transportation in the Portland
metropolitan area every year.419 Every 4 years, JPACT makes recommendations to the
416 Interview 9P.
417 Metro. Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation Bylaws. Online at http://www.metro-
region.org/library docs/trans/ipact bylaws.pdf [last accessed on April 17, 2007]
418 Interview 15P.
419 Metro. Online at http://www.metro-region.org/article.cfm?articlelD-=139 [last accessed on April 16,
2007]
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Metro Council regarding how to program the federal Metropolitan Transportation
Improvement Program (MTIP) "including funds the Oregon Department of
Transportation allocates through the State Transportation Improvement Program (STIP),
public transportation funds administered by the transit agencies Tri-Met and SMART,
and regional 'flexible funds' that Metro allocates through its 'Transportation Priorities'
process. JPACT also works to program the transportation priorities funding which
comes from the Surface Transportation Program and the Congestion Mitigation/Air
Quality program, both federal programs. The funding from these programs amounts to
about $30 million dollars per year (4% of the regional transportation spending).4 21 Every
2 years, the Transportation Priorities process is of considerable interest to local officials
who submit applications for regional flexible funds that can be used for any project
besides local street construction. According to Metro, "for the 2008-11 cycle of funding,
Metro received 66 applications totaling $132 million in requested funding; about $45
million will actually be available."A22
Metro uses it authority over transportation funds to promote its regional land use
and transportation goals by basing the TIP funding criteria on the 2040 Growth Concept
and the Regional Transportation Plan (Chart 6). So projects that are 'transit oriented' are
more likely to receive funding than projects that do not meet regional planning goals.
However, one Metro Councilor said, that the MPO process did not always support
420 Metro. Online at http://www.metro-region.org/article.cfmi?articleid=3.814 [last accessed on April 16,
2007]
42 Metro. Online at http>//www.metro-region.org/article.cfmn?articleID=139 [last accessed on April 16,
2007]
42 Metro. Online at http://www.mnetro-region.org/article.cfm?articleid=19681 [last accessed on April 16,
2007]
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regional planning goals. He recounted how the Metro Councilors reformed the MPO
process:
It used to be a pork barrel process. The City of Portland would want to do
transit and walkability kind of stuff. They would hold their nose and vote
for Washington County's big highway. Washington County would hold
their nose and vote for Portland's crazy ideas. Six years ago, the Metro
Council said we have goals and objectives that we all agreed to, the 2040
goals and objectives, and how we spend our money needs to reflect that.
We [the Metro Council] pushed back. The first year was a bit clumsy. It
was a power play. We said we aren't going to approve any projects that
don't meet these objectives. We said, these projects need to go in because
they meet the requirements. Because it is a grant process, over the cycles,
we have improved the criteria, improved how we evaluate things. So now
every project that comes in is a good project.. .Because of the fact that we
could veto it (even though we couldn't pass something over their
objections, but we could veto it) and we had a clear set of objectives that
the region had adopted, it was very hard for them [JPACT] to argue
against those objectives because they were adopted with their concurrence,
we have been able to move things in a good direction. That has laid the
basis for the new Regional Transportation Plan update. We are saying it is
an implementation strategy for the regional plan so everything that is in
there has to comply with it. We are going to narrow it down and be more
focused and more strategic. It is because of our ability to assert the
regional need over the local desire.
The above description of the process of reforming JPACT and helping connect
transportation funding with land use priorities demonstrates the on-going and changing
relationship between the Metro Councilors and local officials (in this case members of
JPACT). Rather than see Metro as a static organization with fixed roles and
responsibility, I find that Metro is constantly evolving through negotiations between local
officials and Metro Councilors.
Today, local officials and planners recognize the importance of proposing
transportation projects that meet the 2040 goals and following Metro's land use
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guidelines. One local planning director said, "if you meet the criteria, you are more
likely to score points. Metro basically says, 'if you want the money, you play our
game.' " Another local planning director said, that Metro uses its authority over
transportation funding sparingly, but it has "hinted that the MPO is where the real
leverage comes from, so for instance, if you want TIP money, you probably want to play
by the rules." 424 Metro tries to avoid exercising its power over TIP funding to overtly
punish non-compliance with Metro's land use guidelines, but the threat is certainly there.
Local Participation in Metro Policymaking Creates Legitimacy
The Portland system integrates local officials into metropolitan policy-making by
involving them on three important committees: the Metro Policy Advisory Committee
(MPAC), the above mentioned Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation
(JPACT), and the Metropolitan Technical Advisory Committee (MTAC). MPAC, a 25
member "charter mandated committee of local government representatives and citizens"
from the region, serves as the policy advisory committee to Metro Council (Chart 4).42
One member of MPAC said, "Metro does not ignore MPAC."426 While the Metro
Council makes many of the final decisions on policy, it is clear from interviews with
officials and planners in the region that much of Metro's legitimacy comes the having the
participation of local mayors and other elected officials who sit on the Metropolitan
Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC).
424 Interview 1OP.
425 Metro. Online at http://www.metro-region.org/article.cfm?articleid=8 878 [last accessed on March 2,
2007]
426 Interview 7P.
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Part of the importance of MPAC is historical. In the 1990s, when Metro was
taking on a stronger land use planning role, local officials on MPAC played a key role in
determining the scope of Metro's work. A key group of local mayors was instrumental in
creating the 1991 Regional Urban Growth Goals and Objectives (RUGGOs), the goals
that guided Metro's later work. Interestingly, as a result of local officials' participation,
in some instances Metro's policies are stricter (than they would have been) because the
local officials wanted them to be. One Metro official acknowledged the important role
that local elected officials played in shaping the scope of Metro's work:
The local officials ended up getting us to adopt mandates on local
government that were more aggressive than we would have adopted on
our own initiative because our mandates get resisted. If you are being told
what to do, the natural instinct at a local government level is to say 'don't
tell me what to do.' Even if the medicine is good for you, you still resist.
But if local officials say, we want this to happen and the only way it is
going to happen is if Metro mandates it, then it is a different political
427dynamic.
According to Metro officials, Metro would never have adopted some of the
requirements such as stricter parking regulations if it had not been for the mayors
involved with Metro's initial development who understood the important role that Metro
could play in helping them meet their own goals. For example, the Mayor of Gresham at
the time, Gussie McRoberts, supported an increase in parking densities because it would
help her accomplish her goal of making downtown Gresham denser. If parking were
available cheaply in other communities, then there would be little incentive for people to
come to downtown Gresham when it adopts stricter parking requirements. However, if
Metro mandated parking minimums and maximums in other communities, it would help
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level the playing field for Gresham. A Metro official describes the relationship between
localities and Metro:
For example, we adopted parking minimums and maximums where they
[local mayors] are the ones that pushed the agenda for us to adopt these
requirements. They are the ones that pushed this... Metro would never
have gotten away with that. But they were able to have us adopt them as
requirements that all the local governments had to adopt.42 8
Since local officials on MPAC set the terms of Metro's policies, they could not
say they did not have a voice in regional decision-making. In fact, they were at the table
when the policies were negotiated. The role that MPAC played in the formation of Metro
and the continued participation of local elected officials in MPAC is not trivial because
mayors and other local elected officials feel that they helped determine the terms of
metropolitan governance. One Metro Councilor described the participation of local
mayors in MPAC as the "building blocks for Metro." 429 Several of the mayors
interviewed have been actively involved in Metro since the early 1990s, when Metro took
on a stronger land use role. In addition, a few MPAC representatives have been
associated with Metro longer than the Metro Councilors.
MPAC meets two times a month and makes policy recommendations about the
regional plan. Metro's authority is critical to the participation of local elected officials
because local elected officials will not participate unless something is at stake. Without
metropolitan authority, elected officials are less likely to participate in regional decision-
making. Like many other regions (including Boston and Denver), all of the mayors of
suburbs in the Portland region are part-time except for the mayor of Beaverton, who is a
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full-time mayor. Given their part-time status, mayors' time is limited so their active
participation in MPAC is all the more remarkable.
When asked why they participate, local elected officials responded that they
wanted to be at the table when policy that would affect them was determined. Some were
committed to the idea of regional governance and wanted to play an active role in
determining it. Others felt threatened by Metro, but felt it was better to be at the table
when decisions are made. They saw MPAC as a check to the Metro Councilors. Local
mayors attend the MPAC meetings because they feel that they benefit from being at the
table and they potentially lose out by not being at the table. However, not all local
officials feel that MPAC is 'listened' to by the Metro Council and sometimes this is a
source of contention between MPAC and the Metro Council. While MPAC's
subcommittees do much of the policy work for Metro, one local official also complained
about the influence that Metro Councilors have on the subcommittees: "often the Metro
Councilors are actively engaged in subcommittee work. There is a feeling that there is a
lack of independence. The Metro Councilors have agendas. They can greatly influence
the work."403
An example of the tension between MPAC and the Metro Council occurred
during the 2004 expansion of the UGB. When the City of Cornelius, a small,
increasingly immigrant, city at the western edge of the UGB (with a weak tax base),
asked Metro to expand the UGB so Cornelius could add industrial land, the Metro
Council denied the request despite MPAC's overwhelming support of the expansion.4
4 Interview 16P.
43 One thing to note is that industrial lands in the Portland region are more important than commercial
lands because they do not have sales tax in Oregon.
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The Metro Council denied Cornelius' request for the expansion of industrial lands
because the land that Cornelius wanted to reclassify as industrial was classified under the
Oregon State land use planning system as elusive farm zoning (EFZ). Mayors and local
officials I met with were frustrated that the Metro Councilors had ignored their
recommendation. They felt that they had not been listened to and that the environmental
interests on the Metro Council had essentially overridden the consensus decision made by
MPAC.
MPAC representatives' collective frustration with Metro in this case can be
interpreted in two ways. First, it can be interpreted as a collective push against Metro:
local jurisdictions coming together to argue that another local jurisdiction should have the
right to local self- determination. On the other hand, it can be seen as an example of
regional cooperation. City officials who typically think in terms of their own cities' well-
being (above those of other parts of the region) joined together to help out another
jurisdiction. Local officials understood the economic situation in Cornelius because they
met together on a regular basis to talk about their concerns. Probably, there is a little bit
of both motives at play. The fact that the mayors on MPAC work together all the time
allows municipalities to cooperate and make a regional statement about how they think
the region should develop and the importance of regional equity. In addition, mayors
recognize that regional policies impact their bottom lines and they do not want Metro to
overlook local concerns, particularly financial ones. Jurisdictions do not want Metro to
fully determine the land that is available to them for development as they did in
Cornelius. This example also demonstrates the strength that the Metro Council has over
land use. Localities on the edge of the UGB that want to expand need permission from
210
Metro. Metro has the ability to grant changes to the UGB or to reject them and the
communities are obligated to abide by Metro's decisions. I discuss this in more detail in
Section 2.
Metro Technical Advisory Committee
While Metro does not have the staff to become actively involved in the details of
local planning, the way that Metro builds planning capacity is through the involvement of
local planners from the region in Metro's decision-making. Local planners who serve on
MTAC (Metro Technical Advisory Committee), which advises MPAC, meet at Metro
two times a week. One local planning director who serves on MTAC said, "Frankly, a
handful of us are around the table who have been doing this for a long time. There is a
lot of problem solving horsepower.A 32 He is on a first name basis with the Metro
Councilors and Metro staff members. He described working with Metro as "part of the
routine."433 During the UGB amendment process, which he describes as "a big mess" he
has a full time staff member assigned to Metro and because the issues are so important to
his community, it is usually him. The fact that the planning director feels he needs to be
at Metro representing the interests of his community demonstrates the influence that
Metro has over local land use planning. The planning director attends these meetings
because it is important to be at the table to tell Metro which acres to bring into the UGB
and which to leave out. "In years past, Metro used to say, 'here's the new UGB, now
make it work,' " but now, the planning director said, Metro is more open to input from
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local planning officialS.4 Many other planning directors I interviewed said that they
were active participants in MTAC. One planning director said,
MTAC is an important group. A lot of bright people sit on it who are immersed
in the issues. There is a lot of brainpower sitting around the table. It does a good
job of shaping policy in the region. I think there is a misconception about the
nature of MTAC. It is called a technical advisory committee so people think that
we are a bunch of technocrats, but most people are also political people. The
Planning Director position is a position that is not free from politics. So you have
knowledgeable people, who are political, sitting around the table. You also have
some advocates, for example a representative from 1000 Friends, so you get
different view points.43
Another planning director felt that participating on MTAC "helps you understand what is
going on in the region. You feel like you are a part of a greater whole."436 Even planning
directors who were opposed to Metro, admitted that MTAC was an important committee
and it was important to be involved with it.
SECTION 2: Influencing Local Land Use Policy
While the previous section looked at the various roles that Metro plays and its
interactions with local elected leaders, this section explores how Metro influences local
land use planning. I use specific incidences where Metro has influenced local land use
planning to better understand how Metro uses its authority and the other tools at its
disposal.
Under Oregon law, Metro was required to develop goals and objectives. In 1991,
Metro adopted the Regional Urban Growth Goals and Objectives (RUGGOS) to help
434 Interview 10P.
435 Interview 14P.
436 Interview I1P.
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guide its long-range planning efforts. In 1992, voters approved the 'home-rule' charter
that shifted Metro's focus to regional land use planning. From 1992-1994, a public
visioning process known as Region 2040 examined several different scenarios for the
future development of the Portland region. Computer modeling found that if Portland
continued to develop in the same way it had been, by 2040, the UGB would have to be
expanded by 120,000 acres.4 37 In order to find out what Portland residents wanted, in the
spring and summer of 1994, Metro made a major effort to involve the public. Metro sent
a questionnaire to 500,000 households in the region. They received responses from
17,000 people.4 38
The Region 2040 planning process in Portland was similar to regional planning
initiatives like Envision Utah, Chicago 2020, Denver's Metro Vision 2020, and Boston's
MetroFuture. These regional visioning exercises, which aim to promote shared
understanding of regional issues and a culture of cooperation among regional
stakeholders, have become the norm for how metropolitan governance is conducted in the
U.S. 43 9 While the Region 2040 visioning process was similar to other parts of the
country, Metro's power to implement it is unique (Chart 3). Oregon state law mandates
that local comprehensive plans and the zoning that implements them are consistent with
the regional plan.
4" "The Nature of 2040: The Region's 50-Year Plan for Managing Growth," Metro Pamphlet. p. 3.
438 "The Nature of 2040: The Region's 50-Year Plan for Managing Growth," Metro Pamphlet. p. 5.
439 For more information about visioning processes, see Parr, John, "The Chattanooga Process: A City's
Vision Is Realized," in The Consensus Building Handbook: A Comprehensive Guide to Reaching
Agreement, eds. Susskind, Lawrence, Sarah McKearnan, and Jennifer Thomas-Larmer (California: Sage
Publications, 1999).
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In December 1995, the 2040 Growth Concept, which grew out of the visioning
process, was adopted unanimously by the Metropolitan Policy Advisory Committee
(MPAC) and the Metro Council. The 2040 Growth Concept encouraged development of
centers and corridors, redevelopment within the UGB, cooperation with communities
outside of the UGB in order to keep them separate, promote multi-modal regional
transportation systems, protection of open space and farmland in and outside of the UGB,
and the promotion of a range of housing options. In December 1996, Metro approved the
Urban Growth Management Functional Plan, which Metro described as a "toolbox of
planning policies for local governments to use to implement the 2040 Growth
Concept." 440 The Urban Growth Management Functional Plan consists of a number of
Titles or 'requirements' guiding local development, some of which are binding and others
that are recommended. They are as follows:
TITLE 1: REQUIREMENTS FOR HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT
ACCOMMODATION
TITLE 2: REGIONAL PARKING POLICY
TITLE 3: WATER QUALITY AND FLOOD MANAGEMENT
TITLE 4: INDUSTRIAL AND OTHER EMPLOYMENT AREAS
TITLE 5: NEIGHBOR CITIES AND RURAL RESERVES
TITLE 6: CENTRAL CITY, REGIONAL CENTERS, TOWN CENTERS AND
STATION COMMUNITIES
TITLE 7: AFFORDABLE HOUSING
TITLE 8: COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
TITLE 9: PERFORMANCE MEASURES
TITLE 10: FUNCTIONAL PLAN DEFINITIONS
TITLE 11: PLANNING FOR NEW URBAN AREAS
TITLE 12: PROTECTION OF RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS
TITLE 13: NATURE IN NEIGHBORHOODS
440 "The Nature of 2040: The Region's 50-Year Plan for Managing Growth," p. 5.
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These Titles set the benchmarks for urban development that cities and counties must
follow. According to the language of the Urban Growth Management Plan,
regional policies which are adopted by this Urban Growth Management
Functional Plan recommend and require changes to city and county
comprehensive plans and implementing ordinances. The purpose of this
functional plan is to implement regional goals and objectives adopted by
the Metro Council as the Regional Urban Growth Goals and Objectives
(RUGGO), including the Metro 2040 Growth Concept and the Regional
Framework Plan. The comprehensive plan changes and related actions,
including implementing regulations, required by this functional plan as a
component of the Regional Framework Plan, shall be complied with by
cities and counties as required by Section 5(e)(2) of the Metro Charter.441
After the Urban Growth Functional Plan was adopted, cities and counties had 24 months
to change their local zoning to meet the targets for population and housing set by Metro's
plans. According to the language of the plan communities should:
Accept regional 20 year growth targets for residential and employment;
Change local plans to increase permitted densities to assure sufficient
capacity to be consistent with the 2040 growth concept; Adopt minimum
residential densities - providing for no less than 80% of the permitted
density; Change local codes to provide for reductions in parking
minimums and maximums consistent with regional standards to encourage
more efficient use of land; Manage the location of new "big box" retail, so
that investment and reinvestment in retail commercial in existing centers
are maintained and transportation impacts are minimized; and, Raise
levels of acceptable congestion on the road system in high density areas
with good transit and / or pedestrian networks .442
Of course, adoption of the Urban Growth Functional Plan by local communities
has required considerable adjustment and tension. Metro's attempt to upzone areas
instead of constantly expanding the UGB has met with local resistance. As conditions
44' Metro. Online at http://www.metro-region.org/library-docs/about/chap307.pdf [last accessed on April
17, 2007]
442 G.B. Arrington, Jr. "Beyond The Field of Dreams: Light Rail and Growth Management in Portland."
Tri-Met Report (September 1996), 26. Online at http://trimet.org/pdfs/publications/bevonddreams.pdf
[last accessed August 18, 2007]
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have changed over time, communities that upzoned to meet Metro's requirements have
been unhappy with the results. Gresham, a city to the east of Portland with close to
100,000 residents, rezoned land for higher density to meet Metro's requirements.
Gresham officials feel that as a result of the rezoning to more multifamily units, they
have absorbed a large number of the poorer residents in the region. Providing services
for these residents has been a challenge for Gresham since residential development does
not pay enough in tax revenue to support the necessary services. The Mayor of Gresham,
Shane Bemis, described the problems facing the community: "I am very concerned about
Gresham's growing crime and gang problems. These 'big city' problems affect every
single service and initiative this City provides."443 City officials in Gresham view the
'big city' problems in part as a result of the changes in their zoning that resulted from
complying with Metro's goals.
Metro officials feel that some of the unintended consequences of upzoning were
not a result of Metro's policies, but rather the way that localities chose to meet their
density requirements. One Metro official explained the process:
Metro said let's set a target for each local government to accomplish for a
certain number of housing units and jobs in their center if they have a
center and in their jurisdiction generally. So a target was set for new
housing units and new jobs. Everyone had to do something to upzone.
We adopted a requirement that they do the necessary upzoning in order to
get to these targets. We required that they set minimum densities so that
once they establish their zoning, they didn't underbid. We didn't want
them to allow for single family housing in areas zoned for 20 units. We
required them to accommodate accessory dwelling units so they could
pick and chose where in their jurisdictions they would put them.. .Our
443 Letter from Shane Bemis, Mayor of Gresham, January 2, 2007. Online at
http://www.ci. c resh am.or.us/departments/cedd/cp/denographics/default.asp [last accessed on April 17,
2007]
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assertion is that they put a lot of things in the wrong places. We wanted
things in centers and along corridors, near light rail corridors..4
As the Metro official's comments suggest, density continues to be a flash point between
Metro and many of communities in the Portland region. The biggest backlash against
Metro's density requirement was a ballot measure to strip Metro of its authority to require
local governments to increase density. Metro offered a counter measure (Measure 26-
29), which said Metro would not require increase in density in neighborhoods, but
allowed Metro to increase density in centers. Metro's measure passed 60 to 40. As a
result of Measure 26-29, Metro has agreed to focus on increasing density in the town
centers and leave other parts of communities alone. However, local planners still
mentioned density requirements as a potential threat. "If they [Metro Councilors] come
back with new mandates, this community is adamant that we don't want to increase
density to accommodate mixed use, higher density," one local planning official said.445
Another local planning official echoed this sentiment saying, "citizens don't want to live
on 4,500 square foot lots. We are capped so we can't get bigger lots. Maybe the
community doesn't want development in the centers." 446 However another planning
director saw the importance of Metro's density promotion: "there is a tendency for
everyone to want the feel of the country, but there is a huge need to urbanize. Compact
urban growth numbers force communities to examine closely their growth over time and
to ramp up their densities. If not under Metro, these communities wouldn't do this."447
444 Interview 9P.
445 Interview IIP.
446 Interview 16P.
447 Interview 15P.
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While there is tension around residential densities, there are also cases where
communities hoped that rezoning to meet Metro's requirements would help them create a
stronger tax base by attracting commercial and industrial development. Unfortunately,
Metro has found that zoning is not enough to change development patterns. To comply
with Region 2040, Gresham changed its zoning to provide for denser urban retail
developments; however, these projects have not materialized without some type of
intervention. Gresham officials are disappointed with how long it has taken to attract
these types of development. Recognizing that development of regional town centers
takes investment and expertise, Metro has played an important role in making these
projects happen, particularly through its Transit-Oriented Development (TOD) program
(which is discussed earlier in the chapter). In Gresham, Metro relied on capacity building
and financial incentives to help change market conditions and bring about the
development that they initially hoped to see through rezoning.
In interviews with local officials, it became clear that there is considerable tension
around Metro's authority over land use. Officials from the City of Hillsboro are
frustrated with Metro's ability to determine particular regional land uses. Hillsboro
officials argue that corporations come to the Portland region looking for 100-acre lots,
which are difficult to find because of the UGB and Portland's strict land use regulations.
Amendments to Metro's 2004 Title 4 'regionally significant industrial areas' (RSIA)
regulations further restricted the ability of localities to determine their own industrial land
development criteria by setting certain restrictions and requirements on these parcels.448
448 This Metro ordinance is known as Ordinance No. 04-1040B. The purpose of the ordinance was to limit
the retail and office use of 'regionally significant industrial areas.' Online at
http://www.metror-eion.org/library docs/lan-d use/exhibit b.pdf [last accessed August 20, 2007]
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Hillsboro officials thought Metro overstepped its mandate arguing that Metro's strict
regulations reduced the ability of the Portland region to compete with other regions that
do not have strong land use regulations. "Metro got to the detail of telling how many
square feet. They went too far, but this was what got adopted," said one Hillsboro
official. 4 49 Hillsboro officials chaltenged Title 4 in court arguing that Metro did not have
the authority to force Hillsboro to comply. While Hillsboro officials objected to Metro's
Title 4 policy, the Land Use Board of Appeals and the Court of Appeals upheld Metro's
authority, sending a signal to other communities that Metro has the authority to force
communities to change their zoning to comply with Metro.45 4
When asked about how this incident affected the relationship between Hillsboro
and Metro, one Hillsboro official said,
It is a partnership that is evolving. We have had our rough spots with
Metro and I think we have made some good progress with them in the past
year or so to try to repair what was somewhat of a strained relationship
that is a result of a direct challenge that we did based on new industrial
lands protections that were adopted in 2004, the Title 4 industrial land
protection. We challenged that on the basis that it seemed to be an exercise
of Metro's authority beyond what they really were given statutorily, by
their own charter or the Oregon Constitution. They were in effect doing
what looked to us like zoning. It was our stance that their role was
coordinating land use matters in the region among the jurisdictions, maybe
setting some broad policy goals to their framework plan, performance
standards, but not getting down to the level of specificity where this parcel
44 Interview iP.
450 The text from the Court of Appeals from the State of Oregon, filed July 6, 2005: "Because the
ordinances permit Metro to perform the same functions that the statutes allocate to cities, Hillsboro
contends, the ordinances must give way. The flaw in this logic is apparent. Metro's ordinances themselves
are authorized by statute. Thus, Metro's ordinance creating a plan or imposing a zoning regulation that
conflicts with a city's plan or regulation, pursuant to ORS 268.390(5), cannot be preempted by Hillsboro's
statutory authority to perform the same functions. Both Metro and Hillsboro derive their authority from
statute, but the statute authorizing Metro's authority explicitly states that Metro has the authority to bring
cities like Hillsboro into compliance." Online at http://www.pubIications.oid.state.or.us/A 127336.htn [last
accessed August 20, 2007]
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of land has these restrictions and it is going to be zoned regionally
significant industrial area. We lost that case even going through as high as
the Court of Appeals. The court decided that Metro did have that type of
authority.. 4
While officials from the City of Hillsboro often disagree with Metro, the above quote
demonstrates the on-going nature of their relationship with Metro. Hillsboro officials
may be frustrated by the authority that Metro wields, but they have to learn to work
within that framework. Similarly, if Metro Councilors want to stay out of court and out
of the political hot seat, they have to maintain a working relationship with officials from
Hillsboro and other communities despite previous disagreements.
While it might seem that a regional planning agency with regulatory authority
should automatically be able to force localities to adopt goals, targets, and guidelines, as
the stories above demonstrate, the reality is much more complicated. Localities are
responsible for the local implementation of Metro's requirements. Metro requires
compliance with its mandatory titles, but zoning is left to localities. While Metro has the
statutory authority to force localities to comply with certain goals and objectives,
compliance is not always guaranteed. According to a 2004 Metro Annual Compliance
Report (see Chart 7), "[t]he region has reached a compliance rate of 99% for Titles 1
through 6 requirements."4 2 However, five jurisdictions (Gresham, Lake Oswego, West
Linn, Wilsonville, and Clackamas County) had not met all the requirements.453
451 Interview IP.
452 Metro. "Urban Growth Management Functional Plan Annual Compliance Report," December 23, 2004,
Revised August 31, 2005, Revised September 26, 2005, 1.
45 Metro. "Urban Growth Management Functional Plan Annual Compliance Report," December 23, 2004,
Revised August 31, 2005, Revised September 26, 2005, 59.
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Compliance with other Titles, such as Title 11, which deals with new area brought into
the UGB, is described by Metro as "complex and expensive."454
Metro's response to non-compliance is to call a public hearing and ask the
communities that are out of compliance to explain why they have not complied. One
local planning director said Metro has "a massive list of deadlines for changing local land
use, parking requirements, building height standards, etc. Metro threatens to do
something if communities don't comply, but they never really do. They do have
authority, but they don't really use it."4A" The same planning director admitted, "the
easiest thing is to adopt their standards, but if you are different, you want to use a
different approach. It is a time consuming thing to convince Metro that your ordinance is
as good as theirs." 456 This was the sentiment of many local planning directors I
interviewed who felt that it was easier to cooperate with Metro than to actively work to
thwart Metro's goals.
When asked about enforcement, one local planning director emphasized the subtle
way that Metro uses its authority saying that as far as he knew "the 2040 process had
never taken on any local community to force them to change zoning." He felt that this
was "a credit to Metro's political ability. Metro clearly has authority, but it doesn't want
to use it. Instead, Metro has a cooperative, how can we solve the problem approach."457
While Metro technically could 'call out' communities that have not complied, Metro
454 Metro. "Urban Growth Management Functional Plan Annual Compliance Report," December 23, 2004,
Revised August 31, 2005, Revised September 26, 2005, 59.
45 Interview 1 P.
456 Interview I1P.
457 Interview lOP.
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Councilors are reluctant to do so. A Metro Councilor said, "the fact that we are not
reviewing their zoning decisions, I think is a healthy thing. The enforcement mechanism
is that if there is a party that thinks that something they have done is not in compliance, it
can be taken to the land use board."4 58 Another planning director explained Metro's
reluctance to use its regulatory authority:
it is politically difficult to call out cities. There have been past attempts by
citizens to reduce the authority of Metro Councilors. Metro Councilors
are elected and they don't want to have local elected officials bad
mouthing them. Metro is reluctant to actually enforce something. So it is
a matter of persuasion rather than enforcement. The further you get down
the enforcement trail, the more hardened positions become. Tension
increases or decreases depending on what is going on. When Metro
assumes a regulatory role, tension goes up. When they take on the
convener role, tension goes down.459
The pushback that Metro has had from local governments, particularly over UGB
expansion, density, housing targets, and natural resource protection has lead to the
realization that Metro needs to be more cooperative. Increasingly, Metro is trying to take
on more capacity building roles rather than relying as much on their regulatory mandate,
which often gets them into trouble with local officials.
While not all communities have adopted every Metro measure, there are certain
standards which all have adopted. Communities in the Portland region all have to
comply with the state regulations as well as Metro's. The periodic review of local plans
and zoning by Metro and LCDC helps ensure a certain level of compliance. However,
one local planning director described Metro's relationship with different communities
like a big family: "If you were a big family, each kid would have a different personality.
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459 Interview 14P.
Every jurisdiction is doing something right. There is a lot of fighting and a lot of
disagreements."460 It is clear from my interviews that local politics still matter to local
planning. One Metro Councilor describing the different approaches of local governments
to planning said, "The values that they hold are very much the same. It is how they
define those values that is different." 461 Local planning directors that I interviewed all
acknowledged that they were still accountable to their local City Councilors before
Metro. The challenge for local planners was helping City Council members understand
Metro's regulations so they would adopt policies that Metro would recognize as in
compliance with its guidelines.
Managing the UGB and Regulating Land Use
Metro could not function in its current form without the support of Oregon's
strong state land use planning system. State law gives Metro the authority to manage the
UGB for the region. According to one Metro official,
all local governments have to have an Urban Growth Boundary. There are
rules on how you establish an Urban Growth Boundary and expand them.
There are protections on what happens outside of the UGB. We don't
have to regulate what happens outside of the UGB because the state does.
Our actions within the UGB happen within this context. Finally, the state
essentially said that there is really only one UGB in the metropolitan
region. There is no reason to have dueling UGBs. That all emanates from
the authority under the State Land Use Program.462
460 Interview 15P.
461 Interview 3P.
462 Interview 9P.
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As a result of the authority that Metro has from the state, localities have to defer to Metro
when it is time to decide where development can and cannot occur at the region's edge.
Metro's role administering the UGB is not entirely unwelcome by local officials.
One local planning director felt that
the UGB program helped create a perfect need for a metropolitan agency
to administer the expansion of the UGB. If there wasn't a Metro, you can
imagine that it would be an absolute disaster because each community in
the region would be trying to maintain its own UGB and there would be
conflicts over who is going to provide services, etc. for a new area that is
incorporated into the UGB. It makes sense for Metro to administer the
UGB for the 25 cities and 5 counties in one big chunk.463
However, there are other local officials who are frustrated by Metro's control over the
UGB because they view it as a threat to their local autonomy.
While control over the UGB is an important source of Metro's authority, it can be
a source of conflict between Metro officials and local officials who do not always see eye
to eye. One local planning director described determining the UGB as "one of the most
controversial activities in the region. 4 64 There is often political tension around UGB
expansion. One Metro Councilor described the pushback from local communities: "one
is if we expand the UGB, then it is the local government's responsibility to plan and
provide services for the area. In some cases, they are opposed to growth. That is the case
in the suburbs of West Linn.' 4 65 The City of West Linn sued Metro and LCDC over the
2002 expansion of the UGB. In 2005, the Court of Appeals upheld the majority of Metro
and LCDC's 2002 UGB expansion decisions but sent Area 37 (to the west of West Linn)
463 Interview 10P.
464 Interview 14P.
465 Interview 13P.
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back to Metro and LCDC for additional review. 4 66 "In other cases," the Metro Councilor
added, "it is a financial issue, cities do not want to extend services to people who aren't
even here yet. There is a breakdown in how we pay for growth in this state. The fiscal
mechanisms of our local government financial system are broken when it comes to
paying for new growth." 4 67
The suburb of Tualatin disagreed with Metro over the 2002 UGB expansion. In
the past thirty years, Tualatin experienced intense growth going from a community of 750
in 1970 to 26,000 in 2007.468 The citizens of Tualatin were concerned that more growth
would mean more traffic congestion and a decrease in their quality of life. During the
2002 expansion of the UGB, Tualatin's City Councilors agreed that "we don't want this,
but we will take a share of this."469 They identified and approved 400 acres of land to be
brought in for additional industrial expansion, but Metro brought in 22 more acres of
industrial land over the objection of the City Councilors.470 The fact that Metro
Councilors brought in land over the objections of the City Councilors continues to be a
source of contention since it was a direct challenge to Tualatin's home-rule. Local
officials have not forgotten this affront.
Another conflict, occurs when communities want UGB expansion and Metro
denies it. Many communities want to grow their industrial bases (in order to increase
466 Metro. Online at http://www.nctro-region.org/article.cfrn?ArticcID=266 [last accessed on August 17,
2007]
467 Interview 13P.
468 Interview 16P.
469 Interview 16P.
470 Interview 16P.
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their tax revenues). The City of Hillsboro (population 84,445) is described by some
Metro officials as "wanting to develop to the Pacific Ocean." 47 1 One Metro Councilors
said, "Hillsboro feels more restricted by being part of Metro. Almost every session of
legislature, they try to get laws changed to reduce Metro's authority to tell them what to
do."472 Home to Intel and a number of other high-tech corporations, HilIsboro is in good
financial condition because of its strong industrial base and the tax revenue it generates.
In 2003, Hillsboro had a total taxable real property value of $5,402,285,960.41' Given
Hillsboro's financial success, some officials in Hillsboro believe that they understand the
market conditions better than Metro. Metro's control of the UGB is frustrating for
Hillsboro officials because Hillsboro lies at the western edge of the UGB and in order to
meet the growing demand for more industrial lands they have to turn to Metro to expand
the UGB. Many officials in Hillsboro feel that they should be able to increase the
amount of industrial land in their own jurisdiction without relying on Metro. In 2004,
Hillsboro clashed with Metro when Metro denied the addition of a parcel (known as the
Evergreen site) into the UGB and instead added a different site. The Evergreen site was
later added to the UGB after the LCDC asked Metro to reconsider its decision.
Since Metro has the ability to tell Hillsboro where it can expand and where it
cannot, the desire for more industrial lands often pits Hillsboro against Metro. At the
471 Several Metro Councilors said the same thing about Hillsboro. Hillsboro's 2006 population was 84,445
according to Hillsboro's Economic Development Department. Online at
http://www.ci.hillsboro.or.us/EconomicDevelopment/Business.aspx [last accessed September 9, 2007]
472 Interview 12P.
473 Metro Planning Department. Exhibit A to Resolution No. 04-3513, "2004 Performance Measures
Report: An evaluation of 2040 growth management policies and implementation," (December 2004) 19, 9.
Online at http:/www.netro-region .orig/Iibrarv docs/land use/full 2004_perfrneas report .pdf [last
accessed on June 26, 2007]
226
same time that Metro has the authority to reject and approve UGB expansion, it is
important to note that Metro has to deal with Hillsboro carefully because Metro officials
do not want to be perceived as not caring about local concerns. As an institution, Metro
gains its legitimacy from the fact that it provides a forum for local officials in the region.
Mayors from other cities take note of the way that the Metro Councilors treat Hillsboro
and other communities. However, after talking with city officials from other cities, it is
clear that there is a bit of jealousy in the region about Hillsboro's success. Hillsboro is
doing better economically than the rest of the cities, many of which are struggling
financially, yet Hillsboro officials still want more. Several other communities would like
Hillsboro to share some its revenue and are not convinced that Hillsboro needs more
industrial development.
Part of the tension between localities and Metro comes from having a different
focus. Metro Councilors are more concerned with the overall development of the region
and making sure that the demand for developable land in the region is met. Metro has to
provide for a 20-year land supply for housing and employment. Metro's UGB decisions
are also hamstrung by state land use regulations that require the protection of farmland.
According to state law, land that is classified as 'exception lands' should be added to the
UGB before exclusive farmland zoning (EFZ) land, which is supposed to be preserved
for farming. However, some localities argue that the state soil classifications that guide
UGB expansion do not make sense when planning for a jobs/housing balance in the
overall region. They also complain that the "magic numbers that Metro has to reach" in
order to provide a 20-year supply of residential and industrial land do not make sense for
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some communities. 4 74 While Metro Councilors may sympathize with the complaints of
local officials, they are often unwilling to make 'exceptions' because that will make
future governing more difficult. They recognize that special treatment for one
community will not go unnoticed by the other 24 cities. 475 However, given the highly
contested nature of UGB expansion and the growing number of court battles over UGB
decisions, Metro has to be careful to make decisions that will stand up in state court.
Damascus Boring Case
The idea behind the UGB is that it will help concentrate development in urban
service districts. Rather than each community permitting new development on
greenfields that will require additional infrastructure, the UGB attempts to focus
development in areas where there is already additional infrastructure capacity. However,
the logic behind the UGB policy is increasingly being tested, particularly as Metro has
been forced to bring in large areas of undeveloped land in order to meet the state mandate
of ensuring a 20-year land supply looking forward. Metro's experience expanding the
UGB in the Damascus Boring area demonstrates the challenge of providing funds for the
planning and development of new infrastructure in such areas.
In 2002, Metro added 18,700 acres to the UGB, about 12,000 acres of which were
in the Damascus Boring region. This resulted in the creation of the city of Damascus in
2004.476 Metro does not simply add the land into the UGB and then leave planning and
474 Interview 16P.
475 With the addition of the City of Damascus, Metro has just expanded to 25 cities.
476Downloaded October 31,2006 from http://www.ecotippingpoints.org/history.asp
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development up to the local communities. Instead, it provides planning assistance to
communities. In order to plan for the Damascus Boring area, Metro worked for two and
half years with Clackamas County, the City of Happy Valley, the City of Gresham, and
the new City of Damascus on the concept plan. A 26-member advisory committee of
residents and representatives from the different affected jurisdictions lead the planning
process. Metro did the transportation modeling and Clackamas County took care of the
land use and public meetings. They worked as one project team. Metro and Clackamas
County applied for a grant from ODOT (Oregon Department of Transportation) for the
process. Describing the process, one local planning director said,
overall, it went relatively well. The decision to bring it into the boundary
was a result of a visionary county commissioner who is now the CEO at
Metro and the hard work of the administrative staffs at Metro and the
County. Given the nature of the decision, it went politically well. This
was the biggest adjustment in the state and the region so it was a collective
experiment. We won't know for 25 years whether the experiment worked.
A new city was created and how that fits into an attempt to manage growth
is a question.477
Another planning director was more pessimistic about the Damascus project describing
the addition of Damascus as a "political compromise. "478 The land was brought into the
UGB because it was not zoned as exclusive farmland and the "ethic about protecting
farmland in Oregon is still strong."479 Since the "regional government is obliged to
follow statewide goals," Metro was put in a strange position where they ended up
bringing into the UGB thousands of acres of land that is "crummy land, with no services,
477 Interview 14P.
478 Interview 15P.
479 Interview 15P.
229
that is hard to develop."" Right now there are 10,000 people in Damascus and
according to one planning director, "not much enthusiasm for the Damascus Boring
concept plan.",4 ' The planning process is described as "a daunting task. The process is
very slow." 4 2 Whether or not the decision to bring the land in was the right one, Metro
has been an effective partner helping to develop the region: "Metro has been
extraordinarily generous with its time and resources." 483 Still the question of where
estimated 1.6 billion dollars necessary for new roads, sewer, water, fire services etc. will
come from means that development in Damascus may be many years away. 484 The
challenge for Metro is that if they cannot make development work in Damascus then they
really have not accomplished their goal of meeting the regional 20-year land supply.
The Damascus project has drilled home an important lesson for Metro: it is one
thing to bring land into the UGB and it is quite another to pay for it to be planned and
developed. While Metro may have control over the designation of which land is "in" and
"out" of the UGB, Metro officials have become increasingly aware that designating land
for development does not mean that development will happen. By concentrating large-
scale greenfield development in one area, there are economies of scale, but the price of
servicing such areas can be enormous. Metro struggles to figure out how to finance the
planning and development of new lands that have been brought into the UGB. Adjacent
480 Interview 15P.
481 Interview 15P.
482 Interview 15P.
483 Interview 15P.
484 Estimate by Portland consultant Jeff Tashman. Dennis McCarthy. "The Dual for Damascus Damascus:
'Green System' plan draws ire of landowners." The Oregonian. March 31, 2006, Local News p. al.
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communities feel that it is unfair to them to have to bear the brunt of planning for and
providing infrastructure for areas that are designed to address the growth needs of the
whole region.
To address the challenge of planning for land that is brought into the UGB, in
2006, Metro worked with the Portland Metropolitan Home Builders to develop a new
construction excise tax on all new construction in the region. The funds raise by the tax
go to help finance planning in new UGB areas.485 This was considered by Metro
officials to be a major coup because the Home Builders were brought in as partners.
Traditionally, the Home Builders have been opposed to Metro arguing that the strict land
use regulations in the Portland region have limited the supply of land and made
development much more costly and difficult. However, in this case, the Home Builders
recognized that the construction excise tax would help speed up the planning and
development process of lands that are brought into the UGB. The fact that Metro and the
Home Builders are working together is indicative of Metro's increasingly collaborative
approach to regional planning.
Metro is Not Always Successful
While there are examples of how Metro influences local land use planning, there
are also other examples of places were Metro is not able to change local planning. Where
we see Metro not being particularly successful at regional development is in terms of
485 "On March 23, 2006, the Metro Council adopted Ordinance 06-1115, creating Metro Code Chapter 7.04
for the purpose establishing a construction excise tax to provide funding for expansion are planning. The
tax will be levied on new construction activity at a rate 0.12 percent of the value of the new construction
based on building permits. Jurisdictions agreed to collect the Construction Excise Tax on behalf of Metro
beginning July 1, 2006. The tax will sunset when Metro has received $6.3 million. In FY 2007-08 Metro
expects to receive about $3.0 million from this tax." Online at http://www.metro-
region.org/librarv docs/finance/07-08 proposed at-a-glance.pdf, p. B-8. [last accessed April 16, 2007]
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affordable housing. Here it is important to note that Metro does not wield any authority
over affordable housing, but region-wide and statewide policies have influenced housing
development. The Metropolitan Housing Rule requires that each community in the
Portland region provide for a full range of housing needs. 486 According to 1,000 Friends
of Oregon, an environmental group that focuses on land use, statewide Goal 10 (local
communities to allow all types of housing in their communities and the continued supply
of land for residential use) is responsible for increasing the number of buildable units in
the Portland region from 129,000 to over 301,000.487
Metro's Urban Growth Management Functional Plan has a set of voluntary
affordable housing production goals to be adopted by local jurisdictions; however, many
communities view these as unfunded mandates. As of 2005, only Beaverton, Portland,
Multnomah County, and Washington County adopted the voluntary affordable housing
goals.488 One local planning director said, Metro "can't tell us that we have target
numbers. Mandates come down with out the financial incentives. Unfunded mandates
come down." 489 Local officials felt that unfunded mandates were unfair since local
jurisdictions are already financially strapped. A 2004 report of compliance with Metro's
486 According to Robert Liberty, "[t]he Metropolitan Housing Rule required nineteen of the twenty-four
cities, as well as the unincorporated parts of the three counties inside the metropolitan urban growth
boundary, to meet combined density targets (namely densities resulting from averaging single-family and
multifamily housing) for new construction of six, eight, or ten units per acre. The five cities not required to
meet a target density for new residential development were exempted because they had populations of less
than 2500." See, "Abolishing Exclusionary Zoning: A Natural Policy Alliance for Environmentalists and
Affordable Housing Advocates." Online at http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/meta-
clements/journals/bcealr/30 3/07 TXT.htm [last accessed September 10, 2007]
487 Robert Liberty, Director, 1000 Friends of Oregon, "Overview and Accomplishments of the Oregon
Metro Portland Planning Programs," (September 1998).
488 Metro. "Urban Growth Management Functional Plan Annual Compliance Report," 2005, 16.
489 Interview 16P.
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affordable housing recommendations demonstrates some of the drawbacks of voluntary
programs. Many of the recommendations made by Metro were not considered, adopted,
or followed demonstrating the difficulty of implementing voluntary programs. As the
City of Fairview made clear, "the City does not believe that additional incentives to
attract more affordable housing is necessary or appropriate."4 90 Since the affordable
housing program is voluntary, Metro has no ability to force localities to adopt the
affordable housing goals.
While the UGB and Metro have protected agriculture and forest land from rapid
urban development, there is considerable "sprawl" within the Urban Growth Boundary.49 1
One of the reasons is that when the UGB was established it was drawn very large. One
of the interviewees described the initial designation of the UGB as a "big skirt." Another
reason that Portland may appear to be "sprawled" (or have low densities) is that much of
the development that was incorporated into the UGB was already developed at low
densities so the challenge is trying to densify already existing neighborhoods.
Increasingly, Metro is helping steer communities to develop more densely through
capacity building tools rather than regulatory measures.
As evidenced by the Damascus Boring case, another challenge for Metro is how
to fund planning and infrastructure development. One Metro Councilor said, "I think that
we have to ultimately become more of a financier of growth whether through urban
renewal or other mechanisms and less of an abstract planner and regulator. If we are
490 Metro. "Summary of 2004 Compliance of Metro Urban Growth Management Functional Plan Title 7
(Affordable Housing), in Attachment 1: Title 7 (Affordable Housing) Component of the 2004 Annual
Compliance Report of the Urban Growth Management Functional Plan," (Metro, December 14, 2004,
revised September 26, 2005) 1.
""9 Myron Orfield, Portland Metropolitics: A Regional Agenda for Community and Stability, A Report to
the Coalition for a Livable Future, July 1998.
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really going to accommodate 1 million more people in the region, it is going to take an
active investment strategy rather than plans and regulations." 49 2 Here we see the limits of
regulation. Currently, Metro is actively working to address the financial constraints of
development by collaborating with the Home Builders and working with communities on
TOD projects. This is a part of Metro's increasingly collaborate approach to
metropolitan governance.
Measuring Metro's Effectiveness
There is no systematic measurement of Metro's success at local implementation
of regional goals. However, certain measurements suggest that Metro has made a
significant difference in the planning and development of the region. Portland has been
ranked as the 2006 Most Sustainable City among the fifty largest U.S. cities by
SustainLane.com. Sustainlane.com uses close to 2,000 data points to measure each city's
sustainability.493 One noticeable measure of Metro's success is a change in density in the
region. According to David Bragdon, Metro Council President, "[i]n the 1990s, although
our population grew by 26 percent, we were able to accommodate that by extending our
settled area geographically by only eight percent.A 94 Metro's analysis of 13
communities shows the region becoming denser. "Between 1996 and 2000, there was a
132% increase in single-family homes constructed on lots of less than 5,000 square feet,
492 Interview 13P.
493 Press Release. City of Portland Office of Sustainable Development.
494 Metro. President Bragdon's speech at 2004 Regional Planning and Business Symposium, Nov. 18, 2004.
Online at http://www.netro-region.org./article.cfnarticleid=12049 [last accessed on July 5, 2007]
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and lots 5,000 square feet or greater decreased by 32 to 47%."49 From 1996 to 2002,
new housing primarily took place on smaller lots. The number of under 5,000 square feet
lots increased
from 14% (1,041 units) of the 7,193 units built in 1996 to 51% (1,614 units) of
the 3,178 units built in 2002 while all larger lot sizes decreased. Lots larger than
5,000 square feet decreased as follows: Units built on 5,000-7,500 square feet lots
declined from 44% of the total to 30%; units built on 7,501-10,000 square feet
lots declined from 23% of the total to 9%; and units built on lots above 10,000
square feet declined from 19% of the total to 10%.496
These numbers suggest that development patterns in the region have shifted towards
smaller lots and denser development.
Denser development has been aided by Portland's strong public transportation
system, whose funds are allocated through Metro. While across the U.S., daily vehicle
miles per capital traveled increased by 6%, in the Portland region they declined by
11%. 497 Between 1971 and 1996, Portland's Tri-Met service increased by 140% and
ridership was up by 220%.498 From 1990 to 2003, bus and light rail ridership increased
by 65% while population increased by 29% .4L9 Significant development has also taken
place along the light rail corridor. A 1996 partial inventory of development adjacent to
light rail estimated its value at $1,319,860,000.500 The investment in Tri-Met, the
495 Nancy Chapman and Hollie Lund, "Housing Density and Livability in Portland," in The Portland Edge,
ed. Connie Ozawa (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2004) 212.
496 Metro. 2004 Performance Measures Report, 9.
497 Metro. 2004 Performance Measures Report, 76.
498 G.B. Arrington, Jr. "Beyond The Field of Dreams: Light Rail and Growth Management in Portland."
Tri-Met Report (September 1996), 2. Online at http://trimet.org/pdfs/publications/bevonddreams.pd f [last
accessed August 18, 2007]
499 Metro. 2004 Performance Measures Report, 76.
500G.B. Arrington, Jr. (1996), 4.
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regional transit agency, and the connection between land use and transportation planning
can be attributed in part to Metro's ability to act as the MPO as well as the regional
planning agency. In addition, Metro has helped promote the development of regional
centers and corridors along the light rail through its TOD program and its Get Centered!
program.
A critical influence Metro has on the development of the region is the expansion
of the UGB. Here it is significant to note that while the UGB has been expanded about
13 times, the expansion of the UGB is much slower than population growth. This is due
to a concerted effort to redevelop the area inside the UGB and expand the UGB only as a
last resort. According to Metro's report, "[i]n over a decade (1990 - 2002), Metro's
population increased by 26% (1,051,692 to 1,330,001) while the UGB expanded by
8%.501 The 2002 expansion of 18,700 acres was the most notable.so2
Metro's Open Space bond program is described, even by local officials opposed
to Metro, as a very successful program. The Open Space bond program was approved by
voters in 1995 and funded with $135.6 million dollars. It was reauthorized in November
2006 for $227.4 million. As of April 2004, Metro had used the bond money to acquire
8,015 acres of open space and 444.87 acres bought with Metro and local share funds. 503
501 Metro. "2004 Performance Measures Report," 9.
so2 Metro. "2004 Performance Measures Report." Acres brought into the UGB: 1998 - approximately 3,500
acres, 1999 - approximately 380 acres, 2002 - approximately 18,600 acres, and 2004 - approximately
1,940 acres.
541 Metro. "2004 Performance Measures Report," 9.
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Why is the Portland Model important?
The Portland model is important because it provides a combination of capacity
building, regulatory, and financial incentives that induce cooperation. Local officials
know that if they do not show up at meetings, they will still have to abide by decisions
made by Metro. They also recognize that Metro can help them accomplish their goals.
Local officials work with the region to come up with standards and rules. One Metro
Councilor said, "If you think of Metro, the negative version is that we are imposing a
regional will on the poor local cities and government. The other view which is more
accurate is that we are playing the role of the referee for the region." 50 4 According to the
Metro Councilor, being the referee for the region can help create buy-in from
stakeholders because communities "realize that no city or county is an island. They want
to have to have the ability to not have a city run a freeway into their bedrooms. We end
up in some odd situations where at the same time for example, the Metropolitan Home
Builders don't like what we do about the density, but they want us to slap down cities
who don't want to expand the boundaries. "50 5 Metro finds itself in complicated
relationships with regional stakeholders like the Home Builders and local officials who
appreciate when Metro uses its authority to help them accomplish their goals and who
balk when they think Metro's guidelines are interfering with what they perceive as their
best interest. While local officials often complain about Metro, they also know there are
financial benefits associated with being an active player in the metropolitan planning
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504 Interview 3P.
505 Interview 3P.
system. Metro offers local governments access to transportation funds, technical
assistance, and grants to promote certain types of development.
How is Local Land Use Planning in Portland Different?
While conducting interviews with local and metropolitan officials in Portland, I
discovered that many of the questions that I asked about land use planning in Boston did
not translate in the Portland context. When I asked, "Who makes planning decisions?" in
the Boston context, the local officials would talk about local politicians, citizens, and
planning board members. Planners had difficulty getting innovative planning initiatives
passed at town meeting because citizens worried primarily about local tax implications.
Many of the communities had master plans, but they were not tied in any effective way to
local zoning. Local officials felt that the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC)
was not especially relevant to the work that they were doing in their communities. In
Portland, on the other hand, planning appears to be much more important. Local
planning takes place within a nested system. There are statewide and metropolitan-wide
rules and regulations that guide local planning and decision-making. The state mandates
that all communities prepare comprehensive plans that are consistent with state land use
planning goals. Oregon's Land Conservation and Development Commission
'acknowledges' local plans that are consistent with state goals. In addition, local
comprehensive plans have to be consistent with the metropolitan plans set forth by Metro.
Localities have to submit Urban Growth Management Functional Plan Compliance
Reports to Metro demonstrating that their Comprehensive Plans are consistent with
Metro's Urban Growth Management Functional Plan. Any changes to a city's
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comprehensive plan must be in compliance with the Urban Growth Management
Functional Plan.
Local planners interviewed for this research in Portland had very different
responses from their Boston counterparts to questions about how they plan. Without my
prompting they often pointed to the regional plan and how their local comprehensive plan
fit into it. They talked about their relationship with Metro. They regularly attended
meeting at Metro. While overall, there was an agreement that Metro plays an important
role in the region, each local official expressed some frustration with the Metro
Councilors (and sometimes the Metro staff). Often the frustration was with the amount
of paperwork that they were required to submit to Metro in order to be in compliance.
Some local planning directors viewed Metro more negatively. One local planning
director said, "Metro abused its authority through the years. It has grown to the point
where they are ruling through too many regulations and mandates and forcing you to do
all this minutia. Metro got carried away with too many details and did not allow enough
flexibility."506 Metro Councilors were often described as being more liberal and
environmental and therefore pursuing more of an environmental agenda than local
officials.
Local elected officials often felt that they were more 'elected' than the Metro
Councilors because they actually represented a community with particular needs rather
than the districts that the Councilors represent. While local officials often had complaints
about Metro, I found that in most cases the issues they raised concerns about were
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506 Interview I1P.
currently being studied by a committee at Metro and new policies were being developed
to address their concerns.
However, despite their differences with Metro, almost all local elected officials
and planners recognized the important role that Metro plays. Local planning officials
(even the ones who did not like Metro) knew what was happening at Metro because they
were often either involved with the MTAC, MPAC, and/or JPACT. The presence of
Metro was critical to their work. In my Boston interviews, on the other hand, discussions
of the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC) were usually brief. Officials in
Boston acknowledged that they had attended a few meetings (usually at the subregional
level), but they did not feel that they were particularly important or useful. Local
officials in the Portland area met regularly at the MPAC, MTAC, and JPACT meetings
and were well aware of Metro's decisions.
Local planning in the Portland region is certainly more consistent than planning in
Boston and Denver. Communities have comprehensive plans that are consistent with the
state land use planning goals and the regional plan. Local planning is not done in
vacuum. Instead it has to respond to state and regional demands. The adoption of
regional planning goals is not as haphazard as it is in Boston in Denver because there are
certain minimum requirements. At the same time, localities continue to have their own
planning culture and to interpret Metro's policies according to their own framework.
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Conclusion
In the Boston region, the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC) relies
primarily on capacity building to influence local planning. It uses technical assistance to
help communities do the right thing and implement parts of the regional plan. In Denver,
the Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG) uses capacity building as well
as its fiscal control over transportation funds to spur regional cooperation. In the
Portland metropolitan region, Metro's control over the urban growth boundary give it a
unique advantage. Metro becomes a more relevant regional institution. This is a very
important incentive for cooperation and participation in dialogues about regional
planning. Communities that want to grow, particularly with regard to their industrial
lands, need Metro's approval in order to convert lands that are outside of the urban
growth boundary into developable land. In addition, the state mandate that local
comprehensive plans are consistent with statewide goals and Metro's Urban Growth
Management Functional Plan is important for Metro's success. However, despite state
mandated consistency requirements and control over the UGB, communities still insist on
local autonomy and often challenge Metro's authority over local land use.
I have searched for evidence that cooperation is fundamentally different in the
Portland context than in systems of weaker metropolitan governance. I looked for
examples illustrating how Metro's actions altered local planning decisions. What I found
were a number of cases in which Metro impacts local land use planning. However, like
Boston and Denver, there were limits to Metro's ability to shape regional land use. For
instance, without regional revenue sharing, localities continued to want to build up their
own tax revenues, even if this meant expanding the UGB. We see this in the case of the
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fight for UGB expansion for industrial lands. While Metro's control over the UGB has
the effect of determining where growth will go, this also presents a whole series of new
challenges of 1) funding the planning of the area, and 2) figuring out how to finance the
necessary infrastructure necessary for development. Metro struggles with this component
of regional planning.
I argue that the authority that Metro has from the state, its power as the region's
MPO, its involvement of local elected officials in governing, and its connection to the
electorate are essential mechanisms for encouraging municipal involvement in regional
policy formation and plan-making as well as local adoption of regional goals. Metro
officials are careful to use all the tools available to them. For instance, Metro offers
capacity building assistance to local government including help with planning, data
gathering, application of GIS tools, financial and technical assistance for Transit-Oriented
Development (TOD) projects, and educational workshops about effective planning. In
addition, Metro uses its ability to allocate transportation funds to encourage
municipalities to develop transportation projects that will help implement the regional
plan and link land use and transportation. Finally, Metro uses its authority over land use
to ensure that communities are adopting key regional goals.
Typically, the literature on metropolitan planning describes Portland as a "top-
down" model in which the only reason localities implement the regional plan is because
they "have to." However, I find that while having greater regulatory authority makes
Metro a more relevant political player, it does not always mean that Metro always gets its
way. There is still a considerable degree of variation in the level of local commitment to
implementing Metro's plans. In addition, contrary to the traditional view of statutory
242
authority as a means of excluding local officials from the planning process, I find that
Metro's formal authority draws more active participation of local officials, both elected
officials and local planners. As a result of having more authority, local officials
recognize that they need to be actively engaged in the management of Metro's activities.
A number of institutional arrangements built into the structure of Metro encourage local
input, regional capacity building, and shared responsibility over regional governance.
This is not to say that local officials adopt the regional planning requirements set
out by Metro out of 'good will' or that all requirements are adopted; instead the Portland
model combines a number of top down as well as bottom up features. In most instances,
local officials adopt regional planning requirements because they are required to do so by
law. Financial incentives such as Metro's control over TIP funding also help create local
compliance with regional planning requirements. However, in the case of Metro,
communities adopt regional policies because they helped develop the policies that they
are working to put into effect. What allows local officials to work together is not a higher
level of enlightenment about their common interests, but the fact that local officials
understand that to some extent their fate is decided by Metro. This increases the
importance of participating in regional decision-making. Metro becomes relevant to local
stakeholders because it has the authority to implement its plans and provide
transportation money to connect land use to transportation funding. As a result, Metro is
better able to engage with local officials.
One local elected leader, who has played a major role in regional planning in
Portland, argues, "Top down planning doesn't work, but when people help make rules
243
they won't object to them." 5 0 7 The history of how Metro was formed is very much about
an emerging institutional relationship between local officials and Metro. Of course,
despite Metro's authority and more robust institutional relationships with localities, it still
has its ups and downs. It has been more effective at implementing its plans at particular
moments than at others. Metro has had more success implementing certain policies than
others and some communities are more willing to work with Metro than others.
There is considerable debate inside as well as outside Metro regarding the most
effective way to plan for the region. Indeed, in certain instances, local officials have
voiced considerable opposition to Metro's decisions. Metro Councilors, who are elected
by district to serve on the Metro Council, and local elected officials do not always see eye
to eye, although for the most part, they have learned to work together. One local
planning director put it succinctly saying that local officials and Metro have "a long-term
agreement to work through disagreements."5 08 This on-going learning, that takes place
within Metro, is critical to its success. Local officials learn how to be diplomatic when
they interact with the regional body. They also learn how local decisions affect the whole
region. In addition, Metro Councilors have also learned more about the constraints
facing local officials.
Planning in the Portland region is not as seamless as many have described.
Instead, it is a messy, often complicated process. The many layers of regulations from
the state and Metro provide guidelines for local officials to follow. This limits the
number of planning choices that they can make and necessitates a degree of consistency
507 Interview with former Gresham Mayor, Gussie McRoberts.
508 Interview lOP.
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among the local jurisdictions in the region. At the same time, local politics are still at
play and each community has a different relationship with Metro. Some jurisdictions are
onboard with Metro and the regional vision while others feel that Metro limits local
autonomy and burdens local government with additional rules and regulations. Metro is
also reluctant to 'call out' local governments who are not in step with regulations. While
the mixed sentiment about regional planning is similar to Boston and Denver, what
separates Portland is the fact that whether or not local officials 'like' Metro, they still
participate. They cannot ignore Metro. Through JPACT, MPAC, and MTAC, local
elected officials and planners are involved in setting the regional planning priorities.
They do this work through on-going negotiations with the Metro Council and staff
members about what is best for localities and for the region.
At some points during Portland Metro's history, it has emphasized a more
explicitly regulatory approach while at other points it has focused on being helpful to
localities. One Metro official summed up Metro's complicated and constantly evolving
roles:
We go from being demanding, to being collaborative, to being financially
helpful, to being regulatory. We have gone through all of those phases
over time. I guess the phase we are in now is our Council is probably
more aggressive on goals than any previous Council, but they recognize
better that they need allies, that they need collaboration, they will never be
able to regulate their way into accomplishing their ideals, they need to
convince their partners that their partner should be pursuing their ideals,
and they recognize the importance of incentives and financial incentives
so they are much more aggressive at pursuing those kinds of tools rather
than regulatory mandates. That is on a base of having a fair amount of
regulatory mandates in place so it is not like they need to go and dream up
new ones. That base is already there. 509
245
509 Interview 9P.
The balance between mandating a regional orientation and encouraging it through
capacity building and incentives can be hard to maintain. When Metro uses its authority,
local officials push back. Then, to maintain its political viability Metro must emphasize a
more cooperative approach. While Metro is involved in a careful balancing act in its
relationships with local governments, it is Metro's ability to select from among different
techniques that is important to its success. By offering capacity building assistance,
managing financial incentives, and applying regulatory authority, Portland Metro has
become an important regional player that local officials cannot ignore.
Over time, Metro has evolved as an organization and has changed its mission. In
the past few years, a number of legal and political battles with localities have forced
Metro Councilors to rethink their strategy. Rather than relying entirely on regulatory
mandates, they are increasingly viewing capacity building as the key to a more
cooperative regional government. However, they do this work with the regulatory
framework already in place and control over federal transportation money, which makes
it easier for them to be cooperative.
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Portland Interviews Between June 2006 and August 2007:
Hal Bergsma, Long Range Planning, City of Beaverton
Bryan Brown, Planning Director, City of West Linn
Rex Burkholder, Metro Councilor, Metro
Susan Brody, Consultant, PSU
David Bragdon, Metro Council President, Metro
Ron Bunch, Principal Planner, Gresham
John Chandler, General Counsel, Homebuilders Association of Metropolitan
Portland
Bob Clay, Chief Planner, City of Portland Planning
Maggie Collins, Planning Director, City of Damascus
Valerie Counts, Planning Supervisor, Long Range Planning, City of Hillsboro
Andy Cutugno, Metro Growth Management Director, Metro
Alan DeHarpport, Owner, Roundstone Properties, LLC
Mayor Rob Drake, Mayor, City of Beaverton
Karen Frost, Executive Director, Westside Transportation Alliance
Jim Francesconi, Counsel, Haglund Kelley Horngren Jones & Wilder LLP
Ed Gallagher, Planning and Development Manager, Gresham
Carl Hosticka, Metro Councilor, Metro
Mayor Hughes, Mayor, City of Hillsboro
Erik Jensen, City of Hillsboro
Stephan Lashbrook, Planning Director, City of Lake Oswego
Roberty Liberty, Metro Councilor, Metro
Sheila Martin, Director, Institute of Portland Metropolitan Studies, PSU
Doug McLain, Planning Director, Clackamas County
Gussie McRobert, Former Mayor, City of Gresham
Mary Kyle McCurdy, Staff Attorney, 1000 Friends of Oregon
Connie Ozawa, Professor of Urban Studies and Planning, PSU
Rod Park, Metro Councilor, Metro
John Pettis, Associate Planner, City of Gresham
Doug Rux, Planning Director, City of Tualitin
Greg Wolf, Director, National Policy Consensus Center, PSU
Ethan Seltzer, Director, School of Urban Studies and Planning, PSU
Sid Snyder, Community Activist in Beaverton
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Chart 1: Framework for Portland Metro
Federal Government requirement that MPOs administer regional transportation funds and do so with
the input of local elected officials gives Metro considerable authority over transportation money and
helps link transportation funding with land use planning goals. The Federal legislation is known as the
Safe, Accountable, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act- A Legacy for Users (SAFETY-LU)
Strong State Land Use Planning Regulations- (Senate Bill 100, UGB legislation, Statewide
Planning Program and Goals, Land Conservation and Development Commission).
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Chart 2: Structure of Portland Metro
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Chart 3: Statewide Land Use Planning Goals adopted by Senate Bill 100 and
creates the Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC).
State Legislation (ORS ch 268.380) gave Metro the authority to develop
land use eoals and obiectives for the region.
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Metro's Urban Growth Management Plan Requirements:
TITLE 1: REQUIREMENTS FOR HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT
ACCOMMODATION
TITLE 2: REGIONAL PARKING POLICY
TITLE 3: WATER QUALITY AND FLOOD MANAGEMENT
TITLE 4: INDUSTRIAL AND OTHER EMPLOYMENT AREAS
TITLE 5: NEIGHBOR CITIES AND RURAL RESERVES
TITLE 6: CENTRAL CITY, REGIONAL CENTERS, TOWN CENTERS AND
STATION COMMUNITIES
TITLE 7: AFFORDABLE HOUSING
TITLE 8: COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
TITLE 9: PERFORMANCE MEASURES
TITLE 10: FUNCTIONAL PLAN DEFINITIONS
TITLE 11: PLANNING FOR NEW URBAN AREAS
TITLE 12: PROTECTION OF RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS
TITLE 13: NATURE IN NEIGHBORHOODS
Ok
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Consistency
Local Comprehensive Plan- Must be
consistent with the Statewide Land Use
Planning Goals and Metro's Urban
Growth Management Plan
Chart 4:
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Representatives on Metropolitan Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC)
Multnomah County Commission 1
Second Largest City in Multnomah County I
Other Cities in Multnomah County 1
Special Districts in Multnomah County 1
Citizen of Multnomah County 1
City of Portland 2
Clackamas County Commission 1
Largest City in Clackamas County 1
Second Largest City in Clackamas County 1
Other Cities in Clackamas County 1
Special Districts in Clackamas County 1
Citizen of Clackamas County 1
Washington County Commission 1
Largest City in Washington County 1
Second Largest City in Washington County 1
Other Cities in Washington County 1
Special Districts in Washington County 1
Citizen of Washington County 1
Tri-Met 1
Governing body of a school district 1
State Agency Growth Council 1
Clark County 1
City of Vancouver 1
Port of Portland 1
TOTAL 25
Source: http://www.metro-region.org/library-docs/about/chap21.9.pdf July 2006
Edition, 2.19-7
Chart 5:
Representatives on Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation
(JPACT)"0:
City of Portland 1
Multnomah County 1
Washington County 1
Clackamas County 1
Cities of Multnomah County 1
Cities of Washington County 1
Cities of Clackamas County 1
Oregon Department of Transportation 1
Tri-Met 1
Port of Portland 1
Department of Environmental Quality 1
Metropolitan Service District (Metro) 3
State of Washington 3
TOTAL 17
Source: http://www.metro-region.org/library docs/about/chap219.pdf, July 2006 Edition,
2.19-8
510 Metro. "July 2006 Edition, 2.19-8."
Online at http://www.netro-region.ortg/ibrarv docs/about/chap219.pdf [last accessed on August 19, 2007]
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Chart 6:
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Policy Guidance for the 2008-11 Transportation Priorities Program
Program Objectives
"The primary policy objective for Metropolitan Transportation Improvement Program
(MTIP) and the allocation of region flexible transportation funds is to:
- Leverage economic development in priority 2040 land-use areas through investment
to support:
- 2040 Tier I and II mixed-use areas (central city, regional centers, town centers,
main streets and station communities);
- 2040 Tier I and II industrial areas (regionally significant industrial areas and
industrial areas); and
- 2040 Tier I and II mixed-use and industrial areas within urban growth boundary
(UGB) expansion areas with completed concept plans.
Other policy objectives include:
- Emphasize modes that do not have other sources of dedicated revenues;
- Complete gaps in modal systems;
- Develop a multi-modal transportation system with a strong emphasis on funding:
bicycle, boulevard, freight, green street demonstration, pedestrian, regional
transportation options, transit oriented development and transit projects and
programs; and
- Meet the average annual requirements of the State Implementation Plan for air quality
for the provision of pedestrian and bicycle facilities."
Source: http://w ww .metro-region.org/library docs/trans/policv-rationale.pdf,
Memo, DATE: February 22, 2007, TO: JPACT and Interested Parties, FROM: Ted Leybold, MTIP
Manager, SUBJECT: Transportation Priorities 2008-11 - TPAC Recommended Final Cut List
Chart 7: Urban Growth Management Functional Compliance, Titles 1-7
Functional Plan Title No. of Applicable No. of Percentage
Jurisdictions Jurisdictions in Complete
Compliance
Title 1: minimum densities 27 27 100%
Title 1: partitioning standards 27 27 100%
Title 1: accessory dwelling units 27 27 100%
Title 1: map of design types 27 27 100%
Title 1: capacity analysis 27 26 (analysis 96%
complete)
Total Title 1 135 134 99%
Title 2: minimum/maximum 27 27 100%
standards
Title 2: variance process 27 27 100%
Title 2: blended ratios 27 27 100%
Total Title 2 81 81 100%
Title 3: floodplain standards 25 25 100%
Title 3: water quality standards 26 23 88%
Title 3: erosion control standards 27 27 100%
Total Title 3 78 75 96%
Title 4: retail in Industrial Areas 20 20 100%
Title 4: retail in Employment Areas 22 22 100%
Total Title 4 42 42 100%
Title 5: rural reserves 2 2 100%
Title 5: green corridors 10 10 100%
Total Title 5 12 12 100%
Title 6: Centers Development 22 Due December
Strategy 2007
Title 6: Siting Government Offices 22 Due July 2005
Title 6: Reporting on Centers 22 21 95%
Progress
Total Title 6 22 21 95%
Total Titles 1-6 370 365 99%
Title 7: l't progress report 27- due January 31, 21 (received) 78%
2002
Title 7: 2"d progress report 27- due December 17 (received) 63%
31, 2003
Title 7: 3rd progress report 27- due June 2004 12 (received) 44%
Total Title 7 81 50 62%
Urban Growth
23, 2004, revised
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Source: Appendix B: Summary of Compliance with Functional Plan.
Management Functional Plan Annual Compliance Report, December
August 31, 2004, revised September 26, 2005, Draft, p.17.
Chapter 5: Cross-Case Analysis
While the previous chapters have discussed each case study in detail, this section
breaks down the issues into themes and compares across the three cases. The goal of this
analysis is to look for and explain the variation among the different cases. When the
three cases are compared, it is clear that authority does matter for metropolitan planning
agencies. Metropolitan planning agencies with more authority have more active
participation from local elected officials than metropolitan planning agencies which rely
entirely on capacity building and financial incentives. As a result of this participation,
they are perceived as more legitimate and are able to be more effective.
While all metropolitan planning agencies are important because they help create
dialogue about regional issues, the ability to have meaningful dialogue with stakeholders
who can make commitments changes depending on how much authority the agency has.
I found that moving from capacity building to being the MPO for the region is a critical
step that increases the participation of locally elected officials and a sense that the
metropolitan planning agency is an important player in the region. Participation
increases when the metropolitan planning agency is the MPO and also has state mandated
authority.
When the metropolitan planning agency relies only on capacity building to
influence local planning, some communities, particularly those that are more inclined to
adopt smart growth policies in the first place, turn to the metropolitan planning agency
for advice about planning. However, the adoption of regional goals and local adoption of
policies necessary to implement the regional goals is extremely haphazard.
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While it was more likely to have participation from locally elected officials when
the metropolitan planning agency is also the MPO, this does not necessarily lead to the
systematic translation of regional goals to the local level. When the MPO can link certain
aspects of the regional plan to transportation funding, it is more likely that localities will
adopt components of the regional plan than when the metropolitan planning agency is not
the MPO. The promise of access to transportation funds is enough to cause localities to
at least pay lip service to the regional planning goals. However, bringing stakeholders to
the table does not necessarily mean that the agency will be able to radically alter regional
land use planning. Metropolitan planning agencies without state mandated authority are
more likely to adopt a regional plan that is a 'consensus document.' In order to get all the
stakeholders on board, the regional plan consists of broad goals (i.e., more livable
communities and sustainability) but flexibility when it comes to adopting policies at the
local level to implement these goals. The result is that communities whose planning
cultures are more in line with the planning goals are more likely to implement them.
While many communities adopt the goals of the regional plan in their planning
documents, implementation at the local level remains inconsistent.
When the metropolitan planning agency is the MPO and operates in the context of
state mandated consistency between local and regional plans, the adoption of regional
planning goals and the changes to local planning necessary to implement the plan
becomes more regularized. Every community has to acknowledge the regional planning
goals and answer questions about consistency. However, it is surprising to find how
nervous the metropolitan planning agency with authority is to use its authority. In
addition, there tends to be much more variation among the communities when it comes to
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'ollowing the rules' than I was expecting. Since the metropolitan planning agency in
most cases does not want to flex its muscle, local communities have some flexibility
when it comes to implementation. However, consistency across the region is greater than
when the metropolitan planning agency is not the MPO and when it is the MPO but does
not have state mandated planning authority.
Participation
My research demonstrates that having more authority in metropolitan planning
does matter because it changes the relationship between localities and the metropolitan
planning agency. Metropolitan planning agencies with more authority are able to bring
people to the table because officials feel there is more at stake. When a metropolitan
planning agency has some authority, officials view cooperation differently; they feel that
they will benefit from it. This can help create incentives for active participation.
However, this authority does not have to be regulatory. It can also come in the
form of control over limited resources, such as transportation funding. In both the
Denver and Portland cases, officials were concerned about "missing out or having the
rules changed without their input." Having more state mandated authority over land use
planning, as in Portland, can also lead to bolder plans because the metropolitan planning
agencies do not rely solely on the "will" of local stakeholders to implement the plans.
This means that plans can be implemented at the local level even if there is not 100
percent agreement from all the local municipalities.
Who "represents" communities on the metropolitan planning agency boards is
very important to the legitimacy and efficacy of the organizations. In Denver and
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Portland, elected officials serve on the boards. This is important for the legitimacy of the
institution because often the planning staff from communities (even though they may be
well meaning) do not have the political clout to bring their communities on board.
Elected officials are viewed as having more legitimacy. In all the places where I
interviewed planners, planners always deferred to elected officials saying that they were
"elected" and were the voice of the people.
In all three case study areas, the staffs of the metropolitan planning agencies were
described as having a different focus from the localities. Staff members were described
as very competent, but as technocrats who were often disconnected from the realities of
local land use planning or the constraints facing municipalities. In Denver and Portland,
the fact that the staffs are given direction by elected officials at the board level is
important for the legitimacy of the institutions. In Denver, in particular, where the board
of directors is made up of locally elected officials, it was not uncommon for local
officials to express a sense of ownership over DRCOG decisions saying, "we make
DRCOG decisions." In Portland, the relationship is more complicated because while the
Metro Councilors are elected, some local elected officials feel that they are "more
elected" than the Metro Councilors. Still, local elected officials serve on MPAC, which
advises the Metro Council, and JPACT, which helps determine MPO transportation
funding decisions.
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Participation
Capacity Building Only
Lack of' Reaional
Metro planning commitment policies Only
agency does not Participants in regional
have a policy-making are often not elected Difficulty voluntarily only
sufficient do fave th thy officials to implementing when they are
mandate to legitimacy to make policies policies in line with the
bring elected substantial changes to
officials to the Plannin2 communities.
table
Metropolitan planning authorities have been successful at creating regional
dialogue. However, this research shows that not all regional dialogue is equal. Dialogue
that takes place in organizations with mechanisms for implementation is more likely to be
taken seriously. Dialogue in itself is not a panacea and does not necessarily lead to better
regional outcomes. A critical component of dialogue is who participates. Comparing
metropolitan authorities with 1) capacity building, 2) capacity building and financial
incentives, and 3) capacity building, financial incentives and state mandated authority, it
is striking that who participates in the regional dialogues is noticeably different. In the
case of Boston without state mandated authority or authority over transportation funds,
the people who participate on MAPC's Board are often not local elected officials so they
lack the authority and legitimacy to make substantial changes to planning in their
communities. Since many of the Board members are not locally elected officials, they
have difficulty committing their communities to abide by particular policies.
Since elected officials are seen as having the authority to make local planning
decisions it matters when they are not involved in regional decisionoal
bI lc a mune dot
offcils o ot ariciat indrftig heegofflpicis, oca immniti wenther
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perceive the policies as legitimate. Metropolitan planning without authority (regulatory
and financial) is perceived as being "nice" if you have the time to attend some extra
meetings, but not really relevant to the day-to-day governing. In addition, since elected
local officials do not play a role in designing and adopting the policies, they often argue
that "regional policies" are made by technocrats (usually staffs of the metro planning
agencies) at the regional level who do not understand local constraints. In the Boston
region, the vacancies on MAPC's Board, the composition of MAPC Board, and
comments from local officials saying that "regional planning is nice until your ox is
gored" are all evidence that without authority local elected officials often do not come to
the regional table, making it more difficult to translate regional policies into local action.
Participation
Capacity Building + MPO Status
Metro planning Elected officials come to the
agecyistheMP table and participate in regionalagency is the MPOC
Authority to dialogue and help set regional
allocate regional policies so they are often more
transportation funds willing to implement policies at
the local level
When the metropolitan planning authority is the MPO, then local officials come
to the table because there is regional transportation money at stake. Since most
communities are strapped for resources, the limited funds that the MPO controls are an
important source of revenue. As the MPO, the metropolitan planning agency has an
easier time getting the right people to the table.
Once local elected officials come to the table and play a role in determining
regional policies, they may be more willing to support the implementation of regional
260
goals at the local level. The practice of being at the table is also important because
officials come to know each other and begin to see that how their interests are
interrelated. This supports the ideas in the literature on deliberative democracy and
consensus building that stakeholders are transformed by their interactions with other
stakeholders. However, I find that the transformative effect of deliberations becomes
more likely when there is something at stake and local elected officials feel that
participation is worth their time. This calls into question some of the literature on
'voluntary regionalism' by suggesting that stakeholders need incentives to participate in
'voluntary' efforts. While there are certainly benefits to participation in regional
dialogue, local elected officials made it clear that their primary loyalty was to their own
constituents rather than to the regional body because they had to worry about getting
elected. Financial incentives made local elected officials start to see the value of
participation in regional dialogue and policy-making.
Participation
Capacity Building + MPO Status + State Mandated Authority
Capacity building, Elected officials actively
control over Incentives for participate and feel that that
transportation money, participation they play a key role in
and strong mandate over formulating policy
land use
Since local officials know that they will have to abide by the regional planning
goals set by Metro, they want to make sure that they play a role in shaping them. They
also want to be a part of deciding regional priorities for and the allocation of
transportation funding. In Portland, local officials played a critical role in creating Metro
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and ensured that they had an on-going and institutionalized role in Metro with the Metro
Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC), which is composed of local elected officials.
MPAC makes policy recommendations to the Metro Council. For the most part, the
Metro Council takes MPAC's recommendations seriously. However, there are some
cases where MPAC's recommendations are contrary to the Metro Council's final
decision. Still, this appears to more of an exception than the rule because Metro
Councilors know that the more that they listen to MPAC, the more likely they are to have
buy-in from localities.
In addition to MPAC, the Joint Policy and Advisory Committee on Transportation
(JPACT), which along with the Metro Councilors make regional transportation funding
decisions for the MPO, is composed of local elected officials and representatives from
transportation related agencies. All funding decisions have to be approved by JPACT
and Metro. MPAC and JPACT serve as feedback loops between the elected
representatives on the Metro Council, who often take the regional view, and the local
elected officials, who tend to be more concerned with local issues.
Here is also important to point out Portland Metro's unique governance structure.
The fact that Metro Councilors, who are elected by districts, have to run for office on
platforms about regional issues means that they feel they that they have the legitimacy to
make tough decisions about regional policy. Since the Metro Councilors' districts often
consist of parts of different types of communities, Metro Councilors argue that they have
a better understanding of regional concerns than local elected officials. Their elected
status is important because it puts them on more equal status with the local elected
officials. However, there is an underlying tension between the Metro Councilors, who
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see themselves as elected specifically to address regional issues, and local elected
officials who sometimes view themselves as 'more elected' than the Metro Councilors
because they govern established jurisdictions.
Role of the MPO: Ability to Connect Land Use and Transportation
The fact that a metropolitan planning agency is also the MPO can be critical
because it helps bring land use and transportation planning together. The money that the
MPO controls can be an important incentive for cooperation. In both Denver and
Portland, elected officials admit that they come to the table because of the money. A
metropolitan planning agency that is also the MPO has an easier time directly connecting
land use and transportation.
Ability to Connect Transportation to Land Use
Capacity Building
Metro Planning Metropolitan planning agency has
agency is not the Neeen a to use more indirect methods of
use regional plan and regional lnigln s n
MPO, but member of transportation plan linking land use and
MPO transportation
When the metropolitan planning agency is not the MPO it is more difficult to
directly link the regional land use plan to the transportation plan. MAPC's strongest
influence over the regional transportation plan is the staff work that it does for the MPO.
MAPC also has a representative who sits on the MPO and can influence the MPO's
decision-making. One mechanism that MAPC uses to influence the MPO's planning is
through technical assistance. By demonstrating that the numbers used to create
MetroFuture, the regional land use plan, are solid, MAPC has been able to make the case
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to the state Executive Office of Transportation (EOT) that these numbers should be used
for the modeling that goes into the regional transportation plan.
MAPC has no direct influence over the Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority (MBTA), which runs the commuter rail and the subway. This means that
MAPC cannot directly link improvements to the MBTA with a long-term regional vision
or land use plan.
Ability to Connect Transportation to Land Use
Capacity Building + MPO
Metro planning agency Communities are more willing to
tr ca planning agency change their planning to matchthat is the MPG can Metropolitan planning agency regional goals when there is a
connect transportation can link the adoption of re
components of the regional plan financial reward (access tofunds to access to transportation funds transportation funds)plan.toacstotasottofudtrnprainf )
When transportation money is tied to the regional plan, communities are willing
to integrate parts of the regional plan into their plans. Communities also propose
transportation projects that are more likely to be in line with the regional planning goals
because these projects are more likely to be funded.
In Denver, receiving Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) funds is a very
competitive process. Each transportation project that is up for funding is given a certain
number of points. Projects with more points are more likely to receive funding. One
strategy that DRCOG uses to get localities to comply with the regional plan is to offer
more points for transportation projects to communities that sign the Mile High Compact
and agree to the Urban Growth Boundary and other components of the Metro Vision
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plan. Local planners and elected officials also discuss the 'fear' of not getting
transportation funds if they are not on good terms with the DRCOG Board and staff.
DRCOG's planning assistance and approval of the FasTracks light rail system, a
role granted to it by the state, was also important for the future development of the
region. Parts of Metro Vision 2030 are built around the development of centers near the
light rail system. Also, DRCOG has started a Transit Oriented Development (TOD)
program to help communities maximize development around the new light rail stations.
Ability to Connect Transportation to Land Use
Capacity Building + MPO + State Mandated Authority
Metro Planning agency Communities are more willing to
that is the MPO and change their planning to matchthti teMOan lo Communities have an regional goals when there is ahas the ability to incentive and requirement to
mandate local adopt regional plan
implementation of the transportation funds) and
regional plan can regulations that require them to
connect transportation do so
funds to the regional
plan
In the Portland region, Metro is the MPG so it controls the regional transportation
funds and local plans have to be consistent with the regional plan. As a result, Metro is
able to help promote connections between transportation and land use planning. T-Met,
the regional light rail, is also planned by Metro so there is a link between the land use
planning and infrastructure investment in transit. We see some real successes in Portland
when it comes to transit-oriented development where Metro has invested funds in helping
to promote TOD projects and also provided technical assistance.
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Role of Technical Assistance and Capacity Building
Capacity Building Only
ommunitics see metropolitan planning
Metropolitan planning agency as helpful and are more inclined
agency without authority Technical assistance to participate. Metropolitan planning
group purchasing, data, agency uses technical expertise as a
convening, visioning, means of influencing more powerful
legislative lobbying stakeholders who have more authority
Metropolitan planning agencies without state mandated authority or control over
transportation funds have to be creative about coming up with other means of creating
cooperation. MAPC relies on capacity building. Even without authority, MAPC can
provide valuable planning data, resources, and technical assistance. It also provides a
forum for learning about issues. MAPC tries to make itself 'useful' for localities. For
instance, MAPC provides data to communities, technical assistance, rewriting of bylaws
and amending plans, help with joint purchasing of police cars and other equipment, and
assistance with coordinating emergency planning.
MAPC also serves as a meeting place for local planning staffs, particularly at the
subregional level, to meet and discuss their common concerns. In addition, MAPC has
become increasingly engaged in promoting legislative reforms that help cities and towns
in the region. The Metro Mayor's Coalition has been an important mechanism for
engaging local elected officials and demonstrating that MAPC is committed to improving
the state regulations so they better meet local needs. Based on the agenda set by the
Metro Mayors Coalition, MAPC staff research topics such as municipal finance and help
draft and lobby for legislation that will help cities and towns.
Finally, the MetroFuture project, the regional visioning initiative, attempts to
change people's understanding of the region. The participation of thousands of citizens
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and local officials in the MetroFuture visioning process will hopefully lead to an
increasing interest in regionalism and state-level policy change. However, MAPC is
currently struggling with how to implement the MetroFuture vision in the context of a
weak state planning framework, significant barriers to municipal cooperation, and
indirect influence over projects of regional significance and over transportation funding.
Role of Technical Assistance and Capacity Buildin2
Capacity Building + MPO
Metropolitan planning Demonstrating the benefits
agency that is also the Technical assistance, echnicalrassisanc the
convening, planning, data, regional land use andjoint programs transportation plan
DRCOG does capacity building work helping with data, planning, and assisting
communities who want to develop transit-oriented developments (TODs). DRCOG also
takes on a number of other regional roles such as elevator inspection, shared ride
services, and planning for the region's elderly. These functions are important because
communities feel they are 'getting' something from DRCOG membership. DRCOG can
also use its technical resources to help promote the adoption of the regional plan.
However, DRCOG's primary legitimacy comes more from the fact that it is the MPO for
the region, it can determine the distribution of transportation funds, and has the active
participation of local elected officials on its board.
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Role of Technical Assistance and Capacity Building
Capacity Building + MPO + State Mandated Authority
Demonstrating the benefits of
Metropolitan planning cooperation. Agency is perceived
agency that is also the as being 'helpful' and not just
MPO and has state Tech al assistanceregulatory. Linking technical
mandated authority convering, planning, data, joint a to te cnialjointassistance to the regional land use
programs, assistance meeting and transportation plan.
requirements Providing resources to help with
implementation of regional plan.
While capacity building is not the main reason that local elected officials and
planners come to Metro, it helps Metro demonstrate that it is a 'helpful' organization that
does more than just regulate. This is particularly important for Metro right now since
there has been a backlash against strong regulation.
Like DRCOG and MAPC, the data that Metro provides is very important to its
work. Metro has the ability to model land use and transportation in the region. Metro
also helps local planners comply with the statewide regional planning goals and Metro's
functional plans. This can be particularly useful because planners in the Portland region
say that the statewide and regional requirements for compliance can be burdensome.
The two Metro programs that local officials mentioned most often as helpful are
those that provide technical assistance combined with resources: the Green Space
program which provides funds for open space acquisition and the Transit-Oriented
Development program, which helps buy, plan for, and develop land near transit stations.
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Ability to Raise Questions About Projects of Regional Significance
Capacity Building Only
Metro planning agency Large-scale, "regionally
does not have the significant projects" do not
capacity or authority Regional Plan has no teeth have to acknowledge
to plan at the metro- regional plan or planning
scale principles
In the Boston region, the Assembly Square redevelopment, Westwood Station,
and the South Weymouth Naval Air Station redevelopment all demonstrate the limited
role that MAPC plays in influencing projects of regional significance. While MAPC can
submit letters to the MEPA (Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act) Office about the
draft and final Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) for regionally significant projects,
these letters are advisory in nature. MAPC's concerns only become legally binding when
MEPA formally raises them in the Environmental Certificate that it issues. MAPC has to
appeal to the authority held by other state agencies in order to have its concerns
addressed. Depending on the agenda of the governor of Massachusetts or the relationship
between MEPA and MAPC, MAPC can have more or less influence.
Of the three cases that I explored in the Boston region, MAPC appears to be most
effective when it can help with the initial planning process for regional projects. Since
MAPC has the technical capacity to help evaluate the regional impacts of projects,
MAPC can help frame the way that large regional projects are evaluated. MAPC's
technical expertise can also make it an important stakeholder in the planning process.
Here it is important to note that while MAPC is comfortable providing technical
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expertise, the organization is reluctant to take firm stands on projects. The challenge for
MAPC with taking positions on large-scale regional projects is that one community may
be for it and another against it and both communities are members of MAPC. MAPC
staff make every attempt to be perceived as objective and impartial.
Ability to Raise Questions About Projects of Re2ional Si2nificance
Capacity Building + MPO Status
Metro planning agency Limited ability to influence
is the MPO and in the projects, particularly since
case of DRCOG has Metro planning agency is the regional plan is voluntary
state mandated consulted about specific
authority over certain components of the projects
components of
regional projects
As the MPO, DRCOG can determine whether or not regional transportation funds
should be spent to make a project 'feasible.' Proponents of a project that needs certain
transportation improvements to be approved will need to make their case to the MPO for
funding. For DRCOG, being the MPO and having state authority over certain functions,
such as approving regional water and sewer plans, are important means of having a "say"
in projects of regional significance. Yet, there appear to be limits to this authority.
DRCOG is able to raise questions, but not necessarily stop projects.
The Lowry Range project is an example of how DRCOG can say some things
about the project, but it is unclear if DRCOG can stop the project even though
development of Lowry Range would mean development outside of the agreed upon urban
growth boundary (outlined in MetroVision 2030) and inconsistency with the regional
water plan. DRCOG staff members I interviewed expressed concern with the project, but
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were reluctant to say that they were for or against it. DRCOG will probably not be able
to stop the project if it is approved by local jurisdictions. The more likely scenario is that
DRCOG will expand the UGB to incorporate the Lowry Range project. If the UGB is
expanded to include the forty square mile project it will send a message that the UGB is
not very meaningful.
Since locally elected leaders approve DRCOG's policies, it is unlikely that they
will adopt policies that run counter to local interests. DRCOG depends on the 'political
will' of local leaders in order to be relevant so the agency does not want to be viewed as a
'heavy hand.' It stresses that its plans are 'voluntary and flexible.' The Urban Growth
Boundary is an example of where DRCOG takes a much more laissez-faire approach than
Portland Metro. DRCOG leaves the implementation of the Urban Growth Boundary up
to local communities. The fact that some communities have adopted an Urban Growth
Area rather than a boundary is indicative of an agency that is trying to keep everyone on
board. The boundary can also be expanded when needed so some DRCOG board
members think it is meaningless.
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Ability to Raise Questions About Projects of Reg-ional Significance
Capacity Building + MPO Status + State Mandated Authority
MPO status and state The metropolitan planning
mandated authority Ability to influence regional authority has final say in the
over particular land development expansion of the UGB.
use functions Metro can also determine
which parcels of land are
considered 'regionally
significant industrial land.'
Unlike in Boston and Denver, Portland Metro has the authority to determine the
UGB for the metro region. Since most projects of regional significance will need land to
be added to the UGB, Metro is very influential. Often local officials at the edge of the
region, where Metro determines what land is 'in' or 'out', are frustrated by the amount of
authority that Metro has. The City of Hillsboro has been particularly antagonistic
towards Metro. Hillsboro officials wanted to expand the UGB to add more industrial
land and they were prevented from doing so by Metro. Hillsboro also challenged Metro's
ability to set requirements for 'regionally significant industrial areas' because local
officials thought that this amounted to zoning. After a legal battle, the court ruled that
Metro did have this authority. Metro also clashed with the City of Cornelius over the
expansion of the UGB onto prime farmland and Metro won.
Finally, the Damascus Boring addition of 12,000 acres of new development to the
UGB and the creation of a new community demonstrates the influence that Metro has
over the planning of the region. While this land was brought into the UGB by Metro and
has been planned for with the assistance of Metro, it is important to note that Metro has
been less successful at helping to pay for the infrastructure provision necessary for
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development. While Metro has strong authority over land use, it lacks the financial
resources necessary to transform land from one use to another.
Adoption of Regional Planning Goals
Capacity Building Only
Metro planning agency Criteria for "good
with no mandate to require Regional plan serves as a planning" is determined
communities to adopt guide. Adoption is more by the "planning
regional goals or criteria dependent on localities. culture" of each
for 'good planning.' community than by any
regional criteria or goals.
Without fiscal or regulatory authority to influence local planning, regional plans
often have to be vague about recommendation in order to get all the communities on
board. Specific recommendations about density and requirements tend to be avoided.
When the metropolitan planning agency produces a regional plan that communities have
no incentives (sticks or carrots) to follow, then "good planning" is determined more by
the "planning culture" of each community than an acknowledgement of a set of regional
planning goals.
Local planners that I interviewed said that they felt constrained by local politics
and fiscal pressures. They rarely mentioned MAPC when it came to thinking about how
to plan their communities. What is considered "good" planning in one community may
be completely different or at odds with other communities in the region. There is no
standard set of planning goals or baseline criteria set at a higher level that local officials
measure themselves against. Adoption of regional planning goals is haphazard.
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Adoption of Regional Planning Goals
Capacity Building + MPO
Metro Planning agency Many of the communities say that
with access to they are following the plan, but
transportation finds can implementation is flexible and varied
create incentives for Regional plan is flexible
adoption of regional enough that everyone can get
planning goals on board
DRCOG cannot mandate adoption of the regional plan therefore DRCOG has two
mechanisms to encourage adoption of the regional plan: 1) make it flexible enough that
all the different stakeholders will get on board; and 2) use control over TIP funding to
create incentives for plan adoption. Since adoption of some of the criteria from Metro
Vision is a prerequisite for receiving points on TIP applications, many communities have
adopted parts of Metro Vision in their local plans. However, there is still a large degree
of variation in the implementation of the Metro Vision goals. Some communities pay lip
service to Metro Vision and others take it more seriously. Since the criteria for
implementing Metro Vision are flexible, most communities feel that they are following it,
but there is considerable disagreement about whether this is the case. Many interviewees
feel that since Metro Vision needs to be so flexible, that it is not particularly meaningful.
While TIP funding can be an important tool to get localities to adopt the regional
vision, promises of increased TIP funding are not enough to fundamentally change local
land use planning. Without the ability to mandate change to local regulations, DRCOG
relies on voluntary local implementation of the plan.
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Adoption of Regional Planning Goals
Capacity Building + MPO + State Mandated Authority
Metropolitan Local plans are changed to be
planning agency consistent with regional
with a state mandate Mechanisms for plans, but enforcement is
for plan consistency between local and minimal. There is less
between the local regional plans variation, but still local
and regional plan interpretation of regional
goals.
The state gives Metro a mandate to require that local plans are consistent with
Metro's regional planning requirements. Metro is therefore able to determine the criteria
for 'good planning' and require that localities adopt regional planning goals in their
comprehensive plans. This means that localities have had to change their zoning to meet
the requirements of the regional plan. It also means that the ideas that are embedded in
the regional plan become a part of the local comprehensive plans. However, even though
there is a requirement of consistency, the enforcement is not particularly strong and some
communities follow the rules more than others. Despite Metro's authority, it is
politically undesirable to get into fights with communities over plan implementation.
Instead, Metro takes a more cooperative approach and tries to work with localities.
Other Important Factors
In order to compare MAPC, DRCOG, and Metro, I tried to create a theoretical
framework comparing metropolitan planning agencies that were involved in capacity
building, and/or controlled incentives such as transportation money, and/or had state
mandated authority over land use planning. While these categories served as an
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important framework, here I think it is important to mention some of the other factors that
contributed to the effectiveness of metropolitan planning in each region.
State Land Use Regulations
Since metropolitan planning agencies get their authority from the state
government, they should be seen as a part of a nested system. States mandate planning
requirements for the region and each municipality. In states with plan consistency
between regional plans and local plans, it is easier to implement regional plans. Oregon
mandates plan consistency while Massachusetts and Colorado do not.
State land use planning regulations and other state legislation can change the
playing field. For instance, in Boston, Massachusetts state law, Chapter 40B, which
mandates that communities provide at least 10 percent affordable housing or their land
use regulation can be overlooked by developers who provide a certain amount of
affordable housing, changes the way that planning happens in the Boston region. In
Colorado, state policy allowing Metro Districts to provide infrastructure to developments
has lead to development that would otherwise not have been built. A Colorado state law
allowing developers on 35+ acre lots to ignore local land use planning regulations
negatively affects the ability of localities to plan. This regulation has also helped thwart
efforts to 'densify' the area in the urban growth boundary. If developers can divide up
their land into 35-acre plots and ignore the regional vision for denser development, this
can negatively affect the implementation of the regional plan. In Oregon, strong state
land use goals and regulations set the framework for planning. Land in the urban growth
boundary is zoned as urban and land outside of the UGB is considered agricultural. This
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law gives Metro its authority. However, with the threat of Measure 37 looming, Metro
may have to be more creative about where it gets its authority. The current Council
President has been working to build ties with local officials and the Home Builders.
Municipal Finance
While much of the literature on sprawl focuses on urban form and public policy, it
is clear from this research that how municipalities are financed is critical to the land use
planning that they allow and even promote. Municipalities privilege certain types of
development based on their tax generating capacities. Each state has different municipal
financing structures, so for instance, in Denver sales tax revenue is a critical component
of local budgets. In Boston commercial and industrial lands are desirable because of the
property taxes they bring in. While in Portland, where there is no state sales tax,
industrial land is the development that communities seek to attract. With a national trend
towards local financing of services, municipalities in all three of my case study regions
are struggling to balance their budgets. Since each municipality in Boston, Denver, and
Portland is concerned with the cost of providing services, municipal officials promote
development that helps their bottom line. Reliance on development to fund
municipalities is an important barrier to regional cooperation and regional planning.
Even in Portland, without regional revenue sharing regional, planning is
constrained by the fiscal realities that municipalities face. A good example of this is
Hillsboro and Cornelius where Hillsboro has a strong industrial base and Cornelius, an
adjacent municipality, is a poor community without an industrial tax base (however,
Cornelius is where many of the employees who work in Hillsboro live). If there were
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regional tax sharing, then the City of Cornelius could share in the benefit of the industrial
development that is happening in Hillsboro and both communities might not
independently be asking Metro to expand the UGB so they can each have more industrial
land.
In Denver, sales tax revenue drives urban development and creates competition
between counties, cities, and neighboring municipalities. Schools in Oregon and
Colorado are financed with state funds so keeping out school children is not a key
function of local zoning the way it is in Massachusetts. In the Boston region, school
financing is critical to planning decisions since this represents a major portion of local
revenue expenditures. In the 1990s, as small, but rapidly growing municipalities in the
Boston region found they had to build new schools to accommodate the growing number
of school aged children, citizens and officials recognized that single family homes were
not "pulling their own weight" in tax revenue. Increasingly, officials in Boston
communities are trying to attract older populations and singles without children who will
not burden the school system.
Leadership
While authority gets people the table, in all three cases leadership has been very
important. At different times each agency has been more or less effective based on the
leadership of the organization. All three metropolitan agencies suffered from many years
of the same leadership. The new directors have been charged with changing the
institutional culture of the institutions they run. Often this means moving from being a
planning agency involved with the technical details of land use planning to learning how
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to be more politically active and hence, more relevant. At MAPC, executive director
Marc Draisen has been an important new leader who is turning around an agency that has
traditionally been very technical and bureaucratic. Marc's experience in state politics
informs his understanding of how policy change is made. He understands that MAPC
needs to promote a stronger state-planning framework in order to be a more effective
planning institution. At DRCOG, former executive director Bill Vidal played a similar
role in the late 1990s. Changes to DRCOG's organizational structure helped involve
more elected officials. In Portland Metro, the current President of the Metro Council,
David Bragdon, is an elected leader who understands the need for more business
involvement. He recognizes that Metro's authority over regional planning is not enough
because politics matter. Bragdon is also the first to admit that the Metro Council needs
the involvement of local mayors and other regional stakeholders. While Metro is
stronger than other metropolitan planning agencies, Bragdon understands that support for
Metro can shift quickly. The passage of Measure 37 has made officials at Metro
recognize that they are vulnerable to political swings and they need allies in order to
accomplish their goals. They also recognize that regulation is not enough.
Coalitions
Myron Orfield's work on regionalism highlights the importance of coalitions in
regional planning. My research further confirms the importance of coalition building in
regional planning. It is clear that in Denver, FasTracks, the regional light rail project,
came about as a result of a coalition of urban and suburban communities as well as
business and environmental interests. In Portland, political coalitions of
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environmentalists, farmers, and citizens groups at the local and state level were important
for setting the groundwork for the state land use planning framework and the creation of
Metro.
Leaders of metropolitan planning agencies recognize the importance of
continuing to build coalitions. To keep Metro relevant, David Bragdon is busy working
with the Portland Home Builders to come up with methods to keep enough land available
for development. In Boston, Marc Draisen is charged with the hard task of trying to build
a coalition without authority. He recognizes that there needs to be a coalition of mayors
who recognize that "we are all in this together" in order to increase MAPC's political
legitimacy. The Metro Mayors Coalition is an important start. Marc faces a huge
challenge, but he knows that if the mayors start influencing policy at the state level, this
will be an important incentive for continued cooperation. If local officials see MAPC
"doing" something that helps them, they are more likely to take the organization seriously
and believe that participation is beneficial to them.
Coalition building can be a critical role for regional agencies like MAPC,
DRCOG, and Metro. These institutions perform an important function as a forum for
discussion about regional issues. Elected officials sitting on committees get to know each
other and work together. When officials know each other, they may not necessarily agree
with each other, but they can at least understand where they are coming from. Officials
start to recognize that they share many of the same problems. However, without
authority, it is much more difficult to bring people to the table. This is certainly the case
in Boston with the MAPC Council and Executive Committee. Local elected officials are
busy enough dealing with their own constituencies that they are not going to attend
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another meeting unless it benefits them in some way. In Boston, Denver, and Portland,
most of the elected leaders are volunteers so they are already stretched to the limit in
terms of time and energy. They will not actively participate in an institution that does not
offer them some benefits.
At the same time that involving many stakeholders in deliberative forums is an
important part of the success of regional agencies, it can also limit the ability of regional
planning agencies to be effective leaders. Regional agencies have difficulty being policy
leaders because they are working hard to "include" all the stakeholders. Sometimes this
comes at the expense of innovative planning policy. For instance, in Denver, the
MetroVision plan and the UGB are very much compromise agreements. The extent to
which they radically change the behavior of local officials is questionable. Because
DRCOG staff members and Board members are so concerned with being cooperative,
they are reluctant to "call" out localities that they feel are violating the regional plan and
the UGB policy.
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Conclusions
Table 1: Cross Case Evaluation
Characteristic Capacity Building Capacity Building + Capacity Building +
MPO MPO + State
Mandated Authority
Participation Some More Most
Ability to link land use Weak Strong Strongest
to transportation
Use of capacity building Primary Secondary, but Secondary, but still
and technical assistance important important
Ability to Raise Weak Stronger Strongest
Questions about Projects
of Regional Significance
Adoption of regional Haphazard More consistent Most consistent
goals
Local implementation to Haphazard Variation in adoption More consistent, but still
meet regional goals variation
If we compare across the cases, metropolitan planning agencies that have more
tools than capacity building are more influential because they have an easier time
bringing the relevant stakeholders to the table and because stakeholders have incentive to
adopt regional policies. Metropolitan planning agencies that rely entirely on capacity
building need to be creative and connect to other sources of authority in order to be
relevant. This is a much harder task that requires leadership and coalition building. It
can be done, but the net effect amounts to planning at the margins.
It is clear that giving metropolitan planning agencies the tools they need to
influence local planning -- both fiscal and regulatory -- is important. It is also important
to note that there are a number of barriers to effective regional planning that cannot be
resolved by authority alone.
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Appendix
Participation:
Characteristic Boston Denver Portland
Participation of Vacant board seats. Only DRCOG Board consists Metro Council consists of
local elected a few local elected of local elected officials Councilors who are elected
officials? officials participate in the who regularly attend the by district. Elected Metro
MAPC Council and meetings. Many admit Councilors make final
Executive Committee. 12 that they come to the decisions with the advice
mayors participate in meetings because of the of the Metro Policy
Metro Mayors Coalition, TIP funding. They make Advisory Committee
which has become an the final decisions about (MPAC) composed of local
increasingly influential policy decisions and elected officials. Local
part of MAPC's work, direction that DRCOG elected officials think it is
takes. important to participate
because they may be
mandated to implement
most of the decisions that
are made by Metro. They
also want to have influence
over transportation dollars.
Local elected officials also
serve on Joint Policy
Advisory Committee on
Transportation (JPACT),
which along with Metro
Council serves as the MPO.
Impact of local Metro Mayors Coalition Participation of locally Local elected officials,
participation appears to be the one place elected officials in Metro Councilors, and
at MAPC where local decision-making has been local planners form
elected officials set the important means of important layers of the
agenda. By coming changing dialogue. Local organization. The fact that
together and discussing elected officials who have Metro Councilors are
regional issues, the Metro different philosophies elected and that local
Mayors Coalition has about development at elected officials participate
tackled a number of least have to listen to one is important for the
legislative issues. another. legitimacy of the
organization. Local
planners often talk about
spending a considerable
amount of time at Metro
and having good working
orelationships with the staff.
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Participation:
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Characteristic Boston Denver Portland
Participation of Some. Local planners Some. Local planners A lot. Local planners scrve
local planners? participate at the used to play a more on the Technical Advisory
subregional level. Meet to important role in a Committee (TAC) that
discuss local concerns, but standing committee, but advises MPAC. Local
don't directly influence this committee was planners attend Metro
overall MAPC policy. reorganized to promote meetings frequently,
Many planners say they more participation of particularly when the UGB
are too busy and that they elected officials. Planners is being determined.
have enough difficulty participate on ad hoc Planners want to make sure
planning for their own committees. that Metro hears their
communities. They do not concerns since they will
view active participation have to abide by Metro's
in MAPC as essential to decisions.
their local planning work.p
Authority over Transportation Funds:
Characteristic Boston Denver Portland
MPO? MAPC is not the MPO. DRCOG is the MPO. TIP The Metro Council and
Member of 14 member criteria include adoption of the Joint Policy Advisory
MPO Board and serves as Metro Vision goals. Committee on
staff to the MPO along Transportation serve as
with the Central MPO. Metro does not
Transportation Planning explicitly require
Staff (CTPS). adoption of Region 2040
through TIP point
system, but TIP goals are
closely tied to Region
2040
Ability to link Limited and indirect Direct. Connection Direct. Connection
transportation between public transit and between public transit
and land use land use is particularly and land use is
planning important. DRCOG has a particularly important.
transit oriented Metro has a transit
development program that oriented development
provides technical program that provides
assistance for TOD technical assistance as
projects near light rail well as funding for TOD
stations. projects near light rail
stations.
Influence over Minimal. MAPC does not Strong. Helps determine Strong. Helps determine
Regional have direct authority over regional transportation regional transportation
Transportation the allocation of funds for funding. DRCOG played funding. Metro
Projects transportation projects. role in large-scale regional influenced development
MAPC can use its transportation projects. of light rail with the
technical expertise, For instance, helped with planning and funding for
particularly around data as studies of FasTracks and Tri-Met.
a means of influencing the approved the Regional
MPO's planning. Transportation District's
(RTD) plans for
FasTracks.
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Adoption of Regional Planning Goals:
Characteristic Boston Denver Portland
Adoption of Adoption of regional Most communities have Communities have to
regional planning planning goals is haphazard. adopted parts of
goals Some communities adopt MetroVision 2030. Many components of Region
them, others don't. communities have signed 2040 in their planning
Planning is detennined by the Mile High Compact documents. Some
local politics and fiscal saying that they will work communities actively
constraints more than to make their planning implement the goals
regional requirements, consistent with goals of more than others. Metro
plans, or goals. MetroVision 2030. Some is reluctant to "call out"
elected officials are communities, but there is
frustrated that the threat that if
communities sign Mile communities do not
High Compact, but that comply, then they can be
they do not change punished by the state or
planning behavior. Metro may make it
DRCOG does not "call difficult for them to get
out" communities that are TIP funding. Fiscal
not in compliance. Local constraints still influence
concerns are still types of developments
considered more communities approve.
important than regional
goals. Fiscal constraints
still influence types of
developments
ut"_communities approve.
Regional plan Plan not adopted by local Parts of plan adopted by Most components of
adoption at the municipalities, local municipalities, plan adopted because the
local level? particularly urban growth state requires that state-
boundary. wide goals, regional and
local plans are
consistent.
Regional Plan Boston MetroPlan 2000 had Metro Vision changed Region 2040 has become
Impact little impact. MAPC staff planning terms by setting the planning framework
think that it was a 'smart "region wide-vision" and used by local planners.
growth' document that creating incentives for its Localities are required to
helped guide MAPC's work, adoption. Communities report back on their
but it had little influence at discuss Metro Vision as a compliance with the
the local level. Some see guide for their planning functional plans. There
MetroFuture as an important processes. Many is still room for local
political process that can communities refer to interpretation of regional
change the terms of MetroVision in their own goals so not all
discussions about comprehensive plans. communities are the
regionalism. Others see same, but there are some
MetroFuture as another standards which all
document that will sit on the communities have
shelf and will not change adopted.
local planning.
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Ability to Influence Projects of Regional Significance:
Characteristic Boston Denver Portland
Influencing Indirect influence through Setting the voluntary Managing what is "In"
projects of policy advocacy and Urban Growth Boundary and "out" of the UGI. In
'regional appealing to other state for the region. Voluntary this role, Metro
significance' agencies with more nature means that it is still influences the future
authority to influence up to localities to development of the
large-scale projects. implement. Localities region.
make final land use
permitting decisions.
Regional permitting for
water and sewer facilities
allows DRCOG to have a
say in large regional
projects, but still minimal
State Land Use Regulations:
Characteristic Boston Denver Portland
State Planning? Weak state planning. Weak state planning Strong state planning
Master plans are not framework, but state requires consistency
required. Master plans do requires local between state-wide goals,
not have to be adopted by comprehensive plan. regional plan, local
Town Meeting or City master plan, and local
Council. Often Master zoning.
Plans and local zoning are
not connected.
State law allows State laws make State allows for inter- State allows cooperation
cooperation? cooperation among governmental agreements among municipalities.
municipalities difficult. (IGAs). Many cities and
counties have IGAs.
Examples of tax-based
sharing.
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Capacity Building:
Characteristic Boston Denver Portland
Capacity Main source of authority. Capacity building is Important component that
building? Increasingly MAPC is welcomed by local is increasingly used to
adding more roles: communities. DRCOG's demonstrate that Metro is
technical assistance, Transit Oriented "helpful" and not Just
MetroDataCommons, joint Development (TOD) demanding. Particularly
purchasing, legislative Program is viewed as Metro's Transit-Oriented
lobbying, and Metro positive. DRCOG's data Development and the
Mayors Coalition in order is also important. Green Space Initiative are
to be seen as beneficial to considered effective. These
local communities, programs do not threaten
the autonomy of
local____________ communities.
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Chapter 6: Findings and Policy Recommendations
Metropolitan areas across the U.S. are politically fragmented and each community
plans according to its own logic. As a result, development uses larger amounts of open
space than necessary, promotes the inefficient use of energy and water, increases social
inequality, and leads to a variety of other negative externalities. Regions suffer when
land use is determined by purely local logic. In addition, local communities struggle to
balance their budgets and provide services to their constituents that might be provided
more cost effectively at the regional scale.
One way to prevent this type of development is to promote coordinated land use
planning at the metropolitan scale. Metropolitan coordination is a challenge, however, in
a country with a history of making most land use decisions at the local level. Most states
have not encouraged regional planning, which is perceived as being in opposition to local
land use planning. Across the country, the trend in regional planning has been to focus
on efforts that bring stakeholders together to discuss their visions for the region. Most
regional planning agencies in the U.S. bring together stakeholders, but lack the financial
or regulatory incentives to compel them to adopt coordinated policies.
The perception that regulatory approaches-where metropolitan planning
agencies have the authority to tell communities what they can and cannot do- are not in
the interest of local officials has led to a trend in the U.S. towards voluntary approaches
to regional governance. Voluntary regionalism-where communities work together
without state mandated authority-is increasingly viewed as a successful mechanism for
metropolitan governance. Proponents of voluntary regionalism argue it is better at
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stimulating creative problem-solving and compliance than regulatory models because it
better represents local interests.
Part of the reason for the growing reliance on voluntary regionalism is the
pushback from local officials to regulatory approaches. Rather than recognize that there
may, in fact, be benefits to cooperation that will help make their jobs easier, many local
officials view regulatory approaches as a threat to their autonomy. It is assumed that
localities should be weary of more regulatory regional approaches because they lead to
top down decision-making that threatens autonomy and leads to negative outcomes for
local officials. In part, this view has been used as justification for voluntary approaches,
which are considered to be more responsive to local concerns.
Local planners and elected officials often do not view the problems they face as a
result of a system of planning that imposes undue burdens on local communities and
creates a collective action problem. Unfortunately, much of the literature on metropolitan
governance has ignored the problems associated with purely local planning. Instead of
extending the unit of analysis to the local level, most researchers stop at the metropolitan
level and do not interview local officials about their work or their participation in
metropolitan institutions. As a result, there is not a strong understanding of what
constraints local planners and elected officials face as they try to manage their
communities in the context of different forms of regional cooperation.
Without any urgency on the part of local officials for regional solutions, it is no
surprise that voluntary regionalism is the policy of choice. Rather than accept the
growing list of benefits of voluntary regionalism, I researched how regional planning
agencies with varying degrees and types of authority interact with local communities.
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My research examined how different types of agencies shape local land use planning, and
by extension, regional planning.
In order to test whether or not voluntary regionalism can have a positive impact
on regional development, I focused on three metropolitan planning agencies in different
parts of the country with varying degrees of authority over land use planning and
transportation funding. I asked, has the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC) in
Boston affected the way that the region is planned despite its lack of authority (and the
belief of many of its professional staff that it is not powerful enough)? Has it used
capacity building techniques to exert indirect influence over the pattern of development
in the region, or at least to fend off some of the least desirable development proposals of
regional significance? Is the Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG) better
able to direct local planning because it controls the allocation of transportation funds via
its Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) status?51' Finally, is Portland Metro the
most effective regional planning agency because it has the greatest level of statutory
authority or does it suffer from being a top-down regulatory agency that ignores local
concerns?
511 Metropolitan Planning Organizations are designated by the federal government to allocate regional
transportation funds.
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At the Bottom of the Ladder: Voluntary Regionalism
My research produced a number of findings that go against the growing body of
literature on the virtues of voluntary regionalism. My findings suggest that voluntary
regionalism is not superior to regulatory approaches in meeting the needs of local
officials. Since voluntary regionalism does not change the way that local land use is
planned for in substantive ways, it leaves local elected officials and planners struggling to
plan for their own communities in the face of fiscal constraints and local political
pressures. Metropolitan planning without authority tends to be driven primarily by the
demands and constraints on localities rather than a shared vision for the region.
Essentially, voluntary regionalism leaves communities in much the same position they
are in if there is no regional coordination.
My findings suggest that authority is, indeed, important for generating
participation from local elected officials. Without statutory authority over transportation
funds or land use decisions, metropolitan planning agencies have difficulty being relevant
and getting local elected officials to participate. When local elected stakeholders are
absent from the governance of metropolitan planning agencies, the agencies lack
sufficient legitimacy to translate ideas into action at the local level. This is the case with
MAPC in Boston. Without the capacity to convene the necessary stakeholders,
particularly local elected officials, it is almost impossible to convince communities to
take regional growth management goals seriously. This means that the adoption of
regional goals, that may help communities plan in more efficient and sustainable ways, is
haphazard. Communities only adopt regional goals when they match with the
communities' existing goals and objectives.
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Regional planning advocates in Boston need to figure out a way to convince local
elected officials that they benefit from being involved in regional planning. The capacity
building services that a regional planning agency like MAPC offers can serve as an
important mechanism to demonstrate that there are tangible benefits to cooperation.
However, officials in regions of this type need to lobby for more incentives. Regional
planning agencies with financial and regulatory incentives at their disposal become more
relevant and local elected officials are more likely to participate in their governance.
Part of the challenge to getting local officials to lobby to give more authority to
regional planning agencies is dispelling the pervasive myth in American land use
planning that stronger forms of regionalism are always in opposition to local officials.
My findings demonstrate that metropolitan planning agencies with substantial clout do
not necessarily generate more resistance and hostility on the part of those who are
regulated. Local officials may be staunch believers in home rule; however, when a
metropolitan planning agency has statutory authority, these same officials want to
participate in metropolitan decision-making. They want to play an active role in
metropolitan governance so they can influence decisions that affect them. They may, for
instance, be interested in making sure that the regulations that are passed help them
accomplish certain goals.
I also found that just because a regional planning agency has more authority does
not mean that the regional goals and objectives that it adopts are in conflict with local
goals. In fact, the Portland case demonstrates that some of the most effective regional
policies are policies that local elected officials felt would help them meet their own goals.
These policies were agreed to by local elected officials and written into the regional plan.
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The participation of local elected officials in the preparation of regional growth
management plans is essential; however, it is very difficult to get local elected officials
involved when metropolitan planning agencies do not have decision-making authority. In
addition, even when a metropolitan planning agency without authority does get local
officials to endorse goals, compliance is definitely not guaranteed. Local officials may
agree in principle with goals like increased density in city and town centers, more transit-
oriented development, or greater regional equity, but this does not mean that they can or
will re-oriented local land use decisions in their own community to help implement these
lofty goals.
I found that local compliance with metropolitan goals is mostly a function of fear
of punishment, financial rewards, or the opportunity to pursue local goals that have
already been set. The main reason that local officials give for being cooperative is that
they benefit when they are. In cases where a policy runs counter to local interests, they
were unlikely to comply unless forced to do so. Without rewards or punishments to
ensure compliance-despite efforts at capacity building by metropolitan planning
agencies-localities will continue to operate according to purely local logic. This results
in the haphazard adoption of regional goals.
This does not imply that metropolitan planning agencies without authority are
useless. In fact, as with the case of MAPC, if they are creative they can use their
technical expertise to influence state and local land use decisions. Even without statutory
authority, metropolitan planning agencies can advance ideas about smart growth by
talking them up with lawmakers, convening meetings, and assisting local officials who
want to change municipal zoning. This type of influence depends on the political
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credibility of the leadership of the metropolitan planning agency. It also depends on the
willingness of local officials to follow the agency's lead. An agency that casts itself as a
technical capacity building resource will be more effective at influencing planning in
communities that are inclined to pursue smart growth objectives, but less effective in
communities that are not receptive.
While the overall impact of regional planning agencies that rely on capacity
building may not be as dramatic as those with formal authority or with control over
regional transportation funds (when the agency is also the MPO), these agencies are still
an important start for regional planning. Rather than dismantling them, the state
government should increase their authority so they can accomplish metropolitan planning
goals. The more the state bolsters the authority of these agencies, the more effective they
will be.
Moving Up the Ladder: Voluntary Regionalism in the Context of Incentives
My research demonstrates that when regional planning agencies are also the
MPO, an important incentive for participation by local elected official is created.
Agencies that are also the MPO are better able to bring local elected officials to the table;
however, they still have to rely on voluntary means for the adoption of land use policies.
As a metropolitan planning agency moved from capacity building to being the MPO,
participation by local elected officials increased, but increased stakeholder participation
did not translate into the local implementation of unpopular policies.
In the case of DRCOG, the presumption that voluntary approaches are effective at
implementing unpopular land use or growth management policies because they are the
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product of stakeholder participation was not true. In fact, since the goal of DRCOG is to
bring people together, the agency tends to avoid controversial subjects altogether for fear
of alienating its membership. As a result, whatever policies DRCOG Board members
agree on are probably not related to the most vexing conflicts in the region. DRCOG's
policies are purposefully 'voluntary and flexible' to make sure that all the different
communities are on board.
Participation of local officials in regional decision-making is not sufficient to
ensure implementation of regional plans. Instead, the real source of regional authority is
the state. Unless the state grants statutory powers to metropolitan planning agencies, they
will be hamstrung in their efforts to implement regional plans. Without authority from
the state, parts of the plan that are consistent with local agendas, of course, may be
adopted by some localities. However, there are likely to be gaps and exceptions that
undermine the larger effort.
At the Top of the Ladder: Metropolitan Planning Agencies with Authority
When the metropolitan planning agency has the authority to mandate that all
communities-not just the ones who agree with policies-have to adopt and implement
policies, local officials take the agency seriously. Since the agency has the power to
determine certain types of land uses, local elected officials are keen to be a part of the
metropolitan decision-making process. As a result of their participation, local officials
tend to view the decisions made by the agency as more legitimate.
Local officials also look to the metropolitan planning agency as a referee that sets
regional standards for land use. If communities know that all the other communities in
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the region have to comply with regional standards, they are more likely to comply
themselves. The metropolitan planning agency can also help level the playing field for
local communities that fear that they will lose out if they cooperate and their neighbors
do not. In this context, implementation of regional policies is more consistent across the
region.
An argument against increasing the authority of metropolitan planning agencies is
that local planners will feel threatened by stronger metropolitan planning agencies. I
found that this was not the case. In fact, local planners look to such agencies for the help
they need to do their work. Local planners appreciate the planning framework set by
metropolitan agencies as long as there is some room for local interpretation and a clear
demarcation between local and regional responsibilities. Local planners can use a
metropolitan planning agency as a "scapegoat" to justify local growth management
policies that may be locally unpopular but are necessary to meet mandated regional goals
and requirements. Stronger land use regulation also allows them to make the case for
"best planning practices," which must often be set aside in the face of demands from
citizen groups and local elected officials who may be more concerned about short-term
goals like balancing the budget. Having a regional plan with some compliance
mechanisms can also make it easier for local planners to work more effectively with
neighboring localities and hold them accountable when their land use decisions stray
from regional goals. Here it is important to note that local planners want to participate in
the shaping of regional policies. I found that they participate more actively when the
regional planning agency has more authority over land use. However, tension mounts
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when local planners feel the regional planning agency has adopted policies that do not
respect local concerns.
Metropolitan planning agencies with greater authority have to be careful about
being perceived as "heavy handed" or ignoring the interests of local officials. In
Portland, since Metro's decisions sometimes make communities very unhappy, Metro has
to be careful to walk the line between being forceful and being cooperative. Despite
Metro's statutory authority, it still has to be 'helpful' to its member communities, so it
engages in capacity building, technical assistance, and relationship-building. Currently,
Portland Metro is focusing on the need to build extensive multiparty coalitions among
regional stakeholders in the public and private sector.
The presumption is that strong regulatory authority at the metropolitan level
homogenizes local planning. This belief leads local officials to view stronger
metropolitan governance as a threat to local autonomy. However, the evidence I
collected does not bear this out. Even in a "strong" regional system like Portland,
different localities in the same region have very different planning cultures and interpret
regional goals quite differently. While the metropolitan plan may require localities to
adopt certain area-wide goals and objectives, there is still considerable room for local
interpretation. In Portland, Hillsboro has a pro-growth mindset while the City of Portland
takes a different approach. This is true in all three cases. In the Boston region, Acton has
a different planning culture from Framingham. In Denver, the City and County of
Boulder have a strict urban growth boundary while Arapahoe County and the City of
Aurora take a more flexible view of urban development.
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Even in regions with more formal althority, getting officials from different
localities to work together - when they have very different conceptions of what is
"1good" development and what is "bad" development - can be challenging. Since the
areas of agreement among communities are small, even metropolitan planning agencies
with more authority may need to choose carefully which battles they want to fight at any
given time.
It is also important to note that it is not necessary to adopt politically controversial
statewide policies like the Urban Growth Boundary to create effective metropolitan
governance organizations. While the UGB policy has been important to Portland Metro,
other state regulations that require consistency among local, metropolitan, and statewide
goals give Metro the authority it needs to do its work. Policies regarding consistency
between regional and local plans and between local plans and local zoning are not as
controversial as the UGB and could be supported in other states. This is good news for
states in which it is politically impossible to adopt controversial land use regulations.
Still Farther to Climb: Additional Challenges to Metropolitan Governance
While Portland was more effective at engaging local stakeholders and translating
the regional plan to the local level, I found that the influence of metropolitan planning
agencies with formal authority on overall regional development patterns is not as
dramatic as I had hoped. Without regional tax sharing or municipal finance reform, even
Portland Metro is not able to fully implement its regional plan. The fact that there is no
regional revenue sharing in any of my case studies means that regional planning is not
tied to the flow of financial resources in the way it needs to be. Without some sort of
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revenue sharing, the logic of local land use planning will continue to be shaped mostly by
local financial constraints and opportunities.
Financial constraints limit the ability of regional planning agencies to plan.
Planning in a comprehensive way as in Portland (where Metro added an enormous area to
the UGB) can require the region to come up with enormous outlays of money to pay for
infrastructure development (Damascus Boring area is a very good example of this).
Unfortunately, Metro can add area into the UGB, but if it remains without infrastructure
because the financing is not available, then Metro's is not effective.
Even in Portland, strong regionalism does not solve affordable housing or stop
sprawl. In Portland, the UGB was drawn so that even within the UGB we see
predominantly single-family developments. Nevertheless, Portland is doing a much
better job than Denver and Boston at reducing lot sizes and mandating that there be
higher density and different types of development in each community.
I did not find evidence in Boston, Portland, or Denver that metropolitan planning
agencies in their current form play a significant role in promoting fiscal equity among
communities or promoting racial and socio-economic integration. Race and class were
rarely mentioned by any of my interviewees as a planning concern. Presumably, these
topics were too controversial for the agencies to take on. Even in Portland, it is hard
enough to get communities to acknowledge that they need to work together. Discussions
about equity, tax sharing, and redistribution are avoided.
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Policy Recommendations
The first challenge to creating more effective metropolitan governance in the U.S.
is dispelling the myth that local land use planning is more beneficial to localities than a
regional approach. The more that researchers find evidence that localities actually
benefit from metropolitan governance, the more likely local officials will be to give up
some of their authority to regional planning agencies.
Next, we need to recognize and promote the important role of the state in
metropolitan planning. States can and should be the leaders in creating a regulatory and
fiscal setting conducive to metropolitan cooperation. It is important to think of local,
regional and state planning agencies in a nested framework. Researchers need to ask
what state policies enable metropolitan planning agencies to work effectively and which
policies are barriers to their effectiveness? Rather than focusing on 'voluntary
regionalism' as a solution, we should concentrate on formulating model state-level
planning legislation that gives metropolitan planning agencies the power they need to
help municipalities meet regional objectives. For starters, state policy requiring that local
comprehensive or master plans are consistent with local zoning is a must. The next step
is to promote consistency between regional and local plans so that regional goals are
implemented at the local level. In addition, the impact of municipal finance on land use
planning needs to be carefully examined since the way that communities are financed is
often the primary reason they develop in certain ways. Without reforms in state-level
planning frameworks and intergovernmental financial arrangements, it is unlikely that
any metropolitan planning effort will be effective in the long run.
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The tendency in the literature is to dismiss the ability of regions to move to more
regulatory models of regional planning because there is no political will to adopt strict
land use regulations. When it looks like more regulatory approaches are politically
impossible, voluntary approaches are adopted. A growing body of literature extols their
virtues. However, I find that rather than viewing voluntary approaches as the fallback
position, it may be possible to think more incrementally about creating the framework for
stronger regional planning. Sometimes the most effective policies are not the most
dramatic or politically controversial. So while there may not be the political will to
overhaul the state land use planning system, it may be politically possible to take
intermediary steps. In Portland, while the UGB is the most studied policy, it may not be
the primary reason for Metro's effectiveness. In fact, administering the UGB may be a
headache for Metro and end up making it the focus of negative attention. It may be that
other policies such as requirements for consistency with regional plans, lot size reduction,
transit-oriented development, and new parking requirements (policies that are not
particularly interesting to researchers because they are not as controversial) allow Metro
to implement its regional plan. The impact of less controversial land use policies needs
to be studied further.
The literature on metropolitan governance often overlooks the importance of the
federal MPO structure as a mechanism to promote more effective metropolitan planning
agencies. When the MPO function is disconnected from metropolitan planning, a key
incentive for cooperation (transportation money) is lost. MPOs provide a large revenue
stream that can help make metropolitan planning agencies relevant to local officials.
Without the carrot of access to transportation funds, local elected officials are more likely
302
to question why they should bother devoting time to metropolitan planning. In addition,
an opportunity is missed to consolidate regional roles since metropolitan planning
agencies have all the necessary skills to model future land use, forecast demographics,
and assess transportation needs.
Since transportation investments are the largest infrastructure investments that
any region will make, they should be used to support regional planning goals. When
regional planning agencies are the MPO, they help ensure that land use and transportation
decisions are complimentary. Denver and Portland have successfully connected the
expansion of their light rail systems with regional planning goals. DRCOG's connection
of the TIP criteria to the adoption of parts of the regional plan has helped promote the
local adoption of regional goals. More metropolitan planning agencies should follow
DRCOG's lead and link their visioning efforts to the allocation of transportation funds.
The current trend in metropolitan governance is to focus an enormous amount of
resources on regional visioning, but to leave implementation purposefully vague. It is
clear that there is an important role for regional visioning: bringing together diverse
stakeholders and asking them to reevaluate current conditions and imagine how they want
the future to be. However, when regional visioning is done by purely voluntary
organizations, the tools for implementation are often missing. The result is that much of
the political capital and momentum that is built during the visioning stages is often not
channeled into the plan's implementation. The organizers of regional visioning processes
need to think carefully about how they will use the outcome of the regional visioning
plan. Metropolitan visioning is really only the first step. It needs to be used to help
create a constituency that can influence state land use and fiscal policy. If the regional
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planning agency can link the plan with financial and regulatory incentives, it is more
likely to be adopted. Similarly, connecting the plan with state policy can be an effective
implementation tool.
While metropolitan planning in the U.S. may be weak, it is even weaker than it
needs to be when we do not give the agencies the tools they need to be effective.
Authority over transportation funding and land use makes metropolitan planning agencies
relevant. Local elected officials participate making these organizations more legitimate
and effective at translating regional goals into local action. Without these types of
authority, metropolitan planning agencies are confined to using capacity building and
voluntary approaches, which are likely to be much less effective. Demonstrating political
and technical expertise and convening stakeholders are certainly valuable roles, but they
are not enough to create incentives for local adoption of regional goals.
Of course, it will be difficult to convince local elected officials that it is in their
best interest to create more powerful regional institutions. The first step is to change the
nature of the debate about metropolitan governance so it more adequately portrays the
existing land use planning framework in the U.S. My research demonstrates that
regional planning agencies with authority can be built from the bottom up. They can help
communities accomplish goals that are in their best interest. This research challenges the
view that voluntary regional approaches are more effective at engaging local officials and
addressing their needs. Future research needs to be done to question the assumptions we
have about local land use planning and its relationship to metropolitan planning agencies.
The more that a case can be made that metropolitan planning agencies are working with
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communities rather than against them, the more likely it will be to create political support
for empowering these institutions so they can influence regional development.
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